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SUMMARY  
 
 
This thesis examines Malay identity construction by focusing on the complex processes 
of self-identification among queer-identified Malays living in Malaysia and beyond. By 
analysing representations of queer Malays in the works of contemporary Malaysian 
Malay writers, scholars, and filmmakers, as well as queer Malays on the internet and in 
the diaspora, the thesis demonstrates how self-identifying gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgendered Malays create and express their identities, and the ways in which 
hegemonic Malay culture, religion, and the state affect their creation and expression. 
This is especially true when queer-identified Malays are officially conflated with being 
“un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” because queer sexualities contravene Malay cultural and 
religious values. This thesis begins by discussing the politics of Malay identity, 
particularly the tension between “authority-defined” and “everyday-defined” notions of 
being Malay that opens up a space for queer-identified Malays to formulate narratives 
of Malayness marked by sexual difference. The thesis then discusses how queer-
identified Malays specifically construct their identities via various strategies, including 
strategic renegotiations of ethnicity, religiosity, and queer sexuality, and selective 
reappropriations of local and western forms of queerness. The ways in which “gay 
Melayu” identity is a hybrid cultural construction, produced through transnational and 
transcultural interactions between local and western forms of gayness under current 
conditions of globalization is also examined, as well as the material articulation of 
queer narratives of Malayness and its diverse implications on queer-identified Malays‟ 
everyday lives and sense of belonging. The thesis concludes with a critical reflection on 
the possibilities and limitations of queerness in the context of queer Malay identity 
creation. Such reflection is crucial in thinking about the future directions for research 
on queerness and the politics of queer Malay identity. It is hoped that this study will 
show that queer-identified Malays reshape and transform received ideas about 
ii 
 
“Malayness” and “queerness” through their own invention of new and more nuanced 
ways of being “queer” and “Malay.” This study also fills up the lacunae in the 
scholarship on Malay identity and queer Malays by addressing the productions of 
Malay ethnicity and sexual identity among queer-identified Malays within and beyond 
Malaysia‟s borders. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
CONTENTS  
 
 
Acknowledgments          iv 
 
Introduction           1
         
Chapter 1  
Queering the Politics of Malaysian Malay Identity      29 
 
Chapter 2  
Representations of Queer Malays in Contemporary Malaysian Literature  61 
 
Chapter 3  
What Does It Mean To Be “Queer” and “Malay”?: Exploring the  
Construction of Queer Malay Identities in Contemporary Malaysian  
Culture          90 
 
Chapter 4 
“Who are Gay Melayu?”: Emerging Gay Male Identities and Cultural 
Practices in “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu”        121 
 
Chapter 5 
The Articulation of Queer Malay Identity and Its Material Impact on Queer 
Malays‟ Lives and Sense of Belonging to “Bangsa Melayu”   159 
 
Chapter 6 
Being “Queer” and “Malay”: Rethinking Queerness and the Politics of  
Queer Malay Identity in Malaysia and Beyond     201 
 
 
Works Cited           242      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
 
Pisang emas dibawa belayar 
Masak sebiji di atas peti 
Hutang emas boleh dibayar 
Hutang budi dibawa mati
1
 
 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many wonderful people who have 
helped and encouraged me to put this thesis together.  
 
Many thanks to the staff at the University of Sussex Library, Prof. Dr. Vicky Lebeau 
and Mrs. Laura Vellacott at the School of English, and Mrs. Penny King at the Student 
and Progress Assessment Office for their assistance and helpful advice. 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my teacher and supervisor, Prof. Dr. 
William J. Spurlin for his kindness, patience, and guidance. This thesis would have 
never been completed without his unreserved support and encouragement over the 
years. The Malay “pantun” (“quatrain”) cited above is especially dedicated to you – 
Terima-kasih cikgu!  
 
I‟m profoundly grateful to my friends who have continued to inspire me and have 
helped me in their own special ways: Connie Chin, Rosnah Mustafa, Assoc. Prof. Dr. 
Ting Su Hie, Diana Carol, Jayapragas Gnaniah, Kavitha Ganesan, Suzanne Nizam, 
Sam Hoi, Radina Deli, Siti Marina Kamil, Chuah Kee Man, Ernisa Marzuki, Dr. 
Zaimuariffudin Shukri Nordin, Prof. Dr. Malachi Edwin Vethamani, and Assoc. Prof. 
Dr. Teh Chee Seng.  
 
Thanks must also go to all my friends in Brighton and Hove: Dr. Shamira A. Meghani, 
Dr. Gráinne O‟Connell, Nozomi Lynette Uematsu, Nadia, Sue, and Dr. AfzanMaria. 
Very special thanks to Feras Alkabani and Stephen Charles Cook for their love and 
friendship, not to mention their generosity and hospitality. 
 
I‟m hugely indebted to Osman Ali and Amy Ikram Ismail who granted me permission 
to use the stills from their films for this project.
2
 I would also like to thank Dina Zaman 
for her wisdom, humour, and friendship.  
 
To Wayne Chang Ping Lai: I thank you from the bottom of my heart for believing in 
me and, most importantly, for putting up with me for the last two years while I was 
writing this thesis.  
 
Finally, huge thanks to my dad, Jerome Ganah, my mum, Naem Chin, and my brothers, 
Robinson Eddie, Kevin Keegan, and Bryan Robson for their unconditional love and 
support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
                                                 
1 Sail away with a bunch of bananas/One ripe fruit remains on the box/Debts of money we can repay 
/ Debts of kindness, we take to the grave (trans. Sim 30; qtd. in Lim Kim-Hui 31). This Malay “pantun” 
is often used to express one‟s sincerest gratitude to others, particularly for their “budi” (“kindness and 
good deeds”), which is unrepayable and will be remembered from now till the end of time. 
2 Osman Ali‟s credit line: “...terima kasih kerana memilih filem Bukak Api sebagai bhan thesis. 
Anything just keep in touch” [thank you for choosing the film, Bukak Api, as the material for your thesis. 
Anything just keep in touch] (my translation). Amy Ikram Ismail‟s credit line: “...terima kasih atas 
pilihan anda terhadap naskhah comolot bg kajian tesis anda.” [...many thanks for your decision to use the 
film in your research project] (my translation). 
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Introduction 
 
My homosexuality as far as I am concerned, is perfection in God‟s eyes. I 
didn‟t ask to be gay. I was born gay. I never knew anything else. 
Haji Zainal, I am Muslim 
 
The short film Comolot by Amy Ikram Ismail, which was released in 2007, has aroused 
much controversy and criticism for being the first gay-themed film ever to be made in 
Malaysia. Although this eight minute experimental film was first (and only) shown at 
private screenings in Kuala Lumpur, I was very fortunate to have been able to watch it 
a year later on the popular video sharing website, YouTube.
1
 I never realised what the 
controversy was all about until I saw the erotic shower scene between the two leading 
male characters, Daniel and Aiman – a scene that has been considered by many to be 
the most explicit of its kind in the history of the Malaysian film industry (see fig. 1).  
 
 
            Fig.1. Aiman is being embraced by his lover, Daniel, in Comolot, with permission   
                      from Amy Ikram Ismail.   
 
I found that viewers‟ reactions to the film, as evidenced in the comments that they 
posted on the YouTube channel, were equally, if not far more, controversial. Phrases 
such as “memalukan bangsa Melayu” (“bring shame to the Malay race”), “menjatuhkan 
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maruah orang Melayu” (“bring down the dignity of Malays”), and “menghancurkan 
umat Islam” (“disintegrate the Muslim community”) were frequently and extensively 
used to express their shock and disapproval of Amy Ikram‟s bold and unashamed take 
on male same-sex eroticism. As one viewer who addressed himself online as 
“rizwan614” wrote: 
aku seratus peratus bangkang gay!! tlg la... jgn jatuhkn maruah org 
melayu... Islam pulak tu... taubat la korg... wahai insan... korg nk dunia 
terbalik mcm zaman nabi luth tu ke? astaghfirullah... 
cite ni bagus utk org yg pndai pk mana baik mana buruk, jgn jadi camni... 
gay adalah dilarang sama sekali dalam ISLAM!! DILARANG SAMA 
SEKALI!! (rizwan614, “Comolot” March 29, 2010) 
 
[I object gay 100%!! Please... don‟t bring down the dignity of Malays... not 
to mention Muslims... People, please repent... Do you wish to see the world 
to be turned upside down like how it did during the time of Prophet Lut? 
Astaghfirullah (I seek forgiveness from Allah SWT)... 
This is an excellent movie for those who can think what‟s good or bad. 
Don‟t be like this... Gay is totally prohibited in ISLAM!! COMPLETEY 
PROHIBITED!!] (translation mine) 
 
Looking back at those phrases now, there is, I believe, a disturbing and profound truth 
about the powerful impact that male same-sex sexuality has on viewers‟ understandings 
of what it means to be “Melayu,” on the one hand, and what it means to be a member of 
“bangsa Melayu” and “umat Islam,” on the other. Why is it that male same-sex 
sexuality becomes so intensely resented by the viewers, to the extent that they frame 
and articulate their resentment through the cultural and religious notions of “dosa” 
(“sin”), “haram” (“prohibited”), “malu” (“shame”), and “maruah” (“dignity”), as well 
as the prevailing ideas about Malay race and Muslim community? There are, at least, 
two tentative explanations. First, Islam, which has become a definitive marker of 
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Malaysian Malay identity, forbids male same-sex sexuality on the grounds that it as an 
abominable crime and the most heinous of human sins. Malay Muslims in Malaysia, 
like other Muslims the world over, are constantly reminded of the story of the Prophet 
Lut, particularly the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah as a consequence of God‟s 
wrath against male same-sex erotic practices. As other viewers, “ziafrun” and 
“ummieathirah,” maintain:  
Allah melaknat gay. hang penah dengaq dak cita psai bumi saddum, yg 
buminya diterbalik pasai gay (ziafrun, “Comolot” March 29, 2010) 
 
[Allah (SWT) condemns gay. Have you ever heard of the story of Sodom 
that was turned upside down because of gay?] (translation mine) 
 
Ini lah yang telah di sebut di dalam Al Quran, sebenarnya bukan dunia 
yang nak kiamat tapi manusia di dalamnya, sebelum Malaysia juga akan 
dilanda musibah dan bala dari Allah swt, maka bertaubatlah... kaum luth 
dah lama di terbalikkan malaikat... nak ikut contoh kaum yang dilaknat 
Allah..nauzubillahminzalik... (ummieathirah, “Comolot” March 29, 2010) 
 
[This is what has been mentioned in the Quran. It‟s not so much about the 
end of the world, but the end of mankind. Please repent before Allah 
(SWT) brings disaster and calamity to Malaysia. The people of the Prophet 
Lut were toppled by the Angels... Do you want to follow the example of the 
people whom Allah (SWT) condemns? ... Nauzubillahminzalik (May Allah 
(SWT) prevent this from happening)] (translation mine) 
 
The centrality of the Prophet Lut‟s story, as evidenced here, explains why gay-
identified Malay men are often accused of bringing shame and destruction to the Malay 
Muslim community, in particular, and the Muslim-majority Malaysian nation-state, in 
general, for committing the very sins of “kaum Lut/ kaum Sodom” (the people of the 
Prophet Lut/ the people of Sodom). Second, queer-identified Malays are often 
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perceived by many Malays to be “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” not just because they 
defy the standard teachings of Islam, but also because they fail to actualize their 
“fitrah” (“innate and unalterable natural disposition”) as Muslim men and women by 
engaging in “liwat” (“sodomy”) and “musahaqah” (“lesbian sex”).  In other words, the 
dominant Malay Muslim community often attributes queer-identified Malays‟ 
involvement in same-sex erotic practices to a failure to comply with cultural and 
religious expectations of masculinity/femininity. This is probably because Malay 
identity remains predicated on the widely held notion that one must adhere to normative 
gender and sexual roles as dictated and inscribed by the dominant Malay Muslim 
community.  More importantly, queer-identified Malays‟ engagement in same-sex 
sexual practices is also regarded as a failure to possess adequate “iman” (“religious 
faith”), “taqwa” (“God consciousness”), and “ahlaq” (“good moral behaviour”), which 
are crucial to the formation of Malay identity and its articulation in a community that 
valorises heteronormativity and the importance of maintaining one‟s status, reputation, 
and dignity.
2
 If, as Wazir Jahar Karim maintains,  a Malay without “maruah” (“a sense 
of honour”) or “name” (“social recognition”) is “a social outcast within his or her 
community and may be stigmatized for life” (16-17; qtd. in Milner 239), then the same 
can be said of queer-identified Malay men and women who are always at risks of not 
only losing, but having their “maruah” and “nama” smeared for engaging in the sinful 
and shameful act of “liwat” and “musahaqah.” It is important to note that the term 
“queer” in this study refers to “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” and “transgendered” Malays 
in Malaysia. Since there are no equivalent  words for “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” 
“transgender,” and even “queer” in Malay, terms such as “pondan,” “bapok,” kedi,” 
“darai,” “pengkid,” “tomboi,” as well as “mak nyah” are often used to address queer 
identities and subjectivities locally.
3
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The potent impact of same-sex sexuality on viewers‟ perceptions of what “Melayu” 
means, in my view, raises pertinent issues regarding the difficulties and complexities of 
being “Malay” in present-day Malaysia. It is indeed difficult to identify and position 
oneself as “gay”/“lesbian”/“bisexual”/“transgender” and “Malay,” considering that 
identities based on Malay ethnicity and its conflation with Islam continue to be 
sanctified and highly valued by the Malay state elites and the vast majority of Malays 
within the borders of Malaysia. The processes of Malaysian Malay identity creation, as 
Hussin Mutalib, Raymond L.M. Lee, Susan Ellen Ackerman, Sylva Frisk, Vidhu 
Verma, and others have pointed out, are so deeply entrenched in ethnicity and religion. 
This gives the impression that ethnoreligious identities are indeed stronger and more 
significant than those organized around, for instance, same-sex sexuality and desire. 
Vidhu Verma, for instance, maintains that “people‟s stronger ethnic, religious, and 
regional affiliations” continue to have a pervasive influence on notions of identity and 
sense of belonging in the modern Malaysian nation-state (40). It is, therefore, not 
wrong to say that being “Melayu” is always already equated with being Muslim. Such 
a “unique” and, at times, irrevocable equation between ethnicity and religion is 
inscribed in the Malaysian Constitution which defines “Malay” as a person who 
routinely speaks Malay, adheres to Malay customs, and professes the religion of Islam. 
To complicate matters further, there are tensions and conflicts which arise from 
identifying oneself as “queer” in relation to others within the dominantly 
heteronormative Malay Muslim community. This is precisely because same-sex desires 
and practices go against the very grain of Malay culture and religion that reinforce 
heterosexual gendered roles and sanctify heterosexual marriage as the legitimate means 
for sexual gratification. The very reinforcement of gender and sexual normativities 
within the Malay Muslim community impacts directly on the lives of many ethnic 
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Malays, particularly those of queer-identifying Malay men and women. Azwan Ismail, 
a self-identified gay Malay man and the editor of Malaysia‟s first Malay anthology of 
queer writings, claims that:  
Dalam membicarakan mengenai seksualiti terutamanya homoseksualiti, 
kita tidak dapat lari daripada menyentuh mengenai agama dan budaya... 
Terdapat krisis dalam diri dan melibatkan orang lain, termasuk ahli 
keluarga (dan rakan-rakan) serta masyarakat dalam mana-mana situasi yang 
melibatkan homosexualiti (11) 
 
[In deliberating about sexuality, particularly homosexuality, we cannot 
avoid discussing religion and culture...There are crises within and between 
oneself and others, which include family (and peers) and society in any 
situation that involves homosexuality] (translation mine). 
 
While these tensions and conflicts are not completely divergent from those experienced 
by queer-identified people around the world, the question that needs to asked here is 
whether identities based on same-sex sexuality and desire can be created and expressed, 
despite the normative pervasiveness of culture, ethnicity, and religion in the formation 
of Malaysian Malay identity. In other words, can Malay men and women identify and 
regard themselves as “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” or “transgender” in a country where 
being “Melayu” is officially conflated with being “Muslim”? If, as Anne McClintok 
contends, people‟s identities “are always already gendered” (89), then the so-called 
“unique” and, at times, irreversible, equation between ethnicity and religion can 
perhaps be rethought and redressed. This is because ethnic Malays are not only 
Muslims, but are gendered beings who routinely perform various gendered roles and 
fulfil a wide range of bodily desires. More importantly, these gendered roles and bodily 
desires continue to have profound effects on many ethnic Malays‟ diverse perceptions 
of being “Melayu” and “Muslim.” Such profound effects are readily observed in some 
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(if not many) queer-identified Malays‟ own ideas about Malay Muslim identity. For 
example, Haji Zainal who is featured in Dina Zaman‟s book, I am Muslim, asserts that 
same-sex sexuality is an essential component of his Malay Muslim identity. “My 
homosexuality,” as Haji Zainal asserts, “is perfection in God‟s eyes. I didn‟t ask to be 
gay. I was born gay. I never knew anything else...I am very comfortable being a 
Muslim who happens to be gay. And vice-versa” (qtd. in Dina Zaman 107). 
Furthermore, if one acknowledges that Malay identity construction is a complex 
process that is always already fraught with the tension between “authority-defined” and 
“everyday-defined” conceptions of Malayness (Shamsul, “Debating About Identity” 
478), a point to which I shall discuss more in detail in the next chapter, then the 
difficulties of identifying oneself as “queer” and “Malay” can perhaps be adequately 
resolved. This is because such a dialectical tension furthers the notion that being 
“Melayu” is not only formulated and constituted by the Malay state elites, but also by 
many ethnic Malays, which includes queer-identifying Malay men and women. It is, 
therefore, possible to say that a Malay sense of identity can be reformulated and 
reconstituted through queer-identified Malays‟ everyday experiences of being “queer” 
and “Melayu.” This is most salient in the case of many queer-identified Malay men and 
women, particularly those whom I shall discuss throughout this thesis, who specifically 
formulate their own visions of being “Melayu” through their actual lived experiences, 
which are constantly mediated by same-sex sexuality and desires, in addition to official 
markers of Malayness; namely, Malay culture and religion. 
 
Based on this premise, I wish to explore and examine the complexities of Malay 
identity construction by focusing specifically on the processes of self-identification, 
self-definition, self-inscription, and self-assertion among queer-identified Malay men 
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and women living in Malaysia and also beyond. The growing visibility of self-
identified gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered Malays, as well as the thriving gay, 
lesbian, and transgendered “scenes” and communities in Kuala Lumpur and other 
cosmopolitan centres throughout Malaysia, have opened up a critical avenue through 
which to consider the issues concerning the complexity of Malay identity construction. 
This is precisely because many queer-identified Malays continue to assert and establish 
their own ethnic identities marked by queerness, despite the ways in which same-sex 
sexuality remains a social taboo and is legally considered a crime in a Muslim-majority 
country such as Malaysia. I am particularly interested to find out how self-identified 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered Malays formulate and articulate their 
identities, and the ways in which the hegemonic Malay culture, religion, and the state 
affect their creation and expression. More importantly, I am keen to investigate how 
queer-identified Malays forge new and more nuanced ways of being “Melayu,” which I 
believe redefine and radicially transform discursive conflations of Malay and Muslim 
identities. Some of the questions that I would like to ask throughout this study are as 
follow: What does it mean to be “queer” and “Malay” within and outside Malaysian 
borders? How do Malay men and women identify and realign themselves as “queer” 
and “Malay” in relation to others, to the Malay Muslim community, and to the 
Malaysian nation-state? What are the strategies employed in creating and articulating 
“Melayu” identity characterized by sexual difference? What are the material 
implications and ramifications of asserting and inhabiting a queer narrative of 
Malayness”? How do queer-identified Malay men and women subvert and reshape 
received ideas about “Malayness” and “queerness” as understood and perpetuated 
within the local social landscape?  
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The study of identity-formation among queer-identified Malays is important for a 
number of reasons. First, it attempts to provide a critical lens through which to rethink 
received narratives of Malayness by taking further the notion that being “Malay” is not 
fixed because it cannot be constructed solely through Malay culture and religion. Liana 
Chua, for example, has argued that being “Malay” in Malaysia is both “dangerously 
and inescapably fixed” (264).4 This is because the Malay state elites, as Chua points 
out, have played an important role in attributing and perpetuating a sense of fixity to 
Malay ethnic identity through various state policies and practices over time. The 
Malaysian Constitution, as earlier discussed, provides a means through which the 
Malay state elites exert and exercise their power to create a distinct Malay ethnicity by 
officially defining “Malay” as a person who follows Malay customs and traditions, and 
embraces the Islamic faith. This conjures up the idea that Malays in Malaysia cannot be 
but Muslims (Shamsul, “Identity Construction” 209). The distinct and irrevocably fixed 
notion of Malay identity is further reinforced by the ways in which ethnic Malays 
within the borders of Malaysia will lose their legal rights and special privileges as 
“Malay” and “Muslim” for renouncing their faith (“keluar Islam”). To aggravate 
matters, ethnic Malays are not only liable to a hefty fine and/or imprisonment, but may 
also face the death penalty if they are found guilty of commiting apostasy (“murtad”).
5
 
But I would like to argue that the religion of Islam and Malay culture are one, but not 
the only paradigm for thinking about Malay ethnicity. I say this because there are 
diverse and multiple ways of being “Malay” as felt, practiced, and experienced by 
many ethnic Malays in Malaysia and in the diaspora. This view corresponds with the 
tenet of the fluidity and permeability of Malayness shared by many prominent scholars 
of Malay studies.
6
 Anthony Milner, for instance, has argued that being “Malay” is fluid 
and flexible, rather than rigid and fixed. Some Malays of Indian and Arab descent, as 
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Milner points out, adopt a more flexible approach to articulating their sense of 
Malayness. This is particularly prominent in the case of some Malays of Indian 
ancestry (“Darah Keturuan Keling”) and Malays of Arab ancestry (“Darah Keturunan 
Arab”) who regard themselves “Malay” in one situation and “Indian/Arab” in another, 
while others identify themselves as “Malay” and “Indian/Arab” at the same time 
(233).
7
 Eric C. Thompson, on the other hand, contends that Malayness is a 
characteristically permeable construct composed of varied elements that interact and 
intersect with one another. He points out that a Malay sense of identity cannot be 
determined by Malay culture and religion alone simply because being “Malay” is 
constantly shaped and reshaped by a multitude of intersecting variables such as gender, 
sexuality, class, age, and place, in addition to Malay culture and religion (15). My 
study of queer Malay identity creation adds to the existing literature on the permeability 
and fluidity of Malay ethnic identity by demonstrating that queer-identified Malays do 
not always align themselves with the irrevocably fixed notion of Malayness, but instead 
create more flexibe and nuanced ways of being “Malay” using a wide range of identity 
strategies. These include queer-identified Malays‟ strategic reconciliations of their 
sexuality and cultural and religious heritages. Such strategies, as I will discuss in more 
detail in this study, allow queer-identified Malays to redefine and radically transform 
official configurations of Malay ethnicity and its conflation with Islam. This is 
especially notable in the case of many queer-identifying Malay men and women 
(particularly those whom I shall discuss throughout my thesis) who continue to identify 
and reposition themselves as “Malay,” “Muslim,” and “queer,” despite the fact that the 
dominant Malay Muslim community constantly perceives queer-identified Malays to be 
“un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” on the basis that queerness contravenes indigenous 
religious and cultural beliefs and practices. 
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Second, the study of queer Malay identity construction attempts to fill a gap in the 
fields of Malay studies (Malay identity studies in particular). I personally find that 
issues pertaining to queer sexuality as an equally important component of Malay 
ethnicity have often been pushed to the margins of Malay studies. This is because 
Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, Joel S.Kahn, Anthony Milner, Leonard Andaya, Judith 
Nagata, and other well-established Malay studies scholars have placed too much 
emphasis on Islam, social class, race, ethnicity, cultural traditions (“adat”), and/or 
geographical spatializations in examining the production and articulation of Malay 
ethnic identity.
8
 Although there is already a growing body of scholarly research on 
sexuality and gender in Malay identity politics, most of this research, especially that by 
Aihwa Ong, Maila Stivens, Ungu Maimunah Mohd Tahir, and Wazir Jahar Karim, 
rigorously address heterosexual women in Malay culture and society.
9
 Eric C. 
Thompson himself admits that  
[...] the gendered experiences of (Malay) women, and to, a lesser extent, 
men, under recent conditions of social change have been richly 
documented. Likewise, an abundant literature, both in Malay and English, 
addresses the subject of Islam in Malaysia and the relationship with Malay 
Muslim identities. By comparison, identities of age and (queer) sexuality 
have been less prominent concerns in scholarship on Malaysia (16) 
 
One of the possible reasons why queer sexualities do not figure prominently in research 
on Malay identity construction is that many scholars in the field of Malay studies have 
found that culture and religion, along with class, race, ethnicity, and heterosexuality are 
salient markers of Malay identity. My study, however, attempts to redress the lack of 
critical attention paid to queer sexualities by demonstrating that queer sexualities (like 
Malay culture and religion) play a pivotal role in the processes of self-identification 
among some (if not many) ethnic Malays living within and beyond Malaysia‟s national 
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boundaries. I will demonstrate in my thesis that queer sexualities take centre stage in 
the production of identities among many queer-identifying Malay men and women. I‟m 
certainly not the first to point this out simply because numerous scholars have already 
noted the centrality of queer sexualities in the lives of queer-identified Malays in 
modern-day Malaysia.
10
 Khartini Slamah, for example, contends that many Malay 
“mak nyahs” (“male-to-female transsexuals”) identify themselves strongly as “women” 
and assert their identities through cross-gendered identification and through the 
adoption of traditionally feminine gender roles and behaviours. Some Malay “mak 
nyahs” have undergone sex-change operation as a way of becoming completely 
“women,” despite the ways in which sex reassignment surgery is criminalized under 
Malaysia‟s Islamic law.  Michael G. Peletz, on the other hand, maintains that “pondan” 
(“effeminacy”/“sissiness”) is a crucial feature of identity for many queer-identified 
Malay men. This is particularly true for Malay men who have come to regard and think 
of themselves as “pondan”; that is, “an adult male who dresses or otherwise adorns 
himself as a woman [or] walks like a woman, or behaves sexually as a woman (i.e., 
have sex with men), or acts like a woman in other ways (e.g., prefers the company of 
women to men”)” (Peletz, Reason and Passion 123). Interestingly, some “pondans” 
reclaim sissiness with pride and take it on as a subject position within the dominantly 
heteronormative Malay Muslim community. This is especially prominent in the case of 
some pondan-identified Malay men who continue to assert their sissiness because they 
are well-accepted and revered by many Malays living in both urban and rural areas for 
taking on the roles of “mak andam” (“bridal beautician”). What research on queer-
identified Malays by Khartini, Peletz, and others show is that there are members 
belonging to the Malay Muslim community who forge their ethnic identity and sense of 
self through queer sexualities. My study adds to these research projects by showing that 
13 
 
queer-identified Malays not only view queer sexualities as an integral component of 
their identities, but reassert them (albeit with much difficulty) along with cultural and 
religious heritages in defining themselves and their sense of belonging to the Malay 
Muslim community and to the Malaysian nation-state. This, in my view, reinforces the 
point that queer sexualities must be taken into account by scholars of Malay studies 
simply because queer sexualities also serve as an important marker of Malayness for 
some (if not many) ethnic Malays. Taking into consideration queer sexualities 
(alongside other so-called “standard” salient markers of ethnicity) when examining 
Malayness, allows one to understand more comprehensively the complex formulations 
of identity among people who call themselves “Malay.” 
 
Finally, my study attempts to fill up the lacunae in the literature on queer identities and 
cultural formations in Malaysia by examining how queer-identified Malays create their 
own sense of being “queer” that radically reshape and redefine dominant local 
understandings of queerness. I find that studies by Ismail Baba, Khartini Slamah, Olivia 
Khoo, and Teh Yik Koon on queer identities and queer cultures in non-western 
indigenous contexts such as in Malaysia, have not explored fully the multiple 
competing meanings of being “queer” as envisioned by many indigenous men and 
women. For example, the term “gay,” as Ismail Baba contends in his ethnographic 
study on gay and lesbian couples in Malaysia, is often perceived locally to be closely 
associated with effeminate indigenous men. I strongly disagree with Ismail on the 
grounds that some (if not many) gay-identified indigenous men do not see themselves 
effeminate, but instead adopt hypermasculine mannerisms in calling themselves “gay.” 
Some effeminate indigenous men, particularly “pondan” and “mak nyah,” do not regard 
themselves gay. This is simply because some “pondan” and “mak nyah” strongly 
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believe that they are “women” who must assume feminine roles in their relationship 
with other men. Clearly, notions of being “gay” conjure up different meanings to 
different ingenous people in Malaysia. I also find that studies on local forms of 
queerness have not directly addressed issues pertaining to the official conflation of 
queerness with western cultural influences. The Malay state elites, along with religious 
authorities and the local media, not only perpetuate, but attempt to imprint queer 
sexualities (male same-sex sexualities in particular) as part of a destructive and 
decadent western culture in the minds of many indigenous people. Foremost amongst 
these state elites is the former Malaysian premier, Mahathir Mohamad, who once 
maintained that “[w]estern societies are riddled with single-parent families, which 
foster incest, with homosexuality, with co-habitation [...] surely these are all signs of an 
impending collapse” (qtd. in Obendorf 184). The former officer of Malaysia‟s Islamic 
Affairs Department, Abdul Kadir Che Kob, on the other hand, stated that 
“[homosexuality] is a crime worst than murder [...] How can men have sex with men? 
God did not make them this way. This is all Western influence” (qtd. in Williams 10; 
emphasis added). But I would like to argue very strongly that queer sexualities in local 
contexts cannot be conflated with western cultures and societies. This is because queer 
sexualities (particularly male same-sex sexualities) are not entirely western, but are 
always already present in the Malay culture in the form of the “pondan” tradition. 
Interestingly, male same-sex sexuality in the modern western sense has also been 
brought into the local social landscape through a long history of colonialism, and via 
current trends of globalisation. I will demonstrate in this study that globalising 
instruments such as travel and tourism, and the advances in technologies such as the 
internet have opened up a critical site of exchange for queer-identified people in both 
local and western contexts to negotiate diverse ideas about queer sexualities, desires, 
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identities, and practices in formulating a plethora of queer self-inscriptions and self-
representations. This, I believe, is crucial because it offers a more nuanced 
understanding of what being “queer” means in Malaysia, which cannot be perceived, 
understood, and even officially propagated as a form of western decadence.   
 
To buttress my argument about the ways in which queer-identified Malays challenge 
dominant local understandings of “Malayness” and “queerness,” I will analyse 
representations of queer Malays in contemporary Malaysian literature and culture. 
More specifically, I will examine queer-identified Malays as represented in the 
following genres and media; namely, literary works by contemporary Malaysian Malay 
writers (e.g. Abdul Aziz, Dina Zaman, and Karim Raslan), ethnographic studies on 
local queer sexualities by Malaysian Malay scholars (e.g. Ismail Baba and Khartini 
Slamah), queer-themed films by Malaysian Malay filmmakers (e.g. Amy Ikram Ismail 
and Osman Ali), and online discussion “threads” taken from a local gay Malay social 
networking website, “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu.” I have decided to focus on these 
genres and media mainly because they convey diverse ideas about being “queer” and 
“Malay” in Malaysia and beyond. What is more important is that these ideas are 
grounded in, and organized around, Malaysian Malay writers, scholars, filmmakers, 
and online members‟ everyday observations and/or lived experiences of being “queer” 
and “Malay.” Such materially grounded and everyday-defined ideas about identity are 
crucial for my study that attempts to demonstrate how queer Malays subvert and 
reshape discursive configurations of Malayness via their own notions of self-identity. 
This is clearly in line with Shamsul Amri Baharuddin‟s theory of “two social realities” 
(namely, the authority-defined and the everyday-defined notions of Malay ethnicity) of 
being “Malay” in present-day Malaysia. In his article, entitled “Debating about Identity 
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in Malaysia: A Discourse Analysis,” Shamsul contends that being “Malay” cannot 
always be understood  in terms of the “authority-defined” conceptions of Malayness 
which are formulated by members of the elite governing bodies and local authorities. 
This is because these “authority-defined” notions of Malay identity are constantly being 
redefined and reconceptualised by the “everyday-defined” ideas about being “Malay.” 
Such ideas, which have been documented in works of many anthropologists and 
historians of Malay society, are derived from ethnic Malays‟ personal narratives of 
their lives and identities (Shamsul, “Debating about Identity” 478). Interestingly, the 
“everyday-defined” beliefs about Malay identity also take “popular forms of 
expression” or “popular culture” (e.g. cartoons, songs, poems, short stories) that are 
created based on ethnic Malays‟ lived experiences of being “Malay” (Shamsul, 
“Debating about Identity” 478). I would like to extend Shamsul‟s theory of “two social 
realities” by pointing out that the “everyday-defined” visions of Malayness take 
multiple forms of popular culture, including queer-themed films and gay online social 
networking websites. I say this because numerous scholars such as James E. Combs, 
Marcel Danesi, Paul Berardino, and others have pointed out that popular culture is 
composed of diverse sources. Paul Berardino, for instance, maintains that movies, 
television, the news media, radio, music, and the Internet, are all important sources of 
popular culture in the contemporary world (231). With this in mind, I will show in my 
study that queer-themed films and gay online social networking websites, in addition to 
literary works and socio-anthropological/ethnographic studies of Malay culture and 
society, cannot simply be described as forms popular expression or popular culture 
because they also function as a site for “queer,” where contemporary Malaysian Malay 
writers, scholars, filmmakers, and members of “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” discuss, 
document, and disseminate “everyday-defined” notions of being “queer” and “Malay.” 
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More importantly, queer-identified Malays who are represented in works of Malaysian 
Malay writers, scholars, and filmmakers, as well as members of “Komuniti Gay Web 
Melayu” formulate and express their own “everday-defined” narratives of Malayness 
which radically reshape discursive formulations of Malay ethnic identity. By extending 
the concept of “everyday-defined” visions of Malayness to include multiple forms of 
popular culture allows this study to achieve its central objective, which is to show how 
queer-identified Malays in Malaysian literature and culture redress received narratives 
of Malay identity (particularly its conflation with Islam). It is pertinent to note that my 
analysis of queer Malays and their numerous forms of self-identification is shaped and 
influenced by my reading on studies that concern identity and identity-formation, 
particularly those by leading scholars in the fields of Malay studies, queer studies, 
postcolonial studies, and globalisation studies. Foremost amongst these scholars are 
Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, Anthony Milner, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, Homi K. 
Bhabha, Arif Dirlik, Arjun Appadurai, and Jan Nederveen Pieterse. The works of 
Dennis Altman, Martin F. Manalansan, Michael G. Peletz, Tom Boellstorff, and others 
studying queer sexualities in non-western indigenous contexts have also influenced my 
analysis. Such a “multidisciplinary” reading is crucially important for me to present a 
critical examination of the ways in which queer-identified Malays as represented in the 
chosen genres and media produce and assert a queer narrative of Malayness.  
 
I have divided my study into the following six chapters; namely, the politics of 
Malaysian Malay identity, the representations of queer Malays in contemporary 
Malaysian literature, the construction of queer Malay identities in contemporary 
Malaysian culture, the material implications of asserting a queer narrative of 
Malayness, and the possibilities and limitations of queerness in the politics of queer 
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Malay identity within and outside Malaysia‟s national boundaries. The study is 
organized in such a way as to explore in greater detail how ethnic Malays, particularly 
self-identified gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered Malays specifically formulate 
and articulate their identities and the ways in which the hegemonic Malay culture and 
religion, as well as the state affect their creation and expression. This is essential 
because it enables one to understand more fully how queer-identified Malays radically 
transform discursive narratives of Malayness and the various consequences of doing so.  
 
In Chapter 1, I present a brief overview of the politics of Malaysian Malay identity by 
specifically focusing on the official configuration of Malayness and its diverse 
implications on ethnic Malays‟ own understandings of what it means to be “Malay” in 
present-day Malaysia. I demonstrate that Malay ethnic identity is not only defined by 
the state through “authority-defined” notions of being “Malay,” but is also configured 
through Malays‟ “everyday-defined” vision of Malayness. This is especially salient in 
the case of Malays whom scholars of Malay studies have identified as “Other Malays” 
(Kahn xxii) and “New Malays” (Abdul Rahman 157; Halim 148). Some “Other 
Malays” and “New Malays” do not define themselves in terms of the “authority-
defined” conceptions of Malayness (that is, in terms of the key markers of Malay 
ethnicity such as Malay culture and religion), but instead formulate their own ethnic 
identities based on their everyday lived experiences of being “Malay.” Such 
experiences are deeply shaped by social class and/or diverse cultural and religious 
beliefs and practices among “Other Malays” and “New Malays.” This provides the very 
basis for my argument throughout this study that queer-identified Malays can also 
create their own sense of Malay identity. Many queer-identifying Malay men and 
women whom I shall discuss in my thesis define their sense of Malayness in terms of 
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their everyday lived experiences of being “Malay.” These experiences are profoundly 
influenced by queer-identified Malays‟ sexuality and their involvement in same-sex 
erotic and affectional relationships. Such characteristically “queer” narratives of Malay 
ethnicity radically reshape “authority-defined” conceptions of Malayness, where 
Malays are officially designated as Muslims who must fulfil normative gender and 
sexual roles as prescribed and enforced by the dominant Malay Muslim community.  
 
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I explore and examine how queer-identified Malays in the 
works of contemporary Malaysian Malay writers, scholars, and filmmakers, as well as 
members of the local gay Malay social networking website, “Komuniti Web Gay 
Melayu,” specifically construct their own notions of being “queer” and “Malay.”  
These chapters are important for two reasons. First, they discuss various strategies 
employed by self-identified gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered Malays in 
creating their own ethnic and sexual identities. These include queer-identified Malays‟ 
strategic renegotiations of their ethnicity, religiosity, and sexuality, and selective 
reappropriations of both local and western forms of queerness. Second, these chapters 
examine how contemporary Malaysian literature and  multiple forms of popular culture 
(including queer-themed films and gay social networking websites)  function as a space 
for “queer,” where Malaysian Malay writers, scholars, and filmmakers, as well as 
members of “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” convey “everyday-defined” ideas about 
being “Malay” and “queer.” Chapter 2, for instance, examine how queer-identified 
Malay men and women who are featured in the works of Abdul Aziz, Dina Zaman, and 
Karim Raslan formulate their own ethnic identities by strategically reconciling 
conflicting elements such as queer sexuality and Islamic faith. Such a “queer” narrative 
of Malay identity challenge official designations of Malayness which are conceived and 
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sustained through the hegemonic Malay culture and religion, as well as heterosexuality 
and heteronormativity. The chapter also discusses the ways in which the processes of 
self-identification among queer-identified Malays as represented in contemporary 
Malaysian literature is fraught with the tension between articulating identities based on 
culture and religion, and those marked by queerness. This is important because it shows 
that contemporary Malaysian Malay writers are not only interested to discuss queer-
identified Malays‟ “everyday-defined” ideas about being “Malay,” but are keen to 
delve into the complexity of queer Malay identity-formation by highlighting the 
difficulties, conflicts, and anxieties that queer-identified Malays may experience in 
identifying themselves as “queer” and “Malay.” The same can be said of my own study 
which attempts to examine how queer-identified Malays construct their identities and 
explore the material implications of articulating these identities within the borders of   
Malaysia.  Chapter 3 carries my analysis of queer Malays and their multiple forms of 
self-identification a little further by discussing the complex processes of identity 
creation among queer-identified Malays who are featured in ethnographic studies on 
indigenous queer identities and cultures by Ismail Baba and Khartini Slamah, and in 
local queer-themed films by Amy Ikram Ismail and Osman Ali. The central aim of this 
chapter is to show that queer-identified Malays in these works (much like those 
portrayed  in literary works by contemporary Malaysian Malay writers) also adopt 
diverse strategies to create their own visions of being “queer” and “Malay.” These 
strategies include queer identified Malays‟ reconciliation of their sexuality with Islamic 
faith, and selective reappropriations of local and western queer identities and cultures. 
More importantly, this chapter demonstrates that Malaysian Malay scholars and 
filmmakers are also keen to address the compex identity-formation processes among 
queer-identified Malay men and women by showing that such processes are intimately 
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entwined with deeply held indigenous cultural and religious beliefs and practices. This 
is especially true when concepts such as “halal/haram” (“religiously lawful/unlawful”), 
“nafsu/akal” (“passion/reason”), “dosa/taubat” (“sin/repentance”), and “dunia/akhirat” 
(“this world/the afterlife”), which have become deeply ingrained in the minds and in 
the lives of queer-identified Malays continue to inflect and, at times, become a major 
obstacle to the formation and articulation of their own ethnic identities which are 
marked by queerness. In Chapter 4, I extend my earlier discussion of queer Malay 
identity construction in Chapters 2 and 3 to include an examination of diverse notions 
of being “gay” and “Malay” as envisioned and embraced by members of “Komuniti 
Web Gay Melayu.” The chapter demonstrates that notions of being “gay” and “Malay” 
are assembled through an amalgamation of both local and western forms of male same-
sex sexuality.  Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that gay male identities in non-
western indigenous contexts such as Malaysia are not absolute duplicates of those 
prevalent in the West, but are hybrid and heterogeneous cultural formations which are 
shaped by various factors pertaining to subjectivity, and are influenced by the English 
term “gay” and the language which has been used to describe this term within and 
outside the western domains. By taking further the notion that local forms of gayness 
are characteristically hybrid and heterogenous cultural constructs enables this study to 
provide a more nuanced understanding of being “queer” in modern-day Malaysia, 
which cannot be officially rendered and propagated as a form of western decadence. 
What is more important is that this chapter also shows that “Komuniti Web Gay 
Melayu” is not merely a form of popular culture among local gay Malay community, 
considering that it also provides a much-needed avenue for gay- and bisexual-identified 
Malay men to create and express visible and assertive male same-sex sexual identities 
both online and offlline. 
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While acknowledging that there are various ways in which queer-identified Malays 
assert and establish their own versions of Malayness and queerness, it is important not 
to lose sight of the issues surrounding the material articulation of queer Malay identity 
in Malaysia and beyond. In Chapter 5, I examine diverse material implications of 
inhabiting a Malay ethnic identity marked by queerness. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to show that my study on queer Malay identity-formation does not simply 
examine the various strategies used by queer-identified Malays to create their own 
notions of self-identity, but delves into the consequences of taking it on as a subject 
position within and even beyond the borders of Malaysia. This is especially true when 
the articulations of a queer narrative of Malayness have direct material impacts on 
queer-identified Malays‟ everyday lives and their sense of belonging to the Malay 
Muslim community and to the Malaysian nation-state. For example, queer-identified 
Malays cannot protect themselves from harassment, detention, and violence by the 
police and local authorities. One of the main reasons is that that queerness remains 
legally and religiously prohibited in a Muslim-majority country such as Malaysia. In 
Chapter 6, I conclude my study by highlighting important strands of my study and 
reflecting on both the possibilities and limitations of “queerness” (as sexuality, as a 
mode of critique, and as a political strategy) in the context of queer Malay identity 
creation. Such a reflection, I believe, is vital especially when thinking about future 
directions for research on queerness and the politics of identity creation among queer 
Malays living in Malaysia and in the diaspora.  
 
It is pertinent to point out that this study does not set out to ascertain whether queer-
identified indigenous men and women are still “Malay” or “Muslim” or both despite 
the fact that they continue to be regarded as less Malay and less Muslim by members of 
23 
 
the dominant Malay Muslim community. Furthermore, this thesis does not set out to 
assert that queer-identified indigenous people, particularly those who are depicted in 
the genres and media that I shall examine, valorise and glorify queer sexualities, to the 
extent that being “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual” and “transgendered” are more important 
than being “Malay” and “Muslim.” This is because there are diverse, yet possible, ways 
of being “Malay,” “Muslim,” and “queer” as felt, imagined, and understood by many 
queer-identified indigenous men and women, which cannot be fully explored in and by 
this study alone. But there still remains a problem: how can an “outsider” like myself, 
who is neither “Malay” nor “queer Malay” understand, let alone write “genuinely” 
about Malays and queer Malays‟ notions of identity, without being firmly ensconced 
within the Malay and queer Malay communities? Such a problem, I believe, can 
perhaps be adequately resolved by rethinking the “inside/outside” dialectic that Diana 
Fuss cogently demonstrates in “Inside/Out,” where she maintains that, “to be out is 
really to be in – inside the realm of the visible, the speakable, [and] the culturally 
intelligible” (4; emphasis added). Although Fuss problematizes the “inside/outside” 
dialectic with regard to how binary oppositions operate in language and culture, and 
also in relation to the processes of coming out within the gay and lesbian communities 
in the West, I find that her discussion is very helpful to show that I can be both “inside” 
and “outside” the Malay and queer Malay communities at the same time. This is  
especially true of how being “Melayu,” in my view, is not completely dissimilar from 
my own experiences of being “Bidayuh” – one of the main non-Malay “Bumiputera” 
ethnic groups in Sarawak, Malaysia. If ethnicity, religion, and culture are central to 
dominant discursive configurations of Malayness, the same can be said in regard to the 
ways in which many Bidayuhs whom I know place greater emphasis on cultural 
traditions (“adat”) and religious beliefs (i.e. Christianity), in addition to ethnic and 
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communal affiliations, in constructing their Bidayuh identity. Moreover, if 
“homosexuality” is perceived by the Malay Muslim community as violating the Quran 
and Sunnah, the same can be said of how being a “homosexual” and “Bidayuh” defies 
and defiles religious beliefs and practices of the Bidayuh community. It is based on 
these “similarities,” along with my “adequate” knowledge of the Malays and queer 
Malays, and my Malaysian citizenship and background that I am able to reposition 
myself “inside” the Malay and queer Malay communities whilst concurrently 
remaining ensconced in the “outside” in presenting a pragmatic, rather than a 
“genuine,” analysis of the difficulties and complexities of queer Malay identity-
formation. What I mean by “adequate” here is the sufficient amount of knowledge that 
I have gained about Malays, in general, and queer Malays, in particular, through years 
of observations and experiences of socially mixing with my Malay neighbours, 
relatives, students, friends, work colleagues, and superiors) and by engaging in their 
culture. Such knowledge, along with my ability to speak Malay – a language that 
myself and other non-Malay Malaysians have learnt through the course of our lives – 
have enabled me to understand what being “Malay” means, especially when it is 
conveyed by Malays and queer Malays whom I know. But this does not imply that I 
can “genuinely” comprehend and even write about ethnic Malays‟ own sense of self 
and identity simply because I believe that only Malays can truly understand what being 
“Malay” really means. It is, however, imperative to mention that I am willing to be 
corrected by more knowledgeable sources if I give inaccurate depictions of Malays and 
queer Malays throughout this study. What I aim to accomplish in this project is to 
examine the ways in which people in non-western indigenous contexts form, express, 
and inhabit a queer narrative of “Melayu-ness,” while engaging critically with the legal 
and material implications of doing so. More importantly, my analysis of queer-
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identified Malays and their self-identities is aimed at opening up a critical avenue 
through which to consider queer sexuality as an equally important component of 
Malayness. I say this because queer sexuality is not only central to notions of being 
“Malay” for some (if not many) ethnic Malays (queer-identified Malays in particular), 
but it can be incorporated along with discursive markers of Malay ethnicity; namely, 
culture and religion, into indigenous people‟s own sense of Malayness. By taking into 
consideration queer sexuality as an equally salient marker of Malay identity helps 
engender meaningful and thoughtful insights into the complexities of being “Malay” in 
Malaysia and in the contemporary world. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 See “Comolot” at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1rKtvq1nd0>. 
2 See Asrul Zamani‟s The Malay Ideals, especially pp. 348-353 where he discusses how Malays living in 
Malaysia will only be able to truly self identify as “Malay Muslim” and, ultimately, return to true Islam 
by possessing adequate “iman” (“faith”), “taqwa” (“God-consciousness”), and good “ahlaq” (“morals 
and behaviours). He argues that it is only through religiosity and morality that Malays within Malaysia‟s 
national borders are able to overcome the problems of moral decay and social ills (e.g. gambling, rape, 
drug abuse, incest, cohabitation, and homosexuality) which are prevalent within the Malay Muslim 
community. See also Anthony Milner‟s The Malays, especially pp. 239 where he demonstrates how 
ethnic Malays in Malaysia place greater emphasis on status, reputation, and dignity in identifying and 
resituating themselves in relation to others and to the world.  
3 Terms such as “pondan,” “bapok,” “kedi,” and “darai” are used to describe indigenous men who are 
effeminate or “feminine” in their appearances, mannerisms, and/or behaviours. “Pengkid” and “Tomboi” 
are terms that are often used to address indigenous lesbian women who adopt masculine mannerisms, 
while “mak nyah” is regularly used to denote indigenous male-to-female transsexuals. 
4 See Liana Chua‟s article, entitled “Fixity and Flux: Bidayuh (Dis)engagements with the Malaysian 
Ethnic System,” for her discussion of how ethnic minority groups in Malaysia such the Bidayuh “portray 
Malay-ness as dangerously and inescapably fixed” (264). Chua argues that such fixity is attributed by the 
ways in which many Bidayuhs, who have “become Malay” (“masuk Melayu”) by converting to Islam 
and following the Malay customs, find it difficult to “un-become” or cease to be “Malay” simply because 
there are legal implications for renouncing Islam, which is intrinsic to being “Malay” in Malaysia.   
5 See Asrul Zamani‟s The Malay Ideals, especially pp. 133-136 for his discussion of the legal 
ramifications of apostasy (“murtad”) in Malaysia. See also Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed‟s Freedom 
of Religion, Apostasy and Islam, especially pp. 149-159, for their discussion of various apostasy laws in 
Malaysia, including death penalty under the hudud law in the Malaysian Islamic state of Kelantan. 
6 See, for instance, Timothy P. Barnard and Henrik M. J. Maier‟s book, entitled Contesting Malayness: 
Malay Identity Across Boundaries, and Anthony Milner‟s The Malays, especially Chapter 7 for their 
detailed discussions of the fluidity and permeability of Malay identity in Malaysia and in the countries of 
Malay Archipelago. The fluidity and permeability of Malayness, in my view, corroborates other 
scholars‟ assertion that ethnic identity is characteristically fluid and flexible. Foremost amongst these 
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scholars are Chrisotpher A. Airriess, Ines M. Miyares, Jean Phinney, Mary Fong, Rueyling Chuang, 
Timothy A. Schouls, and others. Jean Phinney, for instance, contends that ethnic identity is “a dynamic, 
multidimensional construct that refers to one‟s identity, or a sense of self, as a member of an ethnic 
group. Ethnic identity is not a fixed categorization but rather is a fluid and dynamic understanding of the 
self and group that changes with age, time, and context. An ethnic identity is constructed and modified as 
people become aware of their own and other ethnic groups and of the differences among them and 
attempt to understand the meaning of their own ethnicity within a larger setting” (347). I agree with 
Phinney mainly because queer-identified Malays also reconstruct and modify dominant notion of Malay 
ethnicity as the result of their own realization that they are “different” from other (heterosexual) 
members of the Malay Muslim community. This can be seen in the ways in which queer-identified 
Malays not only incorporate queerness into their own notions of being “Malay,” but assert it as a mark of 
differentiation from many dominant (heterosexual) members of Malay Muslim community who continue 
to regard queer-identified Malays as “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” because of their sexuality. 
7 See Mustapha Hussain, Insun Sony Mustapha, and Jomo Kwame Sundaram‟s “Malay Nationalism 
Before UMNO: The Memoirs of Mustapha Hussain,” especially p. 124 for their discussion of Malays of 
Indian or Arab descents. Many ethnic Malays in Malaysia tend to regard Malays of Indian or Arab 
descents are not “true” Malays and use the term “Darah Keturunan India” (DKI) to address Malays with 
Indian forefathers, and “Darah Keturunan Arab” (DKA) to describe Malays with Arab ancestry. 
8 See Shamsul Amri Baharuddin‟s article, entitled “Debating About Identity in Malaysia: A Discourse 
Analysis,” Joel S. Khan‟s Other Malays: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Malay World, 
Anthony Milner‟s The Malays, Leonard Andaya‟s Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the 
Straits of Melaka, and Judith Nagata‟s essay, entitled “What is a Malay?: Situational Selection of Ethnic 
Identity in a Plural Society,” for their in-depth discussions of the significant role of ethnicity, religion, 
culture, and place in the historical and cultural constructions of Malay Muslim identity in Malaysia. 
9 See Wazir Jahar Karim‟s Women and Culture: Between Malay Adat and Islam, Ungku Maimunah 
Tahir‟s article, entitled “Perceptions of the Ideal Women in the Works of Selected Malaysian Women 
Novelists,” Maila Stiven‟s Matriliny and Modernity: Sexual Politics and Change in Rural Malaysia, and 
Aihwa Ong‟s essay on “State versus Islam: Malay Families, Women‟s Bodies, and the Body Politics in 
Malaysia,” for their laborious discussions of identities and the social positions of Malay Muslim women 
in modern Malaysian nation-state.  
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10 See Ismail Baba‟s “Gay and Lesbian Couples in Malaysia,” Khartini Slamah‟s “The Struggles to be 
Ourselves, Neither Men Nor Women: Mak Nyahs in Malaysia,” Teh Yik Koon‟s “Male to Female 
Transsexuals (Mak Nyah) in Malaysia,” Michael Peletz‟s Islamic Modern: Religious Courts and Cultural 
Politics in Malaysia,” and Tom Boellstroff‟s “Domesticating Islam: Sexuality, Gender, and the Limits of 
Pluralism,” for their rigorous examinations of queer sexualities and cultural formations in the Malay 
Muslim community in particular, and in the Muslim-majority Malaysia in general. 
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Chapter 1 Queering the Politics of Malaysian Malay Identity 
 
 
It has proved impossible to find a notion of being “Malay” that has 
achieved stability – that has become secure. It is an idea in motion – 
something which can present danger as well as opportunities. 
– Anthony Milner, The Malays 
 
What does it mean to be “Malay” in Malaysia? This chapter sets out to discuss the 
politics of Malay identity in its relation to what it means to be “Malay” in the modern 
Malaysian nation-state. It begins by examining the legal definition of Malay identity 
and its diverse implications on the lives of those who have come to regard and think of 
themselves as “Malay.” This is followed by a discussion of how Malay identity is not 
only defined by the state, but also by the Malay populace. By using Shamsul Amri 
Baharuddin‟s “two social realities” approach (i.e. the authority-defined and the 
everyday-defined), which I believe is not completely dissimilar to Homi K. Bhabha‟s 
theory of the pedagogical and the performative, I will demonstrate that there is a 
dialogical tension between the authority-defined and the everyday-defined notions of 
Malayness in the politics of Malaysian Malay identity-formation. This is especially true 
when the official designation of Malay identity is constantly being reworked and 
reconfigured by the everyday lived experiences and social practices of Malays living in 
Malaysia. The dialectical tension between the authority-defined and everyday-defined 
ideas about being “Malay” provides the very basis for my argument that being “Malay” 
can also be defined by the actual material conditions and everyday lived experiences of 
queer-identified Malays. I will also demonstrate how cultural, religious, and social 
class differences in the Malay society open up a space for many Malays to formulate 
and articulate new ways of being “Malay.” This provides yet another basis for my 
contention that queer-identified Malays can also assert and establish a Malay identity 
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marked by sexual difference, which I believe cannot be defined solely in terms of 
distinct cultural and religious markers of Malayness. Finally, this chapter concludes by 
discussing potential problems that may arise as the result of “queering” (used here as a 
verb; that is, to subvert, resist, and transform) discursive formulations of Malaysian 
Malay identity.  
 
Rethinking Malayness in the Malaysian Nation-State 
Issues concerning the identity of those who identify themselves as members of the 
Malay community remain the subject of much debate to this day. This is probably 
because there has never been a satisfactory answer to the questions of “Who is 
“Malay”?” and “What it means to be “Malay”? Many would associate the term 
“Malay” with Malays living in Malaysia. To date, there are nearly thirteen million 
Malays within the borders of Malaysia with a total of twelve million in West Malaysia 
(also known as Peninsular Malaysia) and close to a million in East Malaysia (Sabah 
and Sarawak).
1
 But the term “Malay” also includes Malays from other countries in the 
Malay Archipelago (also known as the “Malay World”) such as Brunei, Singapore, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The “Malay World,” as Geoffrey Benjamin 
posits, encompasses “at least Isthmian Thailand, Peninsular Malaysia, Singapore, the 
central east-coast parts of Sumatra, and much of the coastal northern, western and 
southern Borneo, Brunei, parts of Malaysian Sarawak, and parts of Indonesian 
Kalimantan” (1; qtd in Milner 5; emphasis added).2 Interestingly, the term “Malay” is 
also used to refer to members of diasporic Malay communities in Sri Lanka and South 
Africa, and in other parts of the world. Although Anthony Milner, Syed Husin Ali, and 
others have pointed out that ethnic Malays within Malaysia‟s territorial boundaries, and 
those from the Malay Archipelago and the Malay diaspora, are Malayo-Polynesian 
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(now called Austronesian) speakers who share a common historical origin and cultural 
heritages, the term “Malay” carries different meanings for different people in different 
contexts.
3
 For instance, Malays in Malaysia are legally defined in terms of the three 
important markers of Malayness; namely, Muslim religion, Malay language, and 
culture. Article 160 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution clearly states that, “Malay” 
is “a person who professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks Malay, [and] 
conforms to Malay custom” (qtd. in Husin 2). The Constitution also recognizes Malay 
as the official language and, Islam, as the official religion of the Malay-dominated 
Malaysian nation-state. Khoo Gaik Cheng, Michael G. Peletz, and others have argued 
that Islam in particular not only functions as a key symbol of Malayness, but has 
become a crucial feature of Malaysian Malay identity. This is particularly true when 
many Malaysian Malays identify themselves first (and foremost) as Muslim, which 
reinforces the conflation of “Malay” with Muslim in the national imaginary.4 The 
former Lord President of the Supreme Court of Malaysia, Tun Dato‟ Haji Mohamed 
Salleh bin Abas, acknowledges and endorses the intimately entwined and, at times, 
seemingly irrevocable, relationship between Islam and Malay ethnicity. As Mohamed 
Salleh explains: 
The notion of a non-Muslim Malay is alien to the mind. Such a person 
would be murtad – excluded from the faith. To be Malay one must be 
Muslim, although he may not be a practising or devout Muslim. This 
complete identification of religion with race is so fundamental to Malay 
thought that the religion of Islam has become an important constituent 
element in the legal and constitutional definition of „Malay‟ (qtd. in Lim 
122).  
 
The Constitutional definition of Malay ethnic identity, however, does not adequately 
express the myriad and complex ways in which the term “Malay” have been configured 
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and understood outside the national borders of Malaysia. Malays in Singapore, for 
example, do not necessarily comply with legal narratives of Malaysian Malayness.
 
David C. L. Lim contends that the Singapore Constitution does not define “Malays” 
living in Singapore as Muslims, but only ““recognises” the special position of the 
“Malays” and the Muslim religion” (118). He asserts further that “[the Singapore 
Constitution] does not contain a separate clause defining who the Malay people are, 
except for the reference in Article 152(2), which explains that they are “the indigenous 
people of Singapore”, and that “accordingly,” the Government has the “responsibility 
to protect, safeguard, support, foster, promote,” among other things, their “social and 
cultural interests and the Malay language” (118).5 The prominent Malay studies 
scholar, Anthony Milner, on the other hand, has pointed out that Islam is one, but not 
the only, paradigm for defining Malayness elsewhere. The Christian Batak people in 
Sumatra, Indonesia, for example, continue to regard themselves as “Malay” mainly 
because they have adopted the language and culture of ethnic Malays over time. Such 
appropriations of “cara Melayu” (“ways of the Malays”), as Milner posits, are largely 
attributed to a long history of acculturation, where the Christian Bataks engaged in the 
process of “Malayization” (“becoming Malay”) following their contacts with ethnic 
Malays through various means including trade and commerce.
6
 Milner also argues that 
Malay language is not always a salient feature of Malay ethnic identity beyond 
Malaysia‟s national boundaries. Malays in Sri Lanka and South Africa, whose 
ancestors came from Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula, use languages other than 
Malay as the medium of daily discourse.
7
 Sri Lankan Malays, for example, speak 
mostly Sinhala, while South African Malays use Afrikaans and English to 
communicate with one another (Milner 3).
8
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What discussion by Milner on varied and multiple meanings of Malayness 
demonstrates is that many “Malays” who live beyond Malaysia‟s borders do not 
necessarily take on distinctive markers of Malay ethnicity, nor fulfil religious and/or 
linguistic requirements for being “Malay” as stipulated in the Malaysian Constitution, 
in calling themselves “Malays.” This amplifies Jean Phinney‟s contention that ethnic 
identity (and, in my case, Malay ethnic identity) is not a fixed categorization, but rather 
a fluid and dynamic understanding of the self and his/her ethnic group that changes as it 
moves across various locales and contexts (347). But what if some (if not many) 
Malaysian Malays, who have fulfilled these legal requirements, rethink and, perhaps, 
reshape the formal definition of Malayness? I pose this question mainly because I 
believe that such definition conjures different meanings to different Malays living in 
Malaysia. This is probably true when a Malaysian Malay sense of identity is not only 
expressed through cultural and religious emblems of Malay ethnicity, but is always 
already mediated by a multitude of diverse factors (e.g. age, sex, gender, descent, social 
class, political and regional affiliations) which are not specifically spelt out in the 
Constitution. Although these factors are intimately linked and intersect one another in 
the formulation of Malay ethnicity, they may appear to be mutually exclusive where 
one may exclude or preclude the other. For instance, social class is probably more 
significant than age or gender in the processes of self-identification among the upper 
middle class or working class Malays. Loyalty or strong ties to the home state, on the 
other hand, may appear to be more important than social class in the formulation and 
expression of Malayness among “orang Johor” (“the people of the Malaysian state of 
Johor”) or “orang Kelantan” (“the people of the Malaysian state of Kelantan”). The 
same can be said of the pivotal role that sexuality plays in the production of self-
identities among gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered Malays. But the processes of 
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self-identification as members of the Malay Muslim community can become especially 
complicated (if not more intriguing) when non-Malays and non-Muslims in Malaysia 
can “masuk Islam/masuk Melayu” (“become Islam/become Malay”) through 
intermarriages with Malay Muslims and/or by converting to Islam and conforming to 
Malay custom. This is particularly prominent in the case of many “mualaf” or “saudara 
baru” (“Muslim converts”), most of whom are Malaysian Chinese and Indians, who 
have embraced the Islamic faith, and have taken new Muslim names and adopted the 
Malay language, style of dress, and manners in asserting their new Malay Muslim 
identity.
9
 This gives the impression that anyone can be “Malay” in Malaysia as long as 
one complies with the legal requirements of being “Malay.” As Dina Zaman, following 
Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, notes, ““...the Malay equals Muslim is a very Malaysian 
thing.” The main reason is because constitutionally, no one can be Malay without being 
a Muslim, although curiously enough, one doesn‟t have to be ethnically Malay to be 
constitutionally Malay” (219).10 
 
The point here is not to question the Constitution, but rather to expose its limited and, 
at times, ambivalent formulation of Malay identity. This is mainly because the state-
defined notion of Malayness may not be helpful in expressing and accommodating the 
different narratives of Malay identity as envisioned and embraced by those who call 
themselves “Malays.” It is, however, important to note that discursive narratives of 
Malay ethnicity are remnants of colonialism, which have a powerful and pervasive 
influence on what it meant to be “Malay” historically and how “Malay” was to be 
defined by the Constitution. The Malaysian social scientist, Shamsul Amri Baharuddin, 
has argued that categories such as “Malay” and “Malayness” are colonial inventions 
and constructions, which not only provided a legal definition of Malay ethnic identity, 
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but helped reinforce in the public mind the very idea of Malayness (“A History of 
Identity” 363). The Malay Reservation Enactment of 1913, for example, describes 
“Malay” as “a person belonging to any Malayan race who habitually speaks the Malay 
language or any Malayan language and professes the Moslem religion” (qtd. in Khoo 
and Abdur-Razzaq).
 11
 The Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, on the other 
hand, stipulates that, “to be considered a Malay...one must be a Muslim, speak Malay, 
and observe the tradition of Malay culture” (qtd. in Noritah, “Islam and State” 129). 
These definitions (the latter in particular) have been employed by the Malay state elites 
of post-independence Malaysia in officialising Malay language, Muslim religion, and 
Malay custom (“adat”) as the key pillars of Malay ethnic identity. “Bangsa Melayu” 
(“Malay race”), on the other hand, is also a legacy of colonial knowlege which has 
profound influence on how Malay race/nation is understood and elaborated locally. 
Anthony Milner, for instance, maintains that one of the earliest and most influential 
definitions of “Malay” as a form of community was conceived by Sir Stamford Raffles 
in the early 1800s.
12
 Raffles wrote: “I cannot but consider that the Malayu nation as one 
people, speaking one language, though spread over so wide a space, and preserving 
their character and customs” (103; qtd. in Milner 119). Such definition has been 
employed by the Malay state elites in implementing various governmental policies and 
practices which have placed immense emphasis on “bahasa” (“Malay language”), 
“adat” (“Malay culture”), and “agama” (“Muslim religion”) as key markers of 
“Malayness” and “bangsa Melayu.” More importantly, the Malay state elites have also 
utilised these ethnic identity markers in creating yet another official Malay category; 
that is, “Bumiputera” (“sons of the soil” or “indigenous people”), as a way of 
protecting and bolstering Malays‟ special rights and privileges as the nation‟s ethnic 
core. It is pertinent to mention that non-Malay indigenous people of the Malaysian 
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states of Sabah and Sarawak are also legally designated as “Bumiputera,” who share 
the same rights and special privileges enjoyed by ethnic Malays, including entry into 
the public service, the provision of scholarships, and the allocation of business licenses 
and permits. Article 153 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution clearly states that: 
1. It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the 
special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and 
Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance 
with the provisions of this Article.  
2. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, but subject to the provisions 
of Article 40 and of this Article, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise 
his functions under this Constitution and federal law in such manner as may 
be necessary to safeguard the special provision of the Malays and natives of 
any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure the reservation for 
Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak of such 
proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public service 
(other than the public service of a State) and of scholarships, exhibitions 
and other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities 
given or accorded by the Federal Government and, when any permit or 
licence for the operation of any trade or business is required by federal law, 
then, subject to the provisions of that law and this Article, of such permits 
and licences.
13
 
 
What is clearly evidenced here is that Malay ethnicity is not only intimately tied to 
language, culture, and religion, but is characterized by a sense of “security” (Mak 5) 
and “exclusivity” (Fazil 5). In other words, to be legally defined as “Malay” always 
already secures one‟s status, rights, and privileges as Malaysia‟s dominant ethnic 
community. Moreover, to be officially identified as “(Malay-Muslim) Bumiputera” 
within the multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious Malaysian nation-state always 
already distinguishes oneself from members of the non-Bumiputera communities, 
namely the Chinese and Indians, whose ancestors moved to Malaysia from China, 
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India, and other parts of Southeast Asia. It is important to mention that Chinese and 
Indians (as well as other immigrant communities in Malaysia) do not enjoy the same 
rights and privileges afforded to Malay and non-Malay Bumiputeras on the basis that 
they are not indigenous people of Malaysia. This is mainly because many Malaysian 
Chinese and Indians‟ ancestors came to Malaysia in the 19th and 20th centuries as the 
result of the British “open-door” economic and immigration policies, which 
encouraged a large number of Chinese and Indian immigrants to come to Malaya in 
order to work in the tin mining industries and rubber plantation estates. Malays, as 
Vidhu Verma asserts, were allowed by the British to retain their traditional roles as 
Sultans (“rulers”), aristocrats, and farmers (26). On April 1, 1946, the British proposed 
a centralized administration in Kuala Lumpur under the Malayan Union scheme. The 
Malay nationalist elites reacted strongly against the proposal not just because it would 
reduce the power of Sultans (“kings”) of the Malay states and also because the Malayan 
Union scheme had set out to grant equal citizenship to all races including immigrant 
Chinese and Indians. The Malay nationalist elites claimed that the rights of citizenship 
could only be granted under the condition that immigrant Chinese and Indians must 
acknowledge “ketuanan Melayu” (“Malay supremacy/dominance”) and Malays‟ special 
position as both the indigenous people and the rightful owners of the country. The 
Malayan Union Scheme was soon replaced by the Federation of Malaya Agreement in 
1948, which officially endorsed the “idea of general citizenship for all communities 
while asserting the special rights and protection for the Malays” (Vidhu 29). The rights 
and privileges of the Malays are further enshrined in Article 153 of the post-
independence Malaysian Federal Constitution. 
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While it is possible to say that ethnic Malays in Malaysia assert their ethnic identity and 
mark their ethnic difference through cultural and religious identity markers, I would 
like to argue strongly that these markers cannot fully define what being “Malay” means 
for many Malays. Queer studies scholars, such as Phillip Brian Harper, have argued 
that sexual orientation should not be conceived as a primary identificatory marker of 
sexual identity simply because sexual identity is constantly inflected by the pressures of 
various factors pertaining to subjectivity (26). Although Harper is more interested in 
calling into question essentialised notions of sexuality (queer sexuality in particular), 
his contention that sexuality cannot be determined by sexual orientation alone can be 
used to demonstrate that Malay ethnic identity is not constructed and expressed solely 
through indigenous religious and cultural beliefs and practices. This is because Malay 
ethnic identity (like sexual identity and other forms of identity) is also shaped by 
diverse variables, including age, gender, sex, social class, to name just a few. A Malay 
man, for instance, can identify himself as a young, urban, educated, middle-class, gay 
man in relation to others and to the world. This, in my view, demonstrates that cultural 
and religious markers of Malayness inflect upon and/or intersect with a myriad of 
factors in the production of Malay ethnic identity. As Eric C. Thompson rightly asserts, 
“gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race, class, religion, age, and place all intersect at the 
crossroads of (Malay) identity (construction)” (15; emphasis added). While this 
illuminates the multiple and intersectional nature of Malay ethnicity, it is also 
important, I think, to highlight that notions of being “Malay” are not only created by 
the state (i.e. the Malay nationalist elites), but also by many ethnic Malays. To carry 
this argument further, I shall now refer to Shamsul Amri Baharuddin‟s “two social 
realities” approach which he uses to examine the politics of Malay identity creation in 
modern-day Malaysia. 
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In the article entitled “Debating about Identity in Malaysia: A Discourse Analysis,” 
Shamsul contends that the process of Malaysian Malay identity creation can 
meaningfully be understood in relation to the “two social realities” of being “Malay.”  
These social realities consist of the “authority-defined” and the “everyday-defined” 
notions of Malayness. The authority-defined conceptions of Malay identity, as Shamsul 
posits, are created by those who are part of the elite governing bodies and local 
authorities who observe and interpret the social reality of being “Malay” (477). Such 
observations and interpretations are mostly documented and disseminated through oral 
and written political dialogue or rhetoric. The everyday-defined ideas about Malayness, 
on the other hand, often take the form of the articulation of everyday experiences in the 
course of Malays‟ lives (477). While acknowledging that the “two social realities” of 
being “Malay” are central to the process of Malaysian Malay identity construction, it is 
necessary to point out that there is always a tension between the authority-defined and 
the everyday-defined perceptions of Malayness. This is especially true when the 
everyday-defined notions of being “Malay,” particularly those created by the “voices 
from the below”/ the “subaltern voices,” are often regarded as invalid sources of Malay 
identity (Shamsul, “Debating About Identity” 479). This is mainly because members of 
the elite governing bodies continue to enshrine and perpetuate their own versions of 
Malay ethnicity (i.e. “Bumiputera” category) as the only legitimate way of being 
“Malay” whilst simultaneously marginalizing and even excluding other, everyday-
defined visions of Malayness (I shall return to this point shortly).  
 
The dialogical tension between the authority-defined and the everyday-defined ideas 
about being “Malay” in Malaysia, in my view, is not completely dissimilar to Homi K. 
Bhabha‟s theory of the pedagogical and the performative. In “DissemiNation: Time, 
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Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” Bhabha asserts that there is always 
a split between the pedagogical and the performative in the process of writing the 
nation. Bhabha writes, “[i]n the production of the nation as narration there is always a 
split between the continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the 
repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting 
that the conceptual ambivalence of the modern society becomes the site of writing the 
nation” (297; original emphasis). What is notable here is that the process of narrating 
the nation is often fraught with the tension between the pedagogical conceptions of the 
nation (i.e. those which are configured by the state elites through their visions of what 
the nation should be) and the performative visions of the nation (i.e. those which are 
constructed based on the actual lived experiences of being the nation‟s people). The 
split between the pedagogical and the performative opens up an ambivalent site in the 
process of narrating the nation, where the state elites‟ vision of the nation is constantly 
being rewritten by the nation‟s citizenry. As Bhabha rightly contends, “the nation, in its 
ambivalent and vacillating representation ... opens up the possibility of other narratives 
of the people and their difference” (“DissemiNation” 300). Although Bhabha does not 
directly address Malay identity, I find that the theory of the pedagogical/performative 
not only complements Shamsul‟s notion of the authority-defined/everyday-defined, but 
provides a means through which to think of the ambivalent and contradictory nature of 
Malaysian Malay identity-formation. This is because in the process of constructing 
Malay ethnic identity, there is always a split between the pedagogical and the 
performative (or the authority-defined and everyday-defined) formulations of 
Malayness. This is particularly true when the Malay state elites and many members of 
the Malay community constantly create and articulate diverse and competing notions of 
being “Malay.” It is through the process of splitting that the politics of Malaysian 
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Malay identity construction becomes an ambivalent site, where many ethnic Malays 
continue to reshape and even transform pedagogical narratives of Malayness by 
asserting and establishing a Malay identity which is grounded in, and mediated 
through, their everyday experiences of being “Malay.” The dialectical tension between 
the pedagogical and the performative perceptions of Malayness can be observed most 
readily in the processes of self-definition and self-inscription among “Other Malays” 
(Kahn xxii), “New Malays” (Abdul Rahman 157; Halim 148), and “Queer Malays.” 
It is essential to point out that since there is no equivalent word for “queer” in Malay, 
the term “queer Malay” in this study is used to refer to self-identified gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgendered Malays.  My decision to include a discussion of the “Other 
Malay” and “New Malay” in this chapter is largely motivated by the fact that these 
Malay categories (much like “Queer Malay”) are characteristically “queer” (used here 
as an adjective; that is, transgressive). This is because the “Other Malays” and “New 
Malays” use non-normative identificatory markers in constructing their own ideas 
about being “Malay.” For instance, the “Other Malays” use their native language rather 
than Malay to communicate with one another, while the “New Malays” establish their 
own sense of Malayness by pledging allegiance to political leaders, rather than to the 
Malay rulers (“Raja”).  Interestingly, there are also Malays living in Malaysia who 
formulate their own versions of Malay identity via a multitude of identity markers 
which are not spelt out in the dominant discursive formulation of Malayness.
14
  
 
The „Other Malays” 
In his most recent work entitled Other Malays: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in 
the Modern Malay World, Joel S. Kahn has argued that notions of being “Malay,” as 
felt and practiced by “Other Malays,” do not cohere with discursive conceptions of 
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Malay identity. This is especially true when “Other Malays” in Kahn‟s ethnographic 
research (many of whom are Malays of Javanese, Banjarese, Bugis, or Acehnese 
descent whose ancestors came to Peninsular Malaysia from Indonesia and other parts of 
Southeast Asia), tend to use their native language, rather than Malay, as the medium of 
daily interaction. The “Other Malays,” as Kahn contends further, do not lend 
themselves easily to dominant and, at times, stereotypical, traits and images of 
indigenous Malays (particularly those in rural Malay “kampong” or villages). For 
instance, the “Other Malays” are “highly mobile” and “commercially astute merchants” 
compared to the “village-dwelling” and “commercially-naïve agriculturalist” 
indigenous Malays (Kahn xxii). Moreover, the “Other Malays” adopt a more liberal 
and tolerant attitude toward Islam, unlike indigenous Malays who embrace 
traditionalistic and syncretistic religious beliefs and practices (Kahn xxii).
15
 Kahn also 
points out that the “Other Malays” demonstrate a lack of loyalty to their new homeland 
(i.e. Peninsular Malaysia) and show little or no respect to the Malay rulers, which is in 
contrast to indigenous Malays‟ strong sense of attachment to their country and to their 
leaders (xxii). What is particularly notable here is that “Other Malays” do not align 
themselves easily with both the dominant conceptualization of Malay identity and the 
indigenous Malay community. This is because “Other Malays” create and inhabit 
performative narratives of Malayness, which are assembled out of their actual lived 
experiences of being “Malay,” in marking their difference from the indigenous Malay 
community. More importantly, these experiences are shaped and influenced by “Other 
Malays‟” cultural and linguistic differences. But the major obstacle to expressing a 
sense of difference and otherness through socio-cultural diversity lies in the ways in 
which the “Other Malays”‟ performative notions of being “Malay” are dominantly 
perceived to be “un-Malay” or not Malay. This is particularly true when the Malay state 
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elites continue to sanction and privilege pedagogical constructions of Malay ethnicity 
(i.e. “Bumiputera” category) as the only valid and legitimate way of being “Malay.” 
Kahn himself has pointed out that the state-defined Malay identity is an “exclusive and 
racially exclusionary narrative [that suppresses, but not extinguishes] other identities 
and narratives” (xxii) including those created by the “Other Malays.” This, in my view, 
amplifies Neil Lazarus‟s contention that the nation‟s elites tend to recognize and 
represent themselves as the “true” or the legitimate voice of the nation‟s people (109). 
This is readily observed in what Lazarus calls “the elitist cultural practice” where the 
state elites speak for themselves, while simultaneously silencing others (most of whom 
are members of the subaltern classes), in claiming their rights as the legitimate people 
of the nation (109). I agree with Lazarus‟s assertion mainly because the Malay state 
elites also acknowledge and portray themselves as “authentic Malays” (“Melayu 
Asli/Melayu Jati”) on the grounds that they are the “Bumiputeras”; that is, the 
indigenous people of the Malay Peninsula. It is accurate to say that the formation of the 
“Bumiputera” category not only marks and reinforces further ethnic Malays‟ 
indigenous status, but functions as an elitist mechanism by/through which the Malay 
state elites marginalize and even exclude the “Other Malays” on the basis that they are 
not indigenous inhabitants of Peninsular Malaysia and, therefore, cannot be called 
“Bumiputera” or “Malay” (hence Kahn‟s use of the word “other” to describe the “Other 
Malays”).16    
 
The “New Malays” 
The marginalization of the “Other Malays” within the dominant Malay Muslim 
community as the result of their cultural difference is similarly felt and experienced by 
the “New Malays.” The term “New Malays” or “Melayu Baru,” which was first 
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introduced by the former Malaysian premier Mahathir Mohamad in 1991, refers to 
members of the new Malay middle class.
17
 Abdul Rahman Embong, Halim Salleh, 
Terence Chong, and others have pointed out that the “New Malays” (many of whom 
have come from rural Malay villages) are highly-skilled and highly-educated Malay 
professionals, administrators, managers, technicians, and entrepreneurs living in Kuala 
Lumpur and other modern, cosmopolitan centres throughout Malaysia. It is important 
to note that the new Malay middle class was created by the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), which was launched in 1971 to foster national integration by alleviating poverty 
and improving the socio-economic conditions of all ethnic communities in Malaysia.
18
 
But the state policies and programmes which were implemented during the NEP period 
strongly favoured ethnic Malays on the basis of their Bumiputera statuses. This is 
particularly true when ethnic Malays were given special privileges such as quotas for 
higher education, public sector employment, and corporate equity ownership. Halim 
Salleh, for instance, asserts that, “[b]esides eradicating Malay poverty, the primary 
objective [of the New Economic Policy] was to achieve 30 per cent Malay equity in 
existing and future wealth, particularly in corporate wealth, employment, and 
professional manpower development. For this purpose, the government imposed a 
Malay quota in all critical areas of economic activities, employment, and higher 
education.” (139) It is possible to say that the lives of many ethnic Malays in Malaysia 
have been greatly affected by the NEP policies and this holds true for members of the 
new Malay middle class. For example, some (if not many) “New Malays‟” overall 
outlook on life has changed as a result of the exposure to western knowledge and 
culture they gained through overseas studies and training programmes. This is vividly 
portrayed in “New Malays‟” preference for English over Malay as the language of daily 
communication, and their adoption of a modern western lifestyle. Many young 
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members of the new Malay middle class express their identities through western (i.e. 
American) culture and fashion. The GAP and other famous American retail clothing 
stores, as Khoo Gaik Cheng notes, have become prestige items for urban Malay 
middle-class youths (235). This appropriation of western style of dress, in my view, is 
important because it enables the “New Malays” (the youngsters in particular) to 
articulate a sense of modernity and assert their difference from Malay youths in rural, 
traditional “kampong” (“village”) settings. Khoo, following Joel S. Kahn and Francis 
Loh Wah, also points out that some “New Malays” formulate and express new ways of 
being “Malay” through alternative identificatory markers such as “attachment to a 
leader or patriarch and/or a tradition of egalitarianism and democracy” (27). This is 
probably attributed by “New Malays‟” exposure to western liberalism and egalitarian 
democracy via overseas education. Such new and “alternative” ways of being “Malay” 
challenge received narratives of Malayness, especially when traditional loyalty 
to/toward the Malay rulers (“Raja”) has always been a defining feature of the dominant 
Malay identity. Interestingly, some (if not many) “New Malays” advocate a moderate 
and liberal interpretation of Islamic faith which they believe is more compatible with 
their new modern lifestyle. This is particularly evidenced when some “New Malays” 
downplay the significance of Islam in configuring their own notions of being “Malay.” 
These modern or “westernised” Malays, as Halim Salleh asserts, “have indeed become 
accommodative and conciliatory in their religiosity. Notwithstanding those who are lax 
in their religious practice (irreligious) ...What this seems to mean is that a Malay today 
does not necessarily carry the integrated Malay-Muslim person as it did in the past... it 
is possible for a Malay today to claim Malay status but without bringing Islam into it” 
(153).  
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What is worth noting here is that many members of the new Malay middle class do not 
identify or align themselves closely with discursive formulations of Malay ethnic 
identity. This is because many “New Malays” create and assert their own ethnic 
identity through performative visions of being “Malay.” These performative visions of 
Malayness are constructed based on “New Malays‟” everyday lived experiences, which 
are mediated through social class differences and diverse cultural, linguistic, and 
religious practices. It is, however, crucial not to lose sight of the problems that may 
arise from articulating performative notions of being “Malay.” This is precisely true 
when many “New Malays” have often been regarded as “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” 
for being too “modern” and “westernised.” Asrul Zamani, Halim Salleh, Syed Husin 
Ali, and others have argued that members of the new Malay middle-class who adopt 
modern western lifestyles and culture tend to abandon traditional values pertaining to 
sexual morality and behaviour, as well as marriage and conjugal relationships that are 
central to the configuration of pedagogical narratives of Malay ethnicity.  Asrul 
Zamani, for example, contends that many Malay Muslims in modern-day Malaysia, 
particularly Malay Muslim youths, are “nominal Muslims” (“Muslims only by/in 
name”) simply because they do not possess strong religious convictions as a result of 
their involvement in cohabitation, homosexuality, and prostitution, to name just a few. 
As Asrul writes: 
Cohabitation and abortion are also rampant in large cities [...] Wife 
swapping and “open” marriages are not unheard of. Casual sex as well as 
polyandry is a life trend for many. Homosexuality, lesbianism, and 
transsexualism are alarmingly prevalent, usually starting in schools and 
universities. The problem of homosexuality extends itself as these 
individuals begin to work and thus it has now involved many Malay 
professionals (319). 
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All prohibitions of religion, namely zina (fornication), prostitution, alcohol 
and drug abuse [and] other ills in society have been acknowledged in Islam 
to be against the commandment of God [...] Moreover, those who are 
engrossed in social ills, are the ones who hardly pray. If they are Muslims, 
they are just nominal Muslims (350-351). 
 
To complicate matters, “New Malays” who downgrade the importance of religion in 
asserting and inhabiting a modern Malay identity have also been called “Melayu 
murtad” (“Malay apostates”). Such a term is used to refer to Malays who renounce their 
religious faith in order to convert to another religion, which is considered a very serious 
offence under Shariah law in Malaysia. This is because Malay Muslims cannot 
renounce their religion and would be liable to persecution (including the death penalty) 
if they were found guilty of committing apostasy.
19
 The ways in which many “New 
Malays” are criticised for being “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” have indeed created a 
heightened sense of anxiety and confusion that often undermine the potential for 
forging and asserting a modern narrative of Malayness among members of the new 
Malay middle class. As the Malaysian Malay writer, Karim Raslan, rightly asserts in 
questioning his own notion of being a “Melayu Baru” (“New Malay”): “Could I still be 
a modern Malay and still be a Malay? Or had I, in fact, betrayed my roots, my adat and 
my faith by being so modern?” (“Ceritalah” 15) 20 
 
My discussion of complex processes of self-identification among “New Malays” and 
“Other Malays” has demonstrated that there is indeed a tension between the 
pedagogical and the performative notions of Malayness in the politics of Malaysian 
Malay identity-formation. Such tension can be observed in the ways in which official 
designations of Malay ethnicity are constantly being reworked and reconfigured by 
“New Malays” and “Other Malays” actual lived experiences of being “Malay” in the 
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course of their lives. These experiences, as discussed earlier, are moulded by various 
factors, including specific socio-cultural practices, social class (i.e. “New Malays”), 
immigrant origin (i.e. “Other Malays”), in addition to Malay culture and Islam. I have 
also pointed out that there are various ramifications of expressing dissident narratives 
of Malayness, especially when the Malay state elites and members of the dominant 
Malay Muslim community continue to regard the legal definition of Malayness as a 
valid source of being “Malay.” For example, the “Other Malays” are considered not 
“true” Malays because of their non-indigenous status, while “New Malays” are 
regarded as “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” for being too “westernised” and “irreligious.” 
But I would like to argue strongly that the very dissonance between the pedagogical 
and the performative conceptions of Malayness not only provides a means through 
which “New Malays” and “Other Malays” can create their own Malay identity based on 
their actual  lived experiences, but opens up a space for “queer” in the politics of 
Malaysian Malay identity creation. Queer theorists such as David L. Eng, Judith 
Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz have pointed out that the term “queer,” which 
entered into public consciousness in the 1990s, has been used extensively to  
[challenge] the normalizing mechanism of state power to name its sexual 
subjects: male or female, married or single, heterosexual or homosexual, 
natural or perverse. Given its commitment to interrogating the social 
processes that not only produced and recognized but also normalized and 
sustained identity, the political promise of the term resided specifically in 
its broad critique of multiple social antagonisms, including race, gender, 
class, nationality, and religion, in addition to sexuality (1).  
 
Although Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz do not directly address Malay identity, I believe 
that their assertion of the political promise of the term “queer” is useful to explain how 
the split between the pedagogical and the performative ideas about Malayness opens up 
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a site for “queer” in/within the process of Malaysian Malay identity construction. I say 
this because it is through this process of splitting that “New Malays” and “Other 
Malays” are able to challenge normalizing mechanisms through/by which the Malay 
state elites exercise their power to designate a distinct Malay ethnic identity. This is 
particularly true when “New Malays” and “Other Malays” “queer” (i.e. challenge, 
subvert or undermine) dominant formations of Malay ethnicity by creating a Malay 
identity which is characterized by cultural, religious, and/or social class differences. 
For instance, “New Malays” do not adhere to normative prescriptions of being “Malay” 
as inscribed in the Constitution by preferring English over Malay and by downplaying 
the importance of Malay culture and Muslim religion in defining their own sense of self 
and identity. The split between the pedagogical and performative notions of Malayness 
provides the very basis for my argument that queer-identified Malays also engage in the 
project of “queering” (i.e. resisting and radically transforming), the politics of 
Malaysian Malay identity-formation by forging a Malay ethnic identity marked by 
sexual difference. 
 
“Queer Malays” 
Many queer-identified Malay men and women within the borders of Malaysia construct 
their own ethnic identities around/based on their everyday lived experiences and actual 
material conditions of being “queer” and “Malay.” Gay Malay men in Ismail Baba‟s 
ethnographic study, for instance, identify and reposition themselves as “Malay,” 
“Muslim,” and “gay” by embracing both their sexuality and Islamic faith. Azlan, whom 
Ismail had interviewed in his research, is an educated and “a very liberal and open-
minded” middle class gay Malay man who claims that religion is a personal choice and 
views same-sex sexuality as a work of God (Ismail 152). Roslan, whom Ismail also 
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interviewed in his ethnographic study, is a young gay Malay professional and a devout 
Muslim who thinks that same-sex sexuality is wrong, but claims that as long as he 
regularly performs the “solat” (“obligatory daily Muslim prayers”), God will 
understand his desire for men (Ismail 151). Many young, urban, educated, middle class 
gay Malay men in the local gay social networking website, “Komuniti Web Gay 
Melayu,” on the other hand, create a “gay Melayu” identity in the virtual sphere by 
organizing their lives and notions of self and identity around male same-sex sexuality 
and desire. What is interesting is that gay Malay men in “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” 
continue to assert their gayness without necessarily discarding their ethnic and religious 
heritages in identifying themselves as “gay Melayu” both online and offline.21 The 
same holds true for gay Malay men and lesbian Malay women in Dina Zaman‟s book, 
entitled I am Muslim, who construct their own narratives of Malay ethnicity by 
maintaining both their ethnnoreligious and same-sex sexual identities. “Tudung 
lesbians” (lesbian Malay Muslim women who don the head veils) who are featured in 
Dina‟s book, for example, continue to perform culturally and religiously designated 
roles and duties as members of the Malay Muslim community. This is readily observed 
in the ways in which “tudung lesbians” put on the head veils out of obedience to God 
and as a way of becoming good Muslim daughters and women. Interestingly, “tudung 
lesbians” continue to articulate their desire for women despite strong religious and 
legal prohibitions against female same-sex sexuality.
22
  
 
What is particularly evidenced here is that many queer-identified Malay men and 
women (much like “Other Malays” and “New Malays”) formulate performative visions 
of Malay ethnicity based on their actual lived experiences of being “Malay.” These 
experiences are constantly being shaped by queer Malays‟ diverse socio-cultural and 
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religious practices, as well as social class and sexual differences. Such 
characteristically “queer” narrative of ethnicity reshapes and redefines pedagogical 
conceptualisations of Malayness, where Malays are designated by the nationalist elites 
and the dominant Malay Muslim community as Muslims who must strictly adhere to 
normative prescriptions of gender and sexuality. In other words, queer-identified 
Malays “queer” (used here as a verb; that is, radically transform) official configurations 
of Malayness by defining themselves as “Malays” who not only embrace Muslim 
religion and practise Malay culture and tradition, but organize their lives and identities 
around same-sex sexuality, desires, and practices. It is, however, pivotal to point out 
that there are obstacles to articulating identities marked by queerness in a Muslim-
majority country such as Malaysia.  For example, queer-identified Malays living in 
Malaysia are often conflated with being “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” for committing 
the sinful acts of “Kaum Lut/Kaum Sodom” (“the people of the Prophet Lut (pbuh)/ the 
people of Sodom”). One may recall viewers‟ reception of Amy Ikram Ismail‟s film, 
Comolot, where phrases including “memalukan bangsa Melayu” (“bring shame to the 
Malay race”), “menjatuhkan maruah orang Melayu” (“bring down the dignity of 
Malays”) and “menghancurkan umat Islam” (“disintegrate the Muslim community”) 
were used to criticize and even delegitimize queer-identified Malays‟ sense of Malay 
identity and their membership in the Malay Muslim community. This is because many 
viewers (most of whom are Malay Muslims) claim that a Malay sense of identity must 
always be defined and sustained through heterosexuality and one‟s strong adherence to 
the Quran and the Sunnah.
23
 To aggravate matters, queer-identified Malays‟ lives 
remain subject to juridical surveillance, especially when same-sex sexuality is both 
punishable under civil and Shariah laws in Malaysia. For instance, sodomy is 
punishable by flogging and/or imprisonment under Sections 377A and 377B of the 
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Malaysian Penal Code while “liwat” (“sexual relations between male persons”) and 
“musahaqah” (“sexual relations between female persons”) are punishable by a hefty 
fine, imprisonment, and/or whipping under Section 25 and Section 26 of the Shariah 
Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1977.
24
  
 
My point here is not to question Islam, but rather to demonstrate its significance in the 
politics of Malaysian Malay identity. This is precisely true when many ethnic Malays 
place a very strong emphasis on culture and religion in particular in the process of self-
identification and self-inscription simply because Islam secures their sense of 
Malayness. Some (if not many) ethnic Malays, as Noritah Omar and Washima Che Dan 
maintain, “believe that Islam secures their identity as Malays and that Malay identity is 
assumed within their Islamic identity, [which protects] both their rights as Muslims and 
as Malays” (48). It is not wrong to say that queer-identified Malays will always have to 
struggle to position themselves as “queer” and “Malay” within the ethnic, cultural, and 
social milieu, given that being “Malay” remains firmly entrenched in, and is profoundly 
shaped by, the hegemonic impulses of Malay culture and religion. Such a deep and, at 
times, inescapable connection between identity, ethnicity, culture, and religion 
amplifies Louis F. Miron‟s assertion that “the processes of identity-formation within 
the social contexts of ethnicity ... is inseparable from the broader social relations of 
power and material and ideological structures” (81; emphasis added). This is can be 
seen in the ways in which pedagogical notions of “Malay” and “Malayness” as 
mentioned in an earlier section of this chapter, are legacies of colonial knowledge that 
had a powerful influence what it meant to be “Malay” historically. The 
institutionalization of Malay culture and religion as defining and definitive markers of 
Malay ethnicity during the late colonial and post-independence periods formed and 
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perpetuated culturally authoritative, raced-based ideas about Malayness. These 
pedagogical ideas about Malay ethnicity were then reinforced and became deeply 
ingrained in the minds of many Malaysian Malays over time. But I would like to argue 
strongly that the Malay state elites also adopt a rather “queer” (i.e. transgressive) 
approach to producing and sustaining pedagogical conceptions of Malay ethnic 
identity. I say this because many Malay studies scholars have demonstrated that the 
Malay states elites have given varied and unequal emphasis on religion, culture, 
language, and loyalty to the Malay rulers, to an extent that it has become difficult to 
decide on the specific marker which best constitutes and represents the state-defined 
notion of Malayness. For instance, during his long tenure as Malaysia‟s prime minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad placed a particularly strong emphasis on English and spiritual and 
religious values as crucial features of the official narrative of Malay identity.
25
 This 
pedagogical narrative of Malayness is characteristically “queer” (used here as an 
adjective; that is, transgressive) because it downplays the significance of Malay 
language and culture, which are the key pillars of Malay ethnicity. Such “transgressive” 
pedagogical formulations of Malay ethnicity, in my view, help buttress my contention 
that the politics of Malaysian Malay identity is indeed an ambivalent site (and also a 
site of contestation) where Malayness is constantly being “queered” (i.e. redefined, 
reconfigured, reshaped, and reproduced) by both the Malay state elites and the Malay 
populace. This is especially true when the Malay state elites and the Malay populace, 
which include queer Malays, “Other Malays,” and “New Malays” continually create 
and express diverse, competing versions of Malay identity. 
 
My discussion of the politics of Malay identity shows that there is no satisfactory 
answer to what it means to be “Malay” in the modern Malaysian nation-state. This is 
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because there are different ways in which Malays define their own notions of being 
“Malay” in the course of their lives. This supports the central tenet of my study that 
Malay identity is neither fixed nor impermeable, but is contingent and contested as a 
result of the diverse and ongoing configurations of Malayness by/among those who 
have come to regard and think of themselves as “Malay.” Anthony Milner himself 
admits that “it has proved impossible to find a notion of being “Malay” that has 
achieved stability – that has become secure. It is an idea in motion...it is always open to 
contest” (17). Being “Malay” in Malaysia, then, cannot be fixed nor determined by 
legal markers of Malay ethnicity simply because some (if not) many Malays may or 
may not rely on these markers in configuring their own ethnic identities. The “Other 
Malays,” “New Malays,” and queer Malays, whom I discussed in this chapter, rely on 
various factors pertaining to subjectivity in constructing Malay ethnic identities marked 
by difference which stand as a challenge to the culturally authoritative ones. This 
demonstrates that the dominant conceptualization of Malayness is a social invention 
precisely because there will always be Malay identities that do not fit. My discussion of 
the dialectical tension between the pedagogical and the performative notions of 
Malayness, on the other hand, has also shown that the politics of Malaysian Malay 
identity is an ambivalent site where discursive formations of Malayness are constantly 
redefined and rearticulated by “Other Malays,” “New Malays,” and other members 
belonging to the Malay Muslim community in Malaysia. Such tension creates the very 
opening for queer-identified Malays to construct a Malay identity marked by sexual 
difference, and take it on as a subject position in identifying themselves as “queer” and 
“Malay” in the modern Malaysian nation-state.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 See Anthony Milner‟s The Malays, especially p. 1 for his detailed discussion of the number of Malays 
living in Malaysia. It is pertinent to point out that Malaysia is made up of two regions; namely, West 
Malaysia and East Malaysia. West Malaysia, which comprises eleven states and the Federal Territories 
of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya, is bordered by Thailand to the north and Singapore to the south. East 
Malaysia, which consists of the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, and the Federal Territory of 
Labuan, is located on the northern coast of Borneo Island. Malays are the dominant ethnic group in 
Malaysia, followed by the Chinese and Indians, and other ethnic minority groups, including “Orang Asli” 
(“the Aborigines,” namely, Jakun, Senoi, and Negrito) in West Malaysia, Iban, Bidayuh, and Melanau in 
Sarawak, and Kadazan, Bajau, and Murut in Sabah. 
2 Anthony Milner has argued that it seems impossible to come to any definite conclusion regarding the 
“accurate” classification and/or categorization of the Malay population. Milner contends that some 
Malay activists claim that the whole population of Indonesia and a large proportion of the people in the 
Philippines, not to mention those living in Madagascar, Cambodia, and Vietnam, can be regarded as 
“Malay” on the basis that they are “Austronesian-speaking peoples” (1-2).    
3 Malayo-Polynesian languages are subgroups of Austronesian languages. Indonesian Malay, Malaysian 
Malay, Javanese, Balinese, Tagalog, Samoan, and Tongan, are some examples of the languages which 
belong to the Malayo-Polynesian language family. See Narendra S. Bisht and T.S. Bankoti‟s book, 
entitled, Encyclopaedia of the South East Asian Ethnography, especially on pp. 413-414 for their 
discussion of the Malayo-Polynesian languages, which are spoken by the indigenous people of 
Madagascar, the Malay Peninsula, Indonesia, the Philippine islands, Taiwan, the islands of the Pacific 
Ocean, and southern areas of Vietnam and Cambodia. 
4 See Patricia Martinez‟s article, entitled “Malaysian Malays: Living with Diversity,” where she presents 
the findings from a survey she conducted in December 2005 on Malaysian Malay Muslims‟ perceptions 
of their notions of self and identity. Almost 80% of 1,000 randomly selected Malaysian Malay Muslims, 
whom Martinez had interviewed, claimed that being “Muslim” was much more important than being 
“Malay” or “Malaysian.” This, in my view, buttresses my contention that many Malays within the 
borders of Malaysia identify themselves first (and foremost) as “Muslim.” See also Shamsul Amri 
Baharuddin‟s article, entitled “Identity Construction, Nation Formation, and Islamic Revivalism in 
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Malaysia,” for his discussion of Islam and its significant role in shaping the politics of Malay identity-
formation in present-day Malaysia. 
5 Although the Singapore Constitution does not define Malays in Singapore as “Muslims,” many 
Singaporean Malays claim that religion serves as a distinctive marker of their ethnicity. See Suraiya 
Mohd Ali‟s article, entitled “Malay Ideals Revisited: Constructing Identities,” where she reports the 
findings from a survey she carried out in March 2004 on Singaporean Malays and Malaysian Malays‟ 
perceptions of their ethnic identity and cultural and religious heritages. Suraiya maintains that 
“Singaporean Malays and Malaysian Malays have a strong sense of racial and religious identity as well 
as the sense of a shared cultural heritage” (211). The similarities in opinion between these groups of 
Malays, in my view, may be attributed to the fact that Singapore had once been part of Malaysia. After 
declaring independence from British rule on 31 August 1963, (six years after Malaya, now called 
Peninsular Malaysia, declared its own independence), Singapore merged into the Federation of Malaysia 
on 16 September 1963. The merger, as Šumit Ganguly points out, “was part of a larger plan that sought 
to bring together the former British Colonies of Sarawak, Northern Borneo (now known as Sabah) and 
Brunei (in addition to Singapore and Malay)” (250-251; notes added). But Singapore was evicted from 
the Federation of Malaysia on 9 August 1965 and became an independent nation-state as the result of the 
conflict between the Chinese-dominated leadership in Singapore (led by Lew Kuan Yew from the 
People‟s Action Party) and the Malay-dominated leadership in Malaya (led by Tunku Abdul Rahman 
from the Alliance Party). See, for instance, Šumit Ganguly‟s “Ethnic Policies and Political Quiescence in 
Malaysia and Singapore,” and Dan Slater‟s Ordering Power: Contentious and Authoritarian Leviathans 
in Asia, for their elaborate discussions of the political tension between Singapore and Malaya.   
6 See Anthony Milner‟s The Malays, especially pp. 84-90 for his comprehensive discussion of the ways 
in which many non-Malay, non-Muslims in the countries of Malay Archipelago have engaged in a long 
process of “Malayization;” that is, “becoming Malay,” which took place over many centuries.  
7 Scholars such as Alexander Adeelar and D.J. Prentice contend that the ancestors of Sri Lankan Malays 
came to Sri Lanka between 1656 and 1850. The Dutch brought them in as soldiers, deportees, slaves, and 
servants via Batavia (Jakarta) from Ambon, Banda, Bali, Java, Madura, and from the Bugisnese and 
Malay areas (685). The ancestors of South African Malays, who originated from Indonesia, the Malay 
Peninsula, and Madagascar, were also brought to South Africa by the Dutch as slaves in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. 
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8 Obviously, Malays in Sri Lanka do speak their own version of Malay, which is a mixed fusion of 
Sinhala, Tamil, and Malay. See, for instance, Umberto Ansaldo‟s article, entitled “Contact Language 
Formation in Evolutionary Terms,” for a detailed discussion of Sri Lankan Malay. Malays in South 
Africa, on the other hand, also speak Malay which is heavily influenced by Afrikaans. However, scholars 
such as Alexander Adelaar and Nikolaus P. Himmelmann have pointed out that this version of Malay is 
no longer spoken by South African Malays, also known as the “Cape (Town) Malays.” See, for instance, 
Jamie Stokes‟ book, entitled Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East, especially pp. 
136-137 for his discussion of the “Cape Malays,” particularly their language and culture. 
9
 See Timothy P. Daniels‟s Building Cultural Nationalism in Malaysia: Identity, Representation, and 
Citizenship, especially pp. 69-70 for his analysis of Malaysian Chinese and Indian converts (“mualaf”/ 
“saudara baru”), and the various ways in which they express their sense of being “Malay” and “Muslim,” 
including wearing “baju melayu” (“Malay dress”) and assuming Muslim names by adding “bin 
Abdullah” (for men) or “binti Abdullah” (for women) to their birth or given names. 
10 It is, however, imperative to mention that the practice of “masuk Islam”/“masuk Melayu” is fraught 
with difficulties and complexities. Some (if not many) ethnic Malays do not regard “mualaf”/“saudara 
baru” who adhere to Malay customs, speak Malay, and profess the Islamic faith as “true” Muslims or 
“authentic” Malays. Timothy P. Daniels asserts that many Indian Muslims living in Malaysia often 
experience a deep sense of exclusion within the Malay Muslim community mainly because they are not 
considered “pure” Malay and Muslim. The “Mamak,” as Daniels asserts, “is the high-level category used 
to refer to the Indian Muslim minority in Malaysia. They are a minority in both the “Indian” and 
“Muslim” communities. In the “Indian” community, they are an enigma because they are not Hindu, and 
in the “Muslim” community, they are an enigma because they are not (ethnic) “Malay.” Because they are 
not (ethnic) “Malay,” they are not considered to be “pure” Muslims, and are stigmatized as “Indian” 
converts to Islam. People considered “Mamak” to be one type of mualaf or converts to Islam (saudara 
baru); converts with some degree of “Indian” ancestry (69; notes added).10 For more discussion of the 
problematics surrounding the practice of “masuk Islam”/ “masuk Melayu,” see Timothy P. Daniels‟s 
Building Cultural Nationalism in Malaysia: Identity, Representation, and Citizenship, Jolanda 
Lindenberg‟s article, entitled “Interethnic Marriages and Conversion to Islam in Kota Bahru,” and Syed 
Husin Ali‟s The Malays: Their Problems and Future, especially pp. 3-4. 
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11 The Malay Reservation Enactment of 1913 was created by the British officials in Malaya to protect 
Malays against the loss of their traditional lands to Chinese immigrant capitalists and Indian money 
lenders. Many Malays at the time sold their lands in order to pay off their debts, particularly the money 
they borrowed from “Ceti” or “Chettiars” (Indian money lenders). For more discussion of The Malay 
Reservation Enactment, see Chee Kiong Tong‟s Identity and Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: 
Racializing Chineseness, especially p. 86, and Paul H. Kratoska‟s The Chettiar and the Yeoman: British 
Cultural Categories and Rural Indebtedness in Malaya, especially p. 17.   
12 Sir Thomas Stamford Bingley Raffles (1781-1826) is widely known as a scholar of Malay history, 
language, literature, and culture. He is also well recognised as the former governor of Java and the author 
of “The History of Java.” Raffles is probably better known as the founder of Singapore (Hodge 584; Lim 
138; Mark 47). Hodge, for instance, contends that Raffles played a crucial role in establishing Singapore 
as an important British trading post in the late nineteenth century. This is especially true when Raffles 
was able to secure treaties with local leaders/chiefs by promising them the aid and protection which they 
specifically asked from the British government at the time. These treaties provided Raffles and the 
British government in particular the power and authority to turn Singapore into a major British trading 
port (Hodge 584). 
13 The Yang di-Pertuan Agong is the supreme ruler of Malaysia. While Malaysia is a constitutional 
monarchy with an elected monarch as head of the state, it is important to point out that the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong acts on the advice of the Prime Minister, who is the head of the government of Malaysia. 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong plays several roles, including the Supreme Commander of the Malaysian Armed 
Forces, and the head of Islam in Penang, Melaka, Sabah, Sarawak, the Federal Territories, and the Malay 
state of which he rules (Quay and Chan 423). For more discussion of the scope of Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong‟s power, and Malaysia‟s constitutional monarchy and system of government, see, for instance, 
Andrew Harding‟s Law, Government, and the Constitution in Malaysia.  
14 See, for example, Eric C. Thompson‟s Unsettling Absences: Urbanism in Rural Malaysia for his 
excellent analysis of the importance of place in the process of ethnic identification among rural and 
urban Malays. See also Maila Stiven‟s article, entitled “Sex, Gender, and the Making of the New Middle 
Classes” and Syed Husin Ali‟s The Malays: Their Problems and Future for their discussions of the 
significance of class in the productions of ethnic identity among upper, middle, and working class 
Malays. See Anthony Milner‟s The Malays for his interesting argument about some “Malays” in 
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Malaysia (i.e. Bajau and Suluk in Sabah) who do not call themselves “Malays” and Joel S. Kahn‟s Other 
Malays: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Malay World for his examination of “hybrid 
Malays” who create their identities by embracing both traditional and cosmopolitan values.  
15 See Khoo Gaik Cheng‟s Reclaiming Adat: Contemporary Malaysian Literature and Film for her 
analysis of the traditionalistic and syncretistic religious beliefs and practices among many ethnic Malays 
in Malaysia. Khoo contends that many Malaysian Malays adopt a syncretistic approach to religion by 
practicing normative teachings of Islam alongside “adat” (“Malay custom”), which are characterized by 
their beliefs in magical healing, the world of spirits, mysticism, and animism (5). Such a syncretistic 
approach to Islam is largely attributed to the fact that animism, in addition to Hindu-Buddhist beliefs and 
practices, had been a central feature of Malay culture and society long before Islam was introduced to the 
Malay Peninsula in the 14th century via Indian and Arab Muslim traders.   
16 Another prominent Malay studies scholar, Clive Kessler, also contends that Malays of immigrant 
origin who have resided in Malaysia are not legally regarded, nor defined, as “Bumiputera.” These 
include “Muslims Malays who are not bumiputra (e.g., Achnese immigrants from Sumtra)” and “Malays 
who are neither bumiputra nor Muslim (e.g., Javanese and Batak Christian immigrants)” (139-140; qtd. 
in Sarkissian 176). 
17 The former Malaysian premier, Mahathir Mohamad, introduced the term “Melayu Baru” during his 
presidential address at the general assembly of the ruling Malay party, UMNO (United Malays National 
Organization) in November 1991. See Shamsul Amri Baharuddin‟s “From Orang Kaya to Melayu Baru: 
Cultural Construction of the Malay „new rich‟” and Abdul Rahman Embong‟s “Melayu Baru and the 
Modernization of Malay Society” for their discussions of “Melayu Baru,” particularly in relation to how 
the term was created as part of the national project of transforming and modernising Malays and the 
Malay society in Malaysia.   
18 The New Economy Policy (NEP) ended in 1990 and was succeeded by the National Development 
Policy (NDP) in 1991. Many have argued that the NDP is a continuation of the NEP, where Malays 
continue to be given preferential access to economic opportunities. See the collection of essays on 
Malaysia‟s economic policies in Collin Barlow‟s Modern Malaysia in the Global Economy: Political and 
Social Change into the 21st Century.   
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19 See Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed‟s Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam, especially pp. 149-
159, for their discussion of various apostasy laws in Malaysia, including death penalty under the hudud 
law in the Malaysian Islamic state of Kelantan. 
20 See Khoo Gaik Cheng‟s Reclaiming Adat: Contemporary Malaysian Literature and Film, especially 
pp. 72-73, for her discussion of Karim Raslan as the epitome of the New Malay, who experiences 
difficulties in asserting a sense of Malay identity marked by social class difference. Karim, a well-known 
Malaysian Malay writer, finds that he has to play conflicting roles in order to be considered “Malay”: he 
is torn between the traditional model that emphasized “loyalty, obedience and blind devotion to 
authority,” and the NEP model – “a dynamic, cosmopolitan businessmen, hunting down business 
opportunities in Yangon, Tashkent, Jo‟burg and Santiago” (15; qtd. in Khoo 73). 
21 See Chapters 4 of this thesis for my discussion of the formation of “gay Melayu” identity among many 
gay Malay men in the local gay social networking website, “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu.” 
22 See Chapter 2 of my study for a detailed analysis of gay Malay men and women as represented in the 
works of Abdul Aziz, Dina Zaman, and Karim Raslan,. 
23 See viewers‟ comments on Amy Ikram Ismail‟s film, Comolot, at 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1rKtvq1nd0>.  
24 See Chapter 5 of this thesis for more discussion of the legal repercussions of being “queer” and 
“Malay” in Malaysia. 
25 See Anthony Milner‟s The Malays, especially Chapter 7 on “Multiple Forms of „Malayness‟ for his 
discussion of Malay states elites who constantly redefine what it means to be “Malay” by giving varied 
emphasis on the key pillars of Malayness. 
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Chapter 2 Representations of Queer Malays in Contemporary Malaysian  
                  Literature 
 
The acceptable notion of sex in Malay culture is that it must be conjugal, 
procreative and heterosexual. We see that through the window, but through 
the same window, we also see sex is celebratory, pleasure and fantasy 
oriented, regendered and non-heterosexual. Malay writers in English are 
sometimes resented because the sexualities they depict are not within the 
parameters of the prescribed and also because they disturb the formulated 
notions of ethnicity with their problematic sexualities. 
–Lily Rose Tope, The Hushed Identity:  
Malay Ethnicity and Sexuality in Malaysian 
and Singaporean Literature in English 
 
In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated that there is a dialectical tension between 
pedagogical and performative (or authority-defined and everyday-defined) conceptions 
of Malayness in the process of Malaysian Malay identity-formation. This is especially 
true when official narratives of Malay ethnicity are constantly being reworked and 
reconfigured by many Malays living in Malaysia, who construct their own ethnic 
identities through their everyday lived experiences of being “Malay.” Such experiences 
are deeply shaped by various factors pertaining to subjectivity, including social class 
and diverse cultural and religious practices among many ethnic Malays. The very 
dissonance between pedagogical and performative narratives of Malayness provides the 
basis for my argument which proposes that pedagogical formulations of Malayness are 
also constantly being reconstituted and reformulated by queer-identified Malays who 
create their own notions of ethnic identity based on their actual lived conditions and 
material struggles of being “queer” and “Malay.” In this chapter, I will develop this 
argument a little further by analysing representations of queer-identified Malays in 
contemporary Malaysian literature. More specifically, I will explore and examine how 
queer-identifying Malay men and women in literary works by contemporary Malaysian 
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Malay writers (namely, Karim Raslan, Abdul Aziz, and Dina Zaman) construct their 
own narratives of Malayness. I have decided to focus on these literary works mainly 
because they convey diverse performative ideas about Malay identity, which are drawn 
from Malaysian Malay writers‟ own knowledge, observations, and/or reflections on the 
complex processes of identity-formation among queer-identified Malays. This 
corresponds with Shamsul Amri Baharuddin‟s contention that everyday-defined (or 
performative) ideas about Malay identity often take “popular forms of expression” or 
“popular culture” (e.g. short stories, songs, poems, and cartoons), which are created 
based on ethnic Malays‟ lived experiences of being “Malay.” I would like to extend 
Shamsul‟s argument by demonstrating that literary works are not simply popular forms 
of expression since they also function as a space for “queer” where contemporary 
Malaysian Malay writers deliberate and disseminate performative ideas about being 
“Malay” as felt and experienced by queer-identified Malays, which radically revise and 
redefine dominant pedagogical formulations of Malay ethnicity.  By extending the idea 
of popular forms of expression to include queerness enables this study to achieve its 
objective; that is, to examine queer-identifying Malay men and women in 
contemporary Malaysian literature and the various ways in which they redress received 
narratives of Malayness.  
 
My analysis of literary representations of queer Malays is divided into three parts. First, 
I will discuss the portrayal of queer-identified Malay male characters in Karim Raslan‟s 
shorts stories, entitled „Go East!‟ and „Neighbours.‟ This will be followed by my 
examination of a self-identified gay Malay male character in Abdul Aziz short story, 
„From the Journal of Azlan Muhammad.‟ Finally, I will explore the actual lived 
conditions and everyday struggles of gay Malay men and lesbian Malay women who 
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are featured in Dina Zaman‟s book, entitled I am Muslim. The aim of the analysis is to 
find out how queer-identified Malays in contemporary Malaysian literature identify and 
realign themselves as “queer” and “Malay,” particularly the various strategies they 
employ in formulating a queer Malay identity and the ways in which they resist and 
radically transform pedagogical conceptions of Malayness produced and sustained 
through cultural, religious, gender, and sexual normativities. The analysis also 
examines the tensions and conflicts queer-identified Malays often experience in 
asserting and inhabiting their own notions of self and identity. This can be observed in, 
for instance, the tension between articulating identities based on religion and culture, 
and those marked by queerness. The analysis is important because it shows that 
contemporary Malaysian Malay writers are not only interested to discuss queer-
identified Malays‟ performative visions of Malayness, but are also keen to delve into 
the complexities of queer Malay identity-formation by highlighting the difficulties, 
conflicts, and anxieties queer-identified Malays may experience in identifying 
themselves as “queer” and “Malay” in the Malay Muslim community and in the 
Malaysian nation-state. 
 
Constructing Identities, Negotiating Desires: Gay and Bisexual Malay Men in 
Karim Raslan‟s Short Stories, „Go East!‟ and „Neighbours‟ 
Karim Raslan is a prominent Malaysian-born, British-raised, Malay Muslim writer and 
columnist for major newspapers in Malaysia and abroad. Karim is probably better 
known for his articles and essays about Malaysia and Southeast Asia which have been 
published in his Ceritalah (“Tell Me a Story”) book series.1 Interestingly, Karim is also 
widely recognized for his short stories, most of which have appeared in his first (and 
only) anthology of short fiction, entitled Heroes and Other Stories. I find that the short 
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stories „Go East!‟ and „Neighbours‟ in this anthology are important because they 
provide useful insights into the complex processes of self-identification among gay- 
and bisexual-identified Malay men. This is most readily observed in the ways in which 
gay- and bisexual-identified Malay male characters in Karim‟s short stories employ 
diverse strategies in creating their own ethnic identities which subvert and reshape 
pedagogical conceptualizations of Malay ethnicity. 
 
The story „Go East!‟ depicts the life of Mahmud, a young Malay man who has recently 
moved from Kuala Lumpur (read: West Malaysia) to take up the post of a plantation 
manager in Sabah (read: East Malaysia). The story, which was told from the third-
person point of view, provides the reader with some valuable insights into the 
intricacies and complexities of Malay life in present-day Malaysia. As the story 
unfolds, the reader learns that Mahmud‟s decision to move to East Malaysia (hence the 
title of the story, „Go East!‟) is partly motivated by his desire to break away from the 
social and cultural constraints imposed by the dominant Malay community in West 
Malaysia. For Mahmud, Sabah is the “land of the free” where he can free himself from 
the stifling and suffocating milieu of Kuala Lumpur. As Mahmud explains: 
I like Sabah. I liked it from the day I arrive. I knew it was going to be 
different and it was. It was noisy, dirty, rough and un-Malay…You don‟t 
have to attend bloody boring kenduris of relatives you hardly know. 
There‟s something nice about not having too many Melayu about: they‟re 
always so disapproving – all tak boleh, tak halus, tak manis – it makes me 
sick. We‟re not in an Istana anymore and we carry on as if we‟re all 
courtiers or something (Karim, „Go East!‟105).2 
 
Such a deep resentment against repressive indigenous cultural beliefs and practices, 
which constrain the lives of some (if not many) Malays, is similarly expressed by the 
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Malay informants who are featured in Dina Zaman‟s book, I am Muslim. As one Malay 
informant states, “[t]he trouble with us Malays [is that] we have too many traditions 
and adat. We can‟t do this, we‟re Malays, we must do that, we‟re Malays” (201). What 
is evidenced here is that being “Malay” is indeed governed and regulated by the 
hegemonic impulses of Malay culture. This can be seen in the ways in which ethnic 
Malays must adhere strictly to traditional Malay customs and etiquette, and fulfil their 
social duties and obligations as members of the Malay community. Scholars of Malay 
society and culture such as Michael G. Peletz assert that, “[i]n a Malay culture the 
person is most fully realized in social relationships, not autonomously or in privacy or 
in isolation...The person is not construed as standing apart from and above the world of 
social relationships and institutions, but as both thoroughly grounded in, and in a very 
basic sense defined by, the relationships and institutions in which he or she 
participates” (Reason and Passion 203, 204). While I concur with Peletz‟s assertion 
that a Malay sense of identity must be defined and organized around one‟s relationship 
to Malay society and culture, I would like to argue that Mahmud adopts a “queer” (used 
here as an adjective; that is, transgressive) approach to defining his sense of Malayness. 
This is because Mahmud‟s decision to move to Sabah provides a means through/by 
which he can create a new Malay identity, which is not rigidly tied to, and governed by, 
restrictive rules and conventions of the traditional Malay culture. This is especially true 
when Mahmud‟s notions of being “Malay” are clearly marked by his refusal to fulfil 
his obligations to his family and the Malay community. Mahmud himself claims that 
“[i]t is a kind of relief [to be in Sabah]...No family: it‟s a liberation” (Karim, „Go East!‟ 
104). Interestingly, Mahmud liberates himself from the constraints of the hegemonic 
Malay culture and religion by consuming alcohol and frequenting the local brothel, 
despite the cultural and religious sanctions against drinking and “zina” (“pre-marital 
66 
 
sex”) among Malay Muslims. Such liberation allows Mamud to create his own Malay 
identity, which radically reconfigures dominant pedagogical conceptualizations of 
Malayness. This is precisely because ethnic Malays living in Malaysia are dominantly 
designated as Muslims who must refrain themselves from religiously prohibited 
(“haram”) or “un-Islamic” activities, including drinking and premarital sex. 
 
As the story „Go East!‟ progresses, the reader is exposed to the intimate details of 
Mahmud‟s private life on the plantation estate in Sabah. These include Mahmud‟s 
intimate relationships with his Javanese maid, Suriya, and his Filipino male servant, 
Anton. Mahmud, who is already engaged to his girlfriend, Farida, in Kuala Lumpur, 
admits to being sexually attracted to Suriya. Despite every attempt to avoid physical 
contact with Suriya, Mahmud fails to contain his strong sexual urges and finally 
submits himself to her. The only problem is that Mahmud is unable to perform 
sexually. As Mahmud recalls the embarrassing incident, “Suriya seemed to understand 
without me having to explain anything. She wasn‟t upset. She held me and patted me as 
I cried. I think she thought I was miserable. But I wasn‟t. I was angry, angry with 
myself for my uselessness and my inability to give her good and proper... (Karim, „Go 
East!‟ 108). The shameful incident with Suriya has not only made Mahmud fully aware 
of his sexual impotence, but has continued to haunt him to the point that he fears of 
becoming a laughing stock to his male co-workers on the plantation estate: “I was 
afraid [Suriya would] tell the workers, they‟d laugh and make fun of me” (Karim, „Go 
East!‟ 109). Anxious to prove his manhood to his male colleagues, Mahmud forces 
himself on Tia, a girl prostitute from the local brothel. Mahmud‟s success with Tia (a 
point to which I shall discuss again later) should not be read as a mere validation of his 
masculinity. This is because the ability to perform sexually with Tia not only helps 
67 
 
overcome the emotional distress that Mahmud has to bear as a result of his erectile 
dysfunction, but provides a much-needed means through which Mahmud can identify 
himself as a Malay man in relation to his fellow colleagues and to others on the 
plantation estate. Few weeks after the humiliating event, Suriya introduces Mahmud to 
the young Filipino boy called Anton, who is to assist her with household duties, 
particularly those which involve attending to Mahmud‟s personal needs and requests. 
This is indeed Suriya‟s subtle way of letting Mahmud know that Anton might be able to 
help him overcome his sexual inadequacy. Interestingly, Mahmud finds himself 
sexually drawn to Anton, especially to the young boy‟s lean and toned physique. “Even 
now,” as Mahmud recalls it, “I can still remember the line of [Anton‟s] muscle along 
his arm” (Karim, „Go East!‟ 110). Anton, on the other hand, is also attracted to 
Mahmud and acknowledges their attraction (albeit tacitly) for one another. The two 
men soon develop an intimate relationship which does not go unnoticed by the 
members of Mahmud‟s household.  
 
What is worth noting here is the strategy Mahmud specifically uses to create his own 
concept of self-identity. This is most salient in the ways in which Mahmud places a 
strong emphasis on sexual performance (that is, the ability to achieve and maintain an 
erection for sexual intercourse) in configuring his own Malay male identity. Moreover, 
Mahmud also places a great deal of importance on his strong sexual desires for Anton 
and women in defining his own ideas about being a Malay man. Such a new and more 
nuanced way of being “Malay,” which is deeply shaped by Mahmud‟s bisexual desires, 
challenge and radically transform pedagogical conceptions of Malay identity. This is 
especially true when dominant pedagogical formulations of Malay male identity are 
built upon culturally endorsed beliefs that Malay men must desire women and fulfil 
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cultural expectations of masculinity by entering into a legitimate and socially 
sanctioned conjugal relationship. Michael G. Peletz contends that in order to become “a 
full-fledged social adult” and a full-fledged member of the dominant Malay Muslim 
community, “[Malay men] must enter into legitimate marriage (with socially approved 
member of the opposite sex) and bear or father (or adopt) children” (Reason and 
Passion 304). Mahmud clearly contradicts these culturally endorsed and enforced 
notions of Malay male identity by organizing his life and sense of ethnic identity 
around his desires for, and his relationships with, both men and women (i.e. Anton, 
Suriya, and Faridah).  
 
Although Mahmud is able to subvert and reshape pedagogical ideas about being 
“Malay” by forging his own concept of self-identity, it is important not to lose sight of 
the tensions and conflicts which arise from asserting a Malay identity marked by 
bisexual desires. This is particularly true when Mahmud fears that the workers on the 
plantation estate might find out about his strong sexual desires for Anton. This, in my 
view, reinforces my earlier contention that Karim Raslan (and, perhaps, other 
contemporary Malaysian Malay writers) is not only interested to write about ethnic 
Malays‟ (queer-identifying Malays in particular) own performative visions of being 
“Malay,” but is keen to highlight the consequences of using these performative visions 
as an alternative means of ethnic self-identification. Unfortunately, nothing can be kept 
secret from the workers as they eventually discover Mahmud‟s sexual feelings toward 
Anton. As Mahmud recalls, “[i]n retrospect, I don‟t know what came over me but 
because of Anton, I forgot about the rest of the workers. They had noticed the 
preference I showed to Anton: nothing was private on [this] estate (Karim, „Go 
East!‟113). To make matters worse, the workers express their strong reactions against 
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Mahmud‟s sexual preferences in the form of a graffiti that reads “„Tuan sundal Anton‟ 
(„Tuan is Anton‟s bitch‟)” (Karim, „Go East!‟113), which Mahmud stumbles on while 
inspecting the estate.
3
 In a desperate attempt to defend himself against the workers‟ 
accusations of being Anton‟s sexual partner, Mahmud joins the workers at the brothel 
and ends up having sex with a girl prostitute named Tia. However, Mahmud‟s desires 
for Anton are so strong that he imagines making love to him whilst simultaneously 
forcing himself on Tia. As Mahmud revives the incident:  
Closing my eyes and lying in bed, I imagined the hands were not [Tia‟s] 
but Anton‟s. It was all Anton; his smell, his body and his cries. I dreamt so 
hard that even when [Tia] started moaning and pushed her tiny breasts into 
my face, the charade continued in my mind. But I had performed – I had 
passed the test I had set myself” (Karim, „Go East!‟115). 
 
The story is brought to an abrupt end with Anton being sacked by Mahmud the day 
after the latter spent the night with Tia, leaving the reader (and myself in particular) 
with a deep sense of bewilderment and confusion. This is because Karim leaves the 
reader perplexed about many things, especially Mahmud‟s notion of self-identity. 
Perhaps, it is all about sexual performance, where the ability to perform sexually is all 
that matters to Mahmud‟s notion of being a Malay man, even if he has to imagine 
engaging in sexual intercourse with Anton. 
 
Karim Raslan‟s short story, entitled „Neighbours,‟ on the other hand, offers further 
insights into the multiple ways in which queer-identified Malay men specifically create 
their own notions of Malay male identity. The story „Neighbours‟ follows the life of 
Datin Sarina who is married to a rich Malay businessman named Datuk Mus.
4
 As the 
story unfolds, the reader learns that Datin Sarina is a nosey and gossipy housewife who 
spends most of her time with her close friends, updating themselves with the latest 
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celebrity news and meddling in other people‟s affairs. This is probably because Datuk 
Mus is always away on business trips, thereby leaving Datin Sarina to her own devices. 
But the arrival of Datin Sarina‟s new next-door neighbour changes everything. Narrated 
mainly from Datin Sarina‟s point of view, the story „Neighbours‟ reveals intimate 
details of Kassim‟s private life: his sexuality and his fictive marriage to a “pondan” 
(“effeminate indigenous man”). Prior to the discovery of Kassim‟s “true” self, Datin 
Sarina admits that she became immediately infatuated with Kassim the first time she 
caught a glimpse of him. Datin Sarina confesses that she felt a tremor of excitement 
rushing through her body when she saw her handsome new neighbour: “[Kassim] was 
almost six feet tall. Somehow she had known he‟d be tall. He was ramrod straight, 
smooth shaven, golf-tanned and smiling. Such a smile; she was disarmed. He couldn‟t 
have been more than thirty-five years old and was well-dressed... her new neighbour 
was so good looking” (Karim, „Neighbours‟120). When Kassim finally comes over for 
tea, Datin Sarina admits that she is extremely excited (albeit with a tinge of jealousy) 
about the prospect of meeting Kassim‟s “wife,” who turns out to be her close relative. 
[Sarina] Encik Kassim, I do hope that your wife will do me the pleasure of 
calling on me when the family has settled in. Please don‟t be afraid to ask 
for any help. I understand how tiring it is to be moving house. 
 
[Kassim] I will tell her... actually my mother says she is related to you, 
Datin; her mother is Datin‟s cousin (Karim, „Neighbours‟124; emphases 
added). 
 
What is most notable here is that Kassim (at least in Datin Sarina‟s eyes) epitomizes the 
dominant Malay male subjectivity. This is mainly because Kassim presents himself as a 
heterosexual Malay man who has fulfilled the requirements necessary to become a full-
fledged member of the Malay community, including entering into marriage and 
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becoming a husband and the head of his household. But I would like to argue strongly 
that Kassim adopts specific strategies in constructing his own notions of being a Malay 
man. This is especially true when Kassim takes on a heterosexual public identity as a 
way of identifying and portraying himself in relation to others (particularly to his 
neighbours, Datin Sarina and Datuk Mus) whilst simultaneously maintaining both a 
private homosexual identity and a conjugal relationship with a “pondan.” Such 
strategic renegotiations of a homosexual private identity and a heterosexual public 
identity are central to the complex processes of self-identification and self-assertion 
among some (if not many) gay men in the contemporary world.
5
 Many gay male 
informants in Steven Seidman‟s ethnographic study, for instance, claimed that they 
identified themselves publically as heterosexual as a way of resolving the conflict 
between their sexuality and the social expectations about marriage and raising a family 
(36). Seidman contends further that the gay male informants, whom he interviewed for 
his research, were also able to fit into the heterosexual world by consistently projecting 
a heterosexual public image whilst simultaneously concealing their homosexual 
identity (36). While I agree with Seidman‟s findings on gay men‟s strategic 
renegotiations of heterosexual and homosexual identities, I would like to point out that 
Kassim does not simply adopt a public heterosexual persona as a means of resolving 
the tensions which arise from the social and familial pressures for marriage. I believe 
that Kassim is able to construct his own narratives of Malayness, which radically 
reshape and redefine pedagogical conceptions of Malay ethnicity, precisely through his 
strategic reassertions of public heterosexual and private homosexual identities. What it 
means to be “Malay” for Kassim is not configured and sustained through gender and 
sexual normativities in Malay society simply because he defines his own sense of 
Malayness in terms of male same-sex sexuality. The very projection of a public 
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heterosexual persona, in my view, probably functions as a veil or a screen that Kassim 
uses to protect himself against societal discrimination on the basis of his sexuality. 
Moreover, being a Malay man for Kassim is obviously not constructed on the widely 
held notion that Malay men must marry socially approved members of the opposite sex. 
This is because Kassim establishes and asserts his own visions of a Malay male 
subjectivity through a conjugal relationship with his “pondan” wife. What I find 
particularly interesting is that the fictive marriage between Kassim and his “pondan” 
wife presents a same-sex sexual subversion to the institution of heterosexual marriage 
which has been culturally and religiously sanctified as a legitimate means of sexual 
gratification among Malay Muslims in Malaysia. This is precisely true when this fictive 
marriage opens up a space for “queer” where gay Malay men radically transgress 
traditional normative expectations concerning Malay men by developing male same-
sex erotic and emotional relations that are “haram” (religiously prohibited”) in Islam.  
 
I would also like to point out that the story „Neighbours‟ by Karim Raslan not only 
demonstrates how queer-identified Malay men challenge and transform pedagogical 
narratives of Malayness, but conveys important insights into the various ways in which 
queer-identified Malay men subvert and radically reshape dominant local 
understandings of queerness. This is clearly in line with one the aims of my study, 
which is to fill the gaps in the literature on indigenous queer identities and cultural 
formations by examining how queer-identified Malays redress received ideas about 
queer sexualities in local contexts. The subversion of dominant local ideas about 
queerness can be seen in the shocking revelation of Kassim‟s true identity at the turning 
point of the story. This takes place when Datin Sarina spies on Kassim and his “wife” 
through their bedroom window. As Datin Sarina recalls vividly the incident: 
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“[Kassim‟s wife] or at least what she thought was a woman, had a penis of her own that 
was also erect. It was a pondan...[Kassim‟s wife] pulled herself out suddenly and 
slapped Encik Kassim hard across the buttocks as if he were a fat kerbau and 
sneered...Encik Kassim, moaned like a woman (Karim, „Neighbours‟130-131).6 
Although this incident has put Datin Sarina to shame for prying into her neighbours‟ 
privacy, I find that the shocking discovery is important because it demonstrates that 
Kassim and his “wife” revise settled beliefs regarding male same-sex sexuality, desires, 
and practices in present-day Malaysia. For instance, there is a common assumption 
among many ethnic Malays and members of the local gay Malay community that 
“straight-acting” gay Malay men must always take the dominant, penetrative role in 
same-sex sexual relations. This is mainly because taking the passive, receptive position 
has locally been associated and conflated with being “pondan” (“effeminate”/“sissy”). 
The “hypermasculine” Kassim strongly undermines this assumption by taking and even 
enjoying the receptive role in anal intercourse with his partner. What makes it 
interesting is that Kassim does not regard himself a “sissy” for doing so. As Ann 
Cvetkovich rightly asserts with regard to sexual binary categories or “sexualized 
dichotomies” (e.g. top/bottom, dominant/submissive) that remain prevalent in lesbian 
and gay relationships: “being penetrated need not always represent being topped or 
dominated [simply because] the “feminized” experience of “getting fucked” or of being 
sexually “receptive” cannot be reduced to a single consistent meaning” (133, 135). The 
same holds true for Kassim (and, perhaps, other gay Malay men) who cannot be locally 
designated as a “sissy” just because he enjoys “getting fucked.” This means that being 
sexually “penetrated” by other men can conjure up a multitude of meanings for many 
members of the local gay Malay community. 
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Kassim‟s “wife,” on the other hand, subverts normative notions of same-sex sexual 
practice among “pondans” (“effeminate men”) and “mak nyahs” (“”male-to-female 
transvestites”) in Malaysia. Many “pondans” and “mak nyahs” claim that they must 
assume feminine roles in their intimate relationships with other men simply because 
they have come to regard and think of themselves as “women.” The self-identified 
“mak nyahs,” Khartini Slamah, admits that “[a]s mak nyahs, we had accepted some of 
the conditioning that in a sexual relationship there needs to be someone in the “male” 
role and someone in the “female” role – a “husband” and a “wife”” (101). Kassim‟s 
wife radically subverts such a conditioning by playing the active, penetrating role in 
same-sex sexual acts. My whole point here is that some queer-identified Malay men 
(Kassim and his “wife” in particular) challenge received ideas about same-sex sexuality 
in local contexts. I say this because the various sexual roles Kassim and his “wife” play 
in same-sex sexual relations demonstrate that what it means to be a “queer” for some 
queer-identified Malay man cannot always be expressed through dominant local 
conceptions of “gay” and “pondan” (i.e. that being “gay” is always masculine, and 
“pondan” feminine). Judith Butler has pointed out that, “gender and sexuality are 
performative, rather than fixed or determined by biology or „nature‟” (Gender Trouble 
25). This means that gender and sexuality are not biologically determined and/or 
naturally given, but are constantly fluid and shifting as the result of one‟s performance 
of varied and multiple gender and sexual roles. Sexual roles, like gender ones, then, are 
performative, rather than fixed or innate. Performing the active, penetrative or the anal, 
receptive role in the case of some queer-identified Malay men cannot be conflated with 
an “innate” same-sex sexual identity. For instance, a self-identified “straight acting” 
gay Malay man cannot always be equated with being the penetrative partner in anal 
intercourse between men. The same can be said of how “pondans” and “mak nyahs” 
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cannot always be equated with being the receptive partner in same-sex sexual relation. 
It is possible to say that the story „Neighbours‟ fills an important gap in the scholarship 
on local queer sexualities by demonstrating different, yet possible ways that gay Malay 
men, “pondans,” and “mak nyahs” can play sexually.  
 
Love, Sex, and Relationship: Gay Malay Man in the City in Abdul Aziz‟s Short 
Story, „From the Journal of Azlan Muhammad‟  
Abdul Aziz is a young Malay Muslim writer who originally hails from Sibu, a town in 
the Malaysian state of Sarawak. Abdul‟s short story, „From the Journal of Azlan 
Muhammad‟ was first published in Silverfish New Writing 3, an anthology of fictional 
works by new writers from Malaysia and beyond. I find that the story is important 
because it provides useful information on the strategies used by self-identified gay 
Malay men in forging their own versions of being “Malay.” Azlan, the main character 
of the story, formulates his own ethnic identity by defining himself primarily in terms 
of male same-sex sexuality and his close attachment to the local gay community. This 
is especially true when the story reveals that Azlan lives an openly gay life in 
Malaysia‟s capital city, Kuala Lumpur, where he socializes mostly with other gay-
identified men, particularly his two best friends, Juan and Terry. Azlan even goes to the 
extent of using the phrase “all in the name of sisterhood” (Abdul, „From the Journal‟ 
117) to describe his close and mutually supportive relationships with Juan and Terry, 
which resembles those between sisters/women. Interestingly, the story also reveals that 
Azlan is on a quest for love and happiness, which he seeks to achieve by finding the 
right “man” who is willing to commit fully to a long-term, male same-sex relationship. 
What is worth noting here is the strategy Azlan specifically employs to create his own 
sense of self-identification as a Malay man. This is can be readily observed in the ways 
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in which Azlan gives more prominence to male same-sex sexuality and desire in 
establishing his own notions of being a Malay man. Such queer notions of being 
“Malay” challenge pedagogical narratives of Malay ethnicity, especially when Azlan 
does not comply with cultural expectations of masculinity and marriage (both of which 
are crucial for the formation of pedagogical conceptions of Malayness), but instead 
uses male same-sex sexuality as a means of asserting his own sense of Malayness. 
 
It is necessary to point out that the story „From the Journal of Azlan Muhammad‟ by 
Abdul Aziz not only demonstrates how gay-identified Malay men reshape and 
transform received ideas about Malay ethnicity, but offers useful information about the 
diverse ways in which gay-identified Malay men redress dominant local understandings 
of gayness. Such information is crucial to my study, which aims to fill up the lacunae in 
the literature on indigenous queer identities and cultures by demonstrating how queer-
identifying Malay men and women resist and revise dominant narratives about being 
“queer” in non-western indigenous contexts such as Malaysia. Male same-sex sexuality 
in modern, Muslim-majority Malaysia has always been officially conflated with sin and 
same-sex sexual acts (i.e. sodomy). The former top officer of Malaysia‟s Islamic 
Affairs Department, Abdul Kadir Che Kob, claims that “[male same-sex sexuality] is a 
sin, end of story. How can men have sex with men? God did not make them this way.” 
(qtd. in Williams 10) I strongly disagree with Abdul Kadir‟s view mainly because male 
same-sex sexuality in Malaysia cannot always be equated with same-sex sexual 
practices. This is because Azlan disrupts such an equation by placing a strong emphasis 
on developing a long-term, loving, and committed relationship with a man. Azlan 
clearly states that, “[I do not] hunger for sex anymore. Commitment is the new quest in 
[my] life” (Abdul, „From the Journal‟ 120). What is evidenced here is that male same-
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sex sexual practices are not the only paradigm for thinking about gayness locally 
simply because notions of being “gay,” as felt and practiced by Azlan, are more readily 
defined in terms of same-sex affectional and romantic relationship. This corroborates 
Matt Mutchler‟s contention that many young gay men in the contemporary world 
organize their lives and identities around romantic love, in addition to erotic adventure, 
safer sex, and sexual coercion (qtd. in Plummer 188). I would also like to argue that 
Azlan and other gay men in Abdul Aziz‟s short story redress dominant local ideas 
about male same-sex sexuality, particularly those with regard to male same-sex erotic 
acts and gay bars. In an article entitled “Homosexual‟s Life of Moral Decadence,” the 
secretary-general of the Malaysian Muslim Consumer Association (PPIM), Datuk Dr 
Maamor Osman, claims that “(male) homosexuality” is on the rise in Malaysia, 
following the recent expansion of gay and gay friendly bars and clubs in cosmopolitan 
centres throughout the country.
7
 Dr Maamor asserts further that there is always a strong 
tendency among local gay men to “perform homosexual acts” in these gay bars and 
clubs. The president of the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (ABIM), Yusri 
Mohamad, who strongly concurs with Dr Maamor‟s view, urges the police and local 
authorities to take immediate action against gay bar and club owners for opening up 
avenues where local gay men gather and engage in “homosexual acts.” 8 But I disagree 
with Dr Maamor and Yusri‟ arguments against male same-sex sexuality mainly because 
gay bars and clubs cannot be perceived solely as a place for local gay men to meet up 
and have sex. To equate gay bars and clubs with sex dismisses the fact that they 
function as a critical space for local gay men to develop social and/or political bonds 
with other self-identified gay men, especially when male same-sex sexuality remains 
subject to governmental control and surveillance in present-day Malaysia.
 
Carol 
Warren, for instance, rightly asserts that, “[gay bars] are not only used to make sexual 
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contacts, but to expand the circle of sociability” (184; emphasis added). Azlan‟s closest 
friend, Juan, for instance, complains that, “[i]t‟s not everyday that I get to come down 
[to Kuala Lumpur]. Tomorrow it‟s back to Sungai Petani. And they don‟t have gay bars 
there– I‟m dying here!” (Abdul, „From the Journal‟ 116) 9 Juan‟s sense of agony and 
desperation reinforces Warren‟s assertion (and also my own) that gay bar and other gay 
venues in metropolitan centres such as Kuala Lumpur are crucial for the process of 
socialization among gay men. This is particularly true when gay bar and other gay 
venues become a site in which local gay men are able to expand the circle of sociability 
by organizing social activities with much comfort and ease, and establishing and 
maintaining social support systems and social networks with other gay men from the 
local gay community.
10
  
 
“I am a Muslim, too...”: Pious Gay Malay Men and Lesbian Malay Women in 
Dina Zaman‟s Book, I am Muslim 
Dina Zaman is a Malaysian Malay Muslim writer and editor whose works have 
appeared in one of Malaysia‟s leading English-language newspapers, The New Straits 
Times, and on the popular local news websites, Malaysiakini and The Malaysian 
Insider.
11
 Dina is also well known both locally and internationally for her fictional 
works which have appeared in Skoob Pacifica Anthology No. 2: The Pen is Mightier 
than the Sword and in her first anthology of short fiction, entitled night & day.
12
 Dina‟s 
most recent nonfiction book, I am Muslim, explores diverse, competing views among 
many self-identified Muslims in Malaysia (most of whom are Malays) on Islam and 
what it means to be “Muslim.” The book, which comprises Dina‟s short articles that 
were mostly published on Sajakkini and Malaysiakini’s websites, is divided into four 
main sections: “Travels in Faith,” “Sex within Islam,” “Soul Searching,” and 
79 
 
“Portraits.” I consider the article, entitled „It‟s a Muslim Issue: How Gay Are You?‟ in 
the second section of the book, to be an important piece which highlights the various 
strategies used by gay Malay men and lesbian Malay women in formulating a queer 
Malay identity, and the ways in which gay Malay men and lesbian Malay women revise 
and radically redefine pedagogical conceptions of Malayness.  
 
Haji Zainal Abidin, whom Dina had interviewed for this article, is a 35-year-old 
businessman who identifies himself as a gay Malay man.
13
 As Haji Zainal asserts: 
“[the] thing is, I don‟t see myself in conflict with God...The [Quran] talks about how 
God creates perfection. So if you‟re born handicapped – without an arm or leg, or 
you‟re blind; that in God‟s eyes is perfection itself. My homosexuality as far as I‟m 
concerned, is perfection in God‟s eyes. I didn‟t ask to be gay. I was born gay. I never 
knew anything else.” (Dina, I am Muslim 107).14 What is most notable here the strategy 
that Haji Zainal specifically adopts in constructing his own notion being “Malay.” This 
can be seen in the way Haji Zainal reconciles his sexuality with his religious faith and 
finds no difficulty in doing so. This is mainly because Haji Zainal views his sexuality 
and male same-sex sexuality in particular as a unique creation and a natural endowment 
by God, which must be acknowledged and embraced, rather than rejected and judged. 
Such a positive outlook on same-sex sexuality amplifies Andrew Yip‟s contention that 
many queer-identified Muslims, particularly those whom he discussed in his 
ethnographic research, believe that their sexuality is God‟s creation and, therefore, is 
not inseparable from their sense of self and identity. “Sexuality (for many queer-
identified Muslims),” as Yip posits, “is a „gift,‟ and flawlessly made in the image of 
God...Sexuality, therefore, should not be isolated from one‟s being (e.g., one‟s 
spirituality, emotions, body)” (277). It is, however, important to mention that not all 
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queer-identified Malays living in Malaysia would agree with Haji Zainal and Yip‟s 
positive views regarding same-sex sexuality. The lesbian-identified Hajah, whom Dina 
also interviewed for her article, is a good case in point.
15
  
 
Unlike Haji Zainal, Hajah claims that her sexuality is always at odds with her religious 
beliefs mainly because same-sex sexuality and desire are strictly prohibited and 
punishable under Islamic law. Hajah contends further that if she embraced her sexuality 
fully, she would never be able to secure a place in heaven. Moreover, unlike Haji 
Zainal, Hajah does not regard her sexuality as a divine gift, but has asked God to help 
her get rid of it completely. The only problem is that Hajah cannot contain, nor 
eliminate fully, her feelings and desires for women. As Hajah confesses: 
I don‟t know what to do. When I went to Mecca for my Hajj, I prayed to 
God to take away my sexuality, make me normal, because no matter how 
hard I try to justify myself, the [Quran] does not sanction homosexuality. 
But when I came back... imagine. It‟s been years since I‟ve been on a date 
with a woman. I go off for my second pilgrimage and wham! Women 
everyway! 
       What do I do? (Dina, I am Muslim 106) 
 
The unresolved tension between Hajah‟s religious beliefs and her sexual desires is 
similarly experienced by “tudung lesbians” who are also featured in Dina‟s article. 
“Tudung lesbians,” as Dina notes, are young, Muslim lesbian women (most of whom 
are Malays) who wear the “hijab”/“tudung” (“head scarves”).16 While acknowledging 
that the act of donning the “hijab”/“tudung” conjures a wide range of meanings to 
Muslim women in Malaysia, “tudung lesbians” wear the “hijab”/“tudung” as a way of 
fulfilling their religious obligation; that is, to protect and preserve their modesty by 
covering their “aurah”/“aurat” (“a woman‟s entire body with the exception of her face 
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and hands”). More importantly, “tudung lesbians” put on the “hijab”/”tudung” to 
demonstrate their obedience and devotion to God. Such a profound sense of religiosity, 
which has become the foundation of “tudung lesbians‟” self-identity, is largely molded 
by the ways in which “tudung lesbians” have been raised in religious families that 
instilled strong moral and religious values. But the only problem is that “tudung 
lesbians” continue to desire women and find that such desire is always in conflict with 
their strong moral and religious upbringings. “Tudung lesbians”, as Dina writes, “were 
confused and frightened. They asked me the same question: how could they be gay 
when they were brought up as good Muslims? They wore scarves, they didn‟t mess 
about, they prayed they were good daughters and friends, but they desired only women” 
(I am Muslim 110; emphasis added).  
 
Dina‟s discussion of Hajah and “tudung lesbian” reveals the tensions and conflicts 
queer-identified Malays often experience in constructing and articulating their own 
notions of self and identity. In other words, Dina demonstrates that, while some queer-
identified Malays (e.g. Haji Zainal) are able to identity and realign themselves as 
“queer” and “Malay” by strategically embracing both queerness and religion, other 
queer-identified Malays (e.g. Hajah and “tudung lesbians”) are not able to do so 
because they cannot resolve the dissonance between their religious faiths and their 
sexuality. This helps elucidate the point I‟m trying to make in this chapter and 
throughout this study that queer-identified Malays often experience difficulties in 
asserting and inhabiting their own sense of Malay identity, which they specifically 
create based on their lived experiences of being “queer” and “Malay.” It is not wrong 
to say that the processes of self-identification among queer-identified Malay men and 
women living within the national borders of Malaysia are fraught with both 
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possibilities and limitations. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, for example, has pointed out that 
self-identification is a complex process which is rife with immense potentialities and 
complications. This is because the very act of identifying is constantly inflected by 
multiple forms of identification, which include one‟s identification with and one‟s 
identification as against. As Sedgwick posits, “[a]fter all, to identify as must always 
include multiple processes of identification with. It also involves identification as 
against; but even did it not, the relations implicit in identifying with are, as 
psychoanalysis suggests, in themselves quite sufficiently fraught with intensities of 
incorporation, diminishment, inflation, loss, reparation, and disavowal” (Epistemology 
of the Closet 61; original emphases). Although Sedgwick problematizes the notion of 
identification in relation to women and gay men in the West, I find that her discussion 
of identification as, identification with, and identification as against can be used to 
explain the complex processes of self-identification among queer-identified Malays in 
Malaysia. Haji Zainal, for instance, opens up the possibility of forging and sustaining a 
gay Malay identity through his identification with male same-sex sexuality and 
religion. More importantly, Haji Zainal is able to identify himself unproblematically 
and unconditionally as a gay Malay man because he does not consider his identification 
with religion and male same-sex sexuality to be at odds with each other. As Haji Zainal 
asserts, “I am very comfortable being a Muslim who happens to be gay” (Dina, I am 
Muslim 107) “Tudung lesbians” and Hajah, on the other hand, also open up the 
potentiality of formulating a lesbian Malay identity through their identifications with 
female same-sex sexuality and religion. But because of their strong religious beliefs 
and religious upbringings, “tudung lesbians” and Hajah often experience difficulties in 
resolving the tension between their identifications with same-sex sexuality and their 
Islamic faith. This unresolved tension and its attendant emotional effects including 
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anxiety, fear, and confusion have caused “tudung lesbians” and Hajah to identify 
themselves as against “lesbian.” In other words, “tudung lesbians” and Hajah desire 
women, but because they believe that these desires are unacceptable in Islam, they find 
it hard to embrace their lesbianity, to the extent that they are not able to identify 
themselves fully as “lesbians.” To complicate matters, some “tudung lesbians” whom 
Dina interviewed for her article identify themselves as against “lesbian” because they 
view and define themselves more in terms of their relationships with others including 
family, friends, and God. As one “tudung lesbian” states, “I‟m trying to define who I 
am, not just in the eyes of the world, but in the eyes of God. I talk to some people, they 
say to me, if you‟re gay, you‟re gay, just embrace it. I can’t, I think a lot about 
religion.” (Dina, I am Muslim 112; emphasis added). 
 
It is essential to note that Dina‟s discussion of queer-identified Malays‟ actual lived 
experiences and material conditions also offers further insights into the ways in which 
queer-identified Malays radically reshape and redefine pedagogical conceptualisations 
of Malayness. Haji Zainal and Hajah, for example, disrupt dominant notions of “Haji” 
and “Hajah” as understood by many Malay Muslims in Malaysia. “Haji (for men) or 
“Hajah” (for women) is a term which is often used to denote Malay Muslims who have 
fulfilled their religious obligations of performing the fifth pillar of Islam; that is, the 
Hajj. Many Malay Muslims have come to associate the terms “Haji” and “Hajah” with 
piety and submission to God. Interestingly, Malay Muslims who have completed the 
Hajj often demonstrate their sense of piety by assuming a religious persona which is 
visibly expressed through various external markers. William R. Roff, for instance, 
notes that many Malay Muslim men would put on white skull caps as a way of 
asserting their “Haji” status (38). Roff maintains further that some Malay Muslims, 
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who have returned from their pilgrimage to Mecca would express their “Haji” or 
“Hajah” status in a variety of ways, including wearing Arab clothing and taking more 
“Islamic” names to suit their new status denoted by the title “Haji” or “Hajah” (49). I 
would like to argue that Haji Zainal and Hajah undermine and revise dominant 
pedagogical configurations of “Haji”/“Hajah” by creating new and radical notions of 
being “Haji”/“Hajah.” This is particularly true when Haji Zainal and Hajah continue to 
sustain their Islamic status and religious faiths without necessarily denouncing their 
sexuality and/or desires for members of the same sex. The same holds true for “tudung 
lesbians” who radically subvert hegemonic ways of thinking about the act of donning 
the “hijab”/“tudung” among Muslim women within Malaysian national territory. Many 
Muslims in Malaysia, as discussed earlier, have come to regard the act of wearing the 
“hijab” /“tudung” as a way of showing their obedience to God and as a means of 
preserving and protecting Muslim women‟s chastity and modesty. More importantly, 
Malay Muslim women who don the “hijab”/“tudung” are often perceived by the 
dominant Malay Muslim community to be heterosexual women of good moral 
character and with strong religious convictions. “Tudung lesbians,” however, revise 
and redefine received ideas about “hijab”/ “tudung” by continuing to put on the 
“hijab”/“tudung” to fulfill their obligations as Muslims whilst simultaneously 
sustaining their feelings and desires for women. Even Dina herself was, at first, 
shocked when she learned about “tudung lesbians”: 
What struck me was my ignorance and small-mindedness pertaining to this 
matter: I actually thought that there was no way a girl in a tudung could be 
homosexual. You’re wearing a tudung, for crying out loud, you have taken 
a divine oath to be a good Muslim, you can’t be lesbian. Later I thought, 
what you wear and practise has no bearing on the person who you really are 
(I am Muslim 110; original emphasis). 
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I believe that Dina‟s concluding remark is important because it demonstrates that 
notions of being “Malay” and “Muslim” as felt and experienced by “tudung lesbians” 
cannot simply be defined in terms of religious markers and practices. This is because 
female same-sex sexuality, religious obligations, and external religious markers (i.e. 
“tudung”/“hijab”) constitute an important part of their identity as Malay Muslim 
women. The same can be said of Haji Zainal and Hajah whose notions of being 
“Malay” and “Muslim” cannot be configured through religious symbols and practices. 
This is because Haji Zainal and Hajah use both their sexuality and the title 
“Haji”/“Hajah” as a means of identifying and realigning themselves as pious, queer 
Malay Muslims in the Malay Muslim community. The point here is not to question the 
significance of “hijab”/ “tudung”/ “Haji”/ “Hajah” as religious markers of Malay 
Muslim identity in Malaysia. What I‟m trying to do here is to show that “tudung 
lesbians,” Haji Zainal, and Hajah offer a more nuanced understanding of what it means 
to be “Malay” and “Muslim.” This is vividly portrayed in the ways in which “tudung 
lesbians,” Haji Zainal, and Hajah construct their own ethnic identity through sexual 
difference while simultaneously maintaining cultural and religious features of 
Malayness. Such new and radical ways of being “Malay” buttress my contention that 
Malay ethnicity cannot be constructed solely through cultural, religious, gender, and 
sexual normativities simply because many ethnic Malays (queer-identifying Malay men 
and women in particular) are not just “Muslims” who  who practise Malay traditions 
and customs, but organize their lives and identities around same-sex sexuality, desires, 
and practices.  
 
My analysis of representations of queer-identified Malays in contemporary Malaysian 
literature has demonstrated that literary works by Malaysian Malay writers function as 
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a site for “queer” where they discuss and convey diverse performative ideas about 
being “Malay,” which challenge and redefine dominant pedagogical formulations of 
Malay ethnic identity. This corroborates the overall aim of the thesis which attempts to 
show how Malays, particularly queer-identified Malays in “popular forms of 
expression” such as contemporary Malaysian literature, redress received narratives of 
Malayness by forging performative notions of being “Malay.” Queer-identified Malays 
in the works of Abdul Aziz, Dina Zaman, and Karim Raslan employed a wide range of 
strategies in formulating their own ethnic identities. These strategies include placing 
more emphasis on same-sex sexuality and desire, and embracing both sexuality and 
religion. Such “queer” notions of Malay ethnic identity radically reshape pedagogical 
conceptions of Malayness, which are configured and sustained through the Malay 
culture and religion, as well as normative expectations of gender and sexuality as 
enforced by the dominant Malay Muslim community. My analysis of literary 
representations of queer-identified Malays also shows that contemporary Malaysian 
literature functions a site where Malaysian Malay writers discuss the tensions and 
conflicts queer-identified Malays often experience in asserting and inhabiting their own 
visions of Malayness. This, too, is crucial for the study which attempts to find out how 
queer-identified Malays construct and articulate their identities and the various material 
implications of doing so. Such tensions and conflicts can be seen in the form of the 
dissonance between same-sex sexuality and religion, which has become a major 
obstacle to some queer-identified Malays who wish to assert identities marked by 
queerness, but are not able to do so because of their strong religious convictions and/or 
religious upbringings. It would be interesting, for future research on queer Malay 
identities, to find out the strategies queer-identifying Malay men and women 
specifically employ in resolving the difficulties, conflicts, and anxieties which arise 
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from the producing and asserting a sexually dissident notion of Malay identity. This, I 
believe, may provide more useful insights into the complex processes of self-
identification and self-assertion among queer-identified Malays in modern-day 
Malaysia.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 These series include Ceritalah: Malaysia in Transition, Ceritalah 2: Journeys through Southeast Asia: 
Ceritalah 2, Ceritalah 3: Malaysia: A Dream Deferred, and Ceritalah Indonesia. 
2 It is pertinent to note that the lives of many Malays in Malaysia are still governed and regulated by 
complex codes of behaviour and etiquette (“adab”). This is especially true when Malay society places a 
strong emphasis on respect, esteem, sensitivity towards others‟ needs, and social restraints on behaviour 
in both the public and private domains (Carr 205). Phrases such as “tak boleh” (“not allowed”), “tak 
halus” (“unrefined”), and “tak manis” (“unpleasant”) are often used to describe one‟s failure to adhere to 
and demonstrate the standards of proper Malay behaviour. See, for instance, Alwi bin Sheikh Alhadi‟s 
book, Malay Customs and Traditions and Cathrine Lim GS‟s Gateway to Malay Culture for their 
elaborate discussions of the Malay concept of social behaviour.  
3 The word “Tuan” here means “master” and is used by the workers not only to address, but to show their 
respect to Mahmud as the manager of the plantation estate. Interestingly, the word “Tuan” continues to 
be used as a title of respect for certain high officials or people of high social ranks as it did in the past. 
This is especially true when the term “Tuan” (“master”) was commonly used by indigenous people to 
refer to colonial officials and foreigners. 
4 The word “Datuk” (for men) and the word “Datin” (for women) are non-hereditary honorific state titles, 
which are conferred by a ruler or a governor who is appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (“head of 
the Malaysian nation-state”). The wife of a “Datuk” is a “Datin.” For more discussion of Malay styles 
and titles, see, for instance, Abdullah Ali‟s Malaysian Protocol and Correct Forms of Address.  
5 See Steven Seidman‟s Beyond the Closet: The Transformation of Gay and Lesbian Life for his 
discussion of the negotiations of identities among gay men and lesbians in the America. 
6 “Kerbau” is a Malay word “buffalo.” 
7 See Datuk Dr Maamor Osman‟s view on homosexuality in Malaysia in Melati Mohd Ariff‟s article, 
entitled “Homosexual‟s Life of Moral Decadence” at  
<http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=344763>. 
8 See Yusri Mohamad‟s ideas about homosexual acts in non-western indigenous locales such as in 
Malaysia in Melati Mohd Ariff‟s article “Homosexual‟s Life of Moral Decadence” at 
<http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=344763>. 
9 Sungai Petani is a town in the Malaysian state of Kedah. 
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10 See, for instance, Gerald P. Mallon‟s Social Work Practice with Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and 
Transgender People, for more discussion of gay bar and other gay establishments as site for social 
support among gay men. 
11 See The New Straits Times‟ website at <http://www.nst.com.my/>, Malaysiakini‟s official website at 
<http://malaysiakini.com/>., and The Malaysian Insider‟s official website at 
<http://themalaysianinsider.com/>.  
12 See Skoob Pacifica at <http://www.skoob.com/pub/pacifica/index.html>. 
13 The Arabic word “Haji” is an honorific title given to Muslim men who have completed the pilgrimage 
to Mecca.  
14 Haji Zainal‟s equation of homosexuality with being handicapped could be considered as being 
problematic. This is because such an equation reinforces the widely held belief among many Malaysian 
Malays that being gay is “cacat” (“handicapped”, “disabled”). Many Malays living in Malaysia believe 
that despite being endowed by God with male reproductive organs, gay Malay men are “cacat” because 
of their inability to establish sexual relations with women (hence their inability to reproduce and 
procreate). But I would like to argue strongly that not all Malay gay men equate being gay with being 
handicapped.  Gay Malay men whom I know do not see themselves as “handicapped” or as having 
physical disabilities. Some of these gay Malay men knew that they were gay when they were very young 
and have long embraced their sexuality as an important part of their lives. Other Malay gay men view 
their sexuality as a constant source of conflict rather than a physical or mental defect. This is especially 
evidenced when some Malay gay men find that being “different” from the norm is always in conflict 
with cultural and familial expectations placed on them as Malay Muslim men. My point here is to show 
that Haji Zainal‟s problematic equation is one but not the only way to understand gay Malay men‟s 
perceptions of homosexuality and what it means to be gay in Malaysia. 
15 The Arabic word “Hajah” is an honorific title given to Muslim women who have successfully 
performed the haj. 
16 The Arabic word “hijab,” and the Malay word “tudung,” are used interchangeably in Malaysia to refer 
to women‟s headscarf.  
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Chapter 3 What Does It Mean to Be “Queer” and “Malay”?: Exploring the  
                  Construction of Queer Malay Identities in Contemporary Malaysian  
         Culture 
 
The influence of Western ideas and cultures on these new imaginings of 
Asian homoeroticism is complex. Western gay/lesbian styles and 
terminology have often been appropriated as strategies to resist local 
heteronormative strictures and carve out new local spaces. However, these 
appropriations have not reflected a wholesale recreation of Western sexual 
cultures in Asian contexts, but instead suggest a selective and strategic use 
of foreign forms to create new ways of being Asian and homosexual.  
–Peter A. Jackson, Pre-Gay, Post-Queer: 
Thai Perspectives on Proliferating 
Gender/Sex Diversity in Asia 
 
 
What does it mean to be “queer” and “Malay” in modern-day Malaysia? In Chapter 2, I 
demonstrated that there are various ways in which queer-identified Malays specifically 
created their own notions of ethnic identity. This is particularly notable in the case of 
queer-identified Malay men and women in literary works by Malaysian Malay writers 
who employed diverse strategies in constructing their own sense of Malayness. I want 
to extend my discussion of queer Malay identity construction by focusing on the 
complex processes of self-identification among queer-identified Malays in the works of 
Malaysian Malay scholars and filmmakers. More specifically, in this chapter I want to 
further explore and analyse how queer-identified Malay men and women in 
ethnographic studies by Ismail Baba and Khartini Slamah, and in queer-themed films 
by Osman Ali and Amy Ikram Ismail, formulate their own visions of being “Malay.”  
My decision to focus on the works of Malaysian Malay scholars and filmmakers is 
largely motivated by the fact that they present multiple performative ideas about being 
“Malay.” What is more important is that these performative ideas are derived from the 
scholars and filmmakers‟ own personal observations and reflections on the processes of 
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identity production among queer-identified Malays. This clearly corresponds with 
Shamsul Amri Baharuddin‟s assertion that everyday-defined (or performative) ideas 
about being “Malay” often take multiple forms of expression including ethnic Malays‟ 
personal narratives of their lives and identities (which are documented by 
anthropologists and historians of Malay society), and popular forms of expression or 
popular culture (e.g. songs, poems, and short stories). I would like to broaden 
Shamsul‟s assertion by pointing out that popular forms of expression also include 
queer-themed films by Malaysian Malay filmmakers. This is mainly because, queer-
themed films also  function as a means through which local filmmakers discuss queer-
identified Malays‟ performative ideas about being “Malay” and the various ways in 
which queer-identified Malays challenge dominant pedagogical conceptions of Malay 
ethnicity. By broadening the idea of popular forms of expression to include queer-
themed films enables this study to realize its central aim; that is, to examine how queer-
identified Malays in contemporary Malaysian literature and culture redress received 
narratives of Malayness. 
 
My analysis of queer-identified Malays in the works of Malaysian Malay scholars and 
filmmakers is divided into two parts: First, I will examine queer-identifying Malay men 
and women‟s personal narratives of their lives and identities, which are documented in 
ethnographic studies by Ismail Baba and Khartini Slamah. This will be followed by an 
analysis of self-identified gay and bisexual Malay men, and “mak nyahs” (“male-to-
female transvestites) who are featured in the film Bukak Api by Osman Ali, and the 
film Comolot by Amy Ikram Ismail.” The overall aim of the analysis is to explore and 
examine multiple strategies employed by queer-identified Malays (particularly those 
represented in ethnographic studies and local queer-themed films) in inventing their 
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own ethnic identities and the ways in which they subvert and radically reshape 
pedagogical narratives of Malayness that are produced and sustained through cultural, 
religious, gender, and sexual normativities. My analysis also includes an examination 
of the tensions and conflicts which arise from creating and expressing a Malay ethnic 
identity marked by queerness. This is particularly true when the processes of self-
identification among queer-identified Malays living in Malaysia are intimately 
entwined with indigenous religious and cultural beliefs and practices. I will specifically 
show how concepts such as such as “halal/haram” (“religiously lawful/unlawful”), 
“nafsu/akal” (“passion/reason”), “dosa/taubat” (“sin/repentance”), and “dunia/akhirat” 
(“this world/the afterlife”), which have become deeply ingrained in the minds and in 
the lives of queer-identified Malays, present a major obstacle to the formation and 
articulation of a Malay identity marked by queerness. The analysis is important because 
it helps validate one of the central assertions of my thesis; that is, the various material 
implications of defining and asserting oneself as “queer” and “Malay” in present-day 
Malaysia. 
 
Defining Oneself as “Queer” and “Malay”: Queer-identified Malay Men and 
Women in Ethnographic Studies by Ismail Baba and Khartini Slamah 
Ismail Baba‟s article, entitled “Gay and Lesbian Couples in Malaysia,” which was 
simultaneously published in Journal of Homosexuality and Gay and Lesbian Asia: 
Culture, Identity, Community, in my view, is important because it highlights and 
discusses various psychosocial issues pertaining to self-acceptance, social isolation, 
role models, and socialization process which deeply affect interracial same-sex erotic 
and affectional relationships in modern-day Malaysia. Although Ismail does not 
directly address issues relating to queer Malay identity-formation, I find that his 
93 
 
discussion of queer-identified Malays who are involved in these relationships is very 
useful because it provides important insights into the complex processes of queer 
Malay identity creation. In this article, Ismail analyzes three long-term, interracial 
same-sex intimate relationships: two gay male couples (Azlan and Ramli; Roslan and 
his Chinese partner, Lee) and one lesbian couple (Rokiah and her Caucasian spouse, 
Susan). These same-sex couples are in their mid-30s and 40s and come from different 
socio-cultural and economic backgrounds. For instance, Roslan, Lee, Azlan, and Susan 
are all working professionals, while Ramli works as a mechanic and Rokiah runs her 
own small food business. Ramli, Roslan, Rokiah, and Azlan (all of whom are Malay 
Muslims) align themselves with dominant narratives of Malayness by adhering to the 
standard teachings of Islam, and by fulfilling cultural and religious expectations of 
masculinity/femininity. For example, Rokiah, Ramli, and Roslan have complied with 
both social and familial expectations of marriage. These marriages, however, all ended 
in divorce. Rokiah, a single parent with four children, had few unsuccessful marriages 
while Roslan had been married once and has a six year old son who now lives with his 
former wife. Ramli, on the other hand, had at least three failed marriages. Rokiah, 
Roslan, and Ramli all claim that they got married because heterosexual marriage is 
expected of Malay men and women. Rokiah, as Ismail notes, maintains that Malay 
women are expected to enter into marriage because being “single” is always frown 
upon by many members of the dominant Malay Muslim community. This is especially 
true when Malays must enter into a legitimate marriage with socially approved 
members of the opposite sex and bear or adopt children in order to be accepted and 
recognized as a full-fledged (heterosexual) member of the Malay Muslim community 
(Peletz, Reason and Passion 304). Rokiah probably got married because she wanted to 
be accepted and acknowledged as a legitimate member of her community. Interestingly, 
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Rokiah, Ramli, and Roslan have been able to maintain intimate relationships with their 
same-sex partners over the years, to the extent that these relationships are much more 
important that their heterosexual marriages. Ramli‟s relationship with Azlan, as Ismail 
points out, was disrupted when Ramli decided to get married (as a result of societal 
pressure) for the third time. The marriage, however, lasted for three years mainly 
because Ramli was not happy and realized that his happiness lies with Azlan (Ismail 
153). Although Azlan, Roslan, Ramli, and Rokiah are self-identified Muslims, they 
differ greatly in their religious beliefs and practices. For instance, unlike Azlan and 
Ramli, whom Ismail describes as “not religious” (153), Roslan is a devout Muslim who 
performs regularly the “solat” (“obligatory daily Muslim prayers”) and observes the 
annual fast during the month of Ramadhan; two of the important pillars of Islam (151). 
Rokiah, on the other hand, admits that there is always a conflict between her sexuality 
and her Islamic faith. Rokiah claims that she is often confused about how to live her 
life as a lesbian woman mainly because Islam disqualifies and invalidates lesbianism, 
particularly the deviant practice of “musahaqah” (“lesbian sex”) (Ismail 150). Azlan 
and Roslan, however, do not find themselves in conflict with religion, but have 
embraced both their religious beliefs and sexuality as a way of living in this world as 
“gay,” “Malay,” and “Muslim.” Azlan, for instance, believes that “there is nothing 
wrong with being gay and sees any act of love between men or women as the work of 
God” (Ismail 152).  
 
What is worth noting here is that queer-identified Malays adopt various strategies in 
creating their own notions of being “Malay.” This is readily observed in the ways in 
which queer-identified Malays in Ismail Baba‟s ethnographic study construct their own 
sense of Malayness through strategic renegotiations of ethnicity, Islamic faith, and 
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same-sex sexuality. For example, some queer-identified Malays reconcile their 
sexuality with their religious beliefs, while others fulfil dominant expectations of 
heterosexual marriage whilst simultaneously engaging in same-sex relationships in 
defining themselves as “Malay.” Such nuanced ways of being “Malay,” which are 
forged through queer-identified Malays‟ strategic reconciliations of their sexuality and 
ethnic and religious heritages, redefine and radically transform dominant pedagogical 
conceptions of Malayness. This is especially true when pedagogical formulations of 
Malay ethnic identity are built upon culturally enforced and endorsed beliefs that 
Malays must be heterosexual and maintain socially approved sexual relationships. 
Queer-identified Malays in Ismail Baba‟s research obviously undermine such beliefs by 
defining themselves as “Malay” and “Muslim” who develop and maintain same-sex 
erotic and affectional relationships. Another point worth mentioning is that queer-
identified Malays open up the possibility for thinking about Malay ethnic identity as a 
form of struggle, rather than as something which is fixed, coherent, and/or neatly given. 
I say this because queer-identified Malays cannot be “neatly” defined as Muslims who 
practice Malay traditions and customs, and speak Malay. Rokiah, for example, cannot 
be simply designated as “Malay” because she is constantly struggling to define her own 
sense of Malayness. Ismail‟s research shows that Rokiah cannot resolve the dissonance 
between being Muslim and being a lesbian, to the extent that she finds it very difficult 
to identify and assert herself as a lesbian Malay Muslim woman within the dominantly 
heteronormative Malay Muslim community. Rokiah‟s struggle for her own ethnic 
identity reinforces the idea that being “Malay” is never straightforward and cannot be 
fully determined by ethnic Malays‟ cultural and religious heritages. This, in my view, 
buttresses the central argument of my study by showing that what it means to be 
“Malay” for some (if not many) ethnic Malays living within Malaysia‟s territorial 
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boundaries is permeable and therefore, cannot be constructed solely through Malay 
culture and religion. This is mainly because Malayness is constantly being shaped and 
reshaped by multiple variables, including same-sex sexuality, Malay culture, and Islam.  
 
It is crucial to point out that Ismail Baba‟s study not only demonstrates how queer-
identified Malays radically revise pedagogical formulations of Malay ethnicity, but 
offers some insights into the production of queer identities and queer cultures in 
modern-day Malaysia. Such insights are crucial to my thesis which aims to discuss how 
queer-identified Malays rethink dominant local understandings of queerness. For 
instance, Ismail maintains that because there are no exact equivalent words for “gay” 
and “homosexual” in Malay, derogatory terms such as “pondan,” “mak nyah,” “darai,” 
bapok,” and “kedi” are used predominantly to address effeminate men, male cross-
dressers, transvestites, and male-to-female transsexuals in Malaysia (144-145). Ismail 
maintains further that the term “gay” is often used interchangeably with “pondan” to 
denote indigenous men who are effeminate, men who prefer men, men who behave like 
and see themselves as women (145). Ismail also asserts that the term “gay” is used 
most frequently to describe non-effeminate indigenous gay men who align themselves 
with the “modern manifestation of homosexuality”; that is, the western standards of 
masculine gayness (145). While I concur with Ismail that there is no Malay equivalent 
word for “gay” and “homosexual,” I cannot agree with his contention that “gay” is used 
to refer to “pondan” and non-effeminate indigenous gay men. I say this because queer-
identified indigenous men create varied and competing notions of “pondan” and “gay,” 
which challenge dominant local configurations of “sissiness” and “gayness.”  For 
instance, the term “gay” cannot always be used to refer to “pondan” because many self-
identified gay Malay men in Malaysia do not identify themselves as “sissy” or 
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“effeminate.” The same can be said of how the term “gay” does not primarily signify 
effeminate indigenous men simply because effeminacy is not always a marker of gay 
male identity in the West. As Robert Alan Brookey, following Kinsey, rightly notes, 
“(e)ffeminacy cannot be a marker to identify homosexuality, because homosexuality is 
not a discrete category” (36). This means that effeminacy is one, but not the only, 
paradigm for thinking about gayness since there are diverse and multiple ways of being 
“gay” in non-western contexts such as Malaysia. Many Malay men who have come to 
regard and think of themselves as “gay” dissidentify with, and disengage from, 
“pondan” because the term “pondan” is often used by the dominant Malay community 
to shame indigenous men for being “kewanitaan” (“womanly”) and “tidak jantan” 
(“unmanly”).1 This corroborates Judith Butler‟s assertion that sexuality is regulated 
through the policing and shaming of gender, particularly with regard to how gay men 
are often called “feminine” on the basis that they are no longer “real” or “proper” men 
(Bodies that Matter 238). It is the fear of being called “kewanitaan” and “tidak jantan” 
that explains why many gay-identified Malay men do not regard “pondan” as a marker 
of their gay identity. This is particularly true when gay-identified Malay men in 
Ismail‟s ethnographic study claim that they are not “pondan” because they do not 
behave like women or even see themselves as women (Ismail 157).  
 
I would like to redress Ismail‟s assertion of the term “gay” by showing that such term 
cannot be used interchangeably with “pondan” because “mak nyahs” (“male-to-female 
transsexuals”), who are often referred to as “pondan,” seek to differentiate themselves 
from gay men whilst simultaneously reclaiming “pondan” in constructing their own 
notions of self and identity. This is crucial because it demonstrates that many queer-
identified Malays in Malaysia resist and revise dominant ideas about local forms of 
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queerness by formulating their own queer identities. In her article, entitled “The 
Struggle To Be Ourselves, Neither Men Nor Women: Mak Nyahs in Malaysia,” 
Khartini Slamah maintains that “mak nyah,” which was originally coined in 1987 in 
conjunction with the formation of the short-lived Association of Transsexuals in 
Federal Territory, is a term that defines Khartini herself and other transsexuals in 
Malaysia. As Khartini explains: 
The term „mak nyah‟, which derives from mak (mother), was coined in 
1987 by Malaysia‟s male transsexuals in an attempt to define ourselves. 
Our attempt at self-definition emerged from two streams: first, a desire to 
differentiate ourselves from gay men, transvestites, cross-dressers, drag 
queens and other „sexual minorities‟, with whom all those who are not 
heterosexual are automatically lumped; and, second, because we wanted to 
define ourselves from a vintage point of dignity rather than from the 
position of derogation in which Malaysian society had located us, with 
names such as bapok, darai, pondan, and bantut, all of which mean „men 
who are effeminate‟ (99).2 
 
What is particularly worth noting here is that “mak nyahs” not only distinguish, but 
also disassociate themselves from “gayness” which Ismail describes as being locally 
conflated with “pondan.” Although the term “mak nyah” was created because Khartini 
herself and other transsexuals did not want to be described derogatively as “pondan,” I 
would like to point out that some “mak nyahs” continue to regard themselves as 
“pondan.” The transsexual character, Kak Tipah, in Osman Ali‟s film Bukak Api, for 
example, claims that she is both “mak nyah” and “pondan,” and uses these two terms 
interchangeably in expressing her transsexual identity. Interestingly, Kak Tipah and 
other “nyahs” reclaim the term “pondan” by dismantling its pejorative associations. 
This is especially true when “pondan” is reclaimed and performed as a site of 
resistance, where “nyahs” take on “pondan” with dignity and pride as part of 
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indigenous tradition by subverting and undermining the homophobia and misogyny 
(i.e. “tidak jantan”/ “kewanitaan”) that are often associated with it. This, in turn, creates 
a new site of hybridity where “pondan,” which many “nyahs” regard as a marker of 
their identity, comes out of Malay culture, but is, at times, layered with western notions 
of queer, as queer has been reclaimed as agency and defiance in the West. There are 
also some (if not many) “nyahs” who specifically adopt the strategy of accommodating 
various and, at times, overlapping identities in creating their own forms of self-
identification. As Khartini asserts:  
In our community, having sex change operation is not a must to qualify for 
mak nyah status. This is mainly because most mak nyahs, who live in 
conditions of economic marginalization, cannot afford to have sex change 
operations. Our mak nyah identity is fluid enough to encompass the 
diversities of gender and sexualities. Mak nyahs define themselves in 
various ways along the continuums of gender and sexuality: as men who 
look like women and are soft and feminine, as the third gender, as men who 
dress up as women, as men who like to do women‟s work, as men who like 
men, etc. (100) 
 
Khartini‟s remarks on the flexibility and fluidity of “mak nyah” identity reinforces the 
idea that indigenous male-to-female transsexuals open up the possibility of inventing a 
dynamic description of themselves in relation to others and to the world, which cannot 
be defined in terms of fixed normative ideas about gender and sexuality. Judith Butler 
has maintained that gender and sexuality are not fixed because a stable sex cannot 
always be sustained through a stable gender on the basis that sexuality and gender do 
not always align themselves heteronormatively (Gender Trouble 208). The same holds 
true for “mak nyahs” whose sense of identity cannot be sustained and regulated by rigid 
normative ideas about Malay male subjectivity. This is because “mak nyahs” can still 
identify themselves as “men” while simultaneously maintaining their femininity and 
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femaleness. Such a fluid and dynamic notion of self and identity amplifies the 
American transgender activist, Dallas Denny‟s assertion that there are indeed diverse 
and possible ways of being “transgender.” As Denny points out, “[w]ith new ways of 
looking at things, suddenly all sorts of options have opened up for transgendered 
people: living full time without gender surgery, recreating in one gender role while 
working in another, identifying as neither gender, or both, blending characteristics of 
different genders in new and creative ways, identifying as genders and sexes heretofore 
undreamed of...” (1; qtd. in Ekins 185)   
 
Finally, I would like to argue that the term “gay,” which Ismail uses in his ethnographic 
research, does not refer solely and specifically to non-effeminate indigenous gay men 
who realign themselves with the “modern manifestation of homosexuality”; that is, the 
western standards of masculine gayness (Ismail 145). It is important to emphasize that 
not all self-identified gay Malay men express their sexuality in terms of western 
masculine gay male identity. Some gay-identified Malay men living in Malaysia 
employ various strategies in forging their own notions of being “gay” locally. These 
include gay Malay men‟s selective reappropriations of both local and western forms of 
gayness. Peter A. Jackson, for example, has argued that western forms of queerness are 
continually redeployed and recontextualised by many queer-identified people in Asia as 
a way of constructing and expressing their own notions of being “queer” which are not 
absolute renditions of those prevalent in the West. As Jackson writes: 
The influence of Western ideas and cultures on these new imaginings of 
Asian homoeroticism is complex. Western gay/lesbian styles and 
terminology have often been appropriated as strategies to resist local 
heteronormative strictures and carve out new local spaces. However, these 
appropriations have not reflected a wholesale recreation of Western sexual 
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cultures in Asian contexts, but instead suggest a selective and strategic use 
of foreign forms to create new ways of being Asian and homosexual (6). 
 
I agree with Jackson mainly because western queer identities and cultures are also 
strategically adopted and reworked by queer-identified Malays as a way of reclaiming 
queerness which is not reducible to its rendition of western culture. This can be 
observed in the ways in which some “lelaki lembuts” (“effeminate indigenous gay 
men”) do not necessarily adopt “manly” or “straight” mannerisms of western masculine 
gay men in expressing their sense of gayness. This is particularly true when some 
“lelaki lembuts” in the local gay social networking website, “Komuniti Web Gay 
Melayu” (whom I shall discuss in more detail in the next chapter) continue to maintain 
their femininity as a way of distinguishing themselves from “str8” or “straight-acting” 
indigenous gay men. Interestingly, some “lelaki lembuts” do not regard themselves as 
“nyahs” as a result of creating and maintaining an illusion of femininity through cross-
dressing. For instance, some “lelaki lembuts,” particularly those who cross-dress at 
drag shows in Kuala Lumpur‟s gay bars and clubs, continue to self-identify as “gay” 
and do not see or think of themselves as “nyahs” simply because their motivation for 
cross-dressing (which is a crucial feature of “mak nyahs‟” subjectivity) is mainly to 
entertain others.
3
 It is not wrong to say that some gay-identified Malay men (“lelaki 
lembuts” in particular) open up the possibility of inventing their own gay identity by 
selectively and strategically reappropriating both local and western forms of male 
same-sex sexuality. Such nuanced ways of being “gay” challenge local understandings 
of gayness, especially when the term “gay,” as Ismail Baba asserts, often denotes non-
effeminate indigenous gay men. The term “gay,” then, can also be used to refer to 
“lelaki lembuts” who identify and reposition themselves as “gay” on their own terms 
and in their own unique ways.
4
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Sexuality, Desire, and Identity: Queer Malays in Queer-themed Films by Osman 
Ali and Amy Ikram Ismail 
My discussion of Ismail Baba and Khartini Slamah‟s ethnographic studies have 
demonstrated that many queer-identified Malays formulated new versions of Malayness 
through (among others) strategic renegotiations of various elements such as ethnicity, 
religiosity, and same-sex sexuality. My discussion also showed that queer-identifying 
Malay men and women forged their own notions of queer identity by selectively 
reappropriating local and western forms of queerness. It is imperative to highlight that 
queer-identified Malays also create new ways of being “Malay” by incorporating a 
strong desire to be “women” or bisexual desires and practices into their own sense of 
Malayness. This is especially prominent in Osman Ali‟s film, Bukak Api, and Amy 
Ikram Ismail‟s film, Comolot.  
 
Bukak Api (“Open Fire”), which was directed by Osman Ali and produced by Pink 
Triangle Malaysia, is a groundbreaking semi-documentary film about the trials and 
tribulations of being “mak nyahs” in modern-day Malaysia.5 The film follows the lives 
of Jelita and a small, close knit group of “mak nyah” sex workers in Chow Kit, Kuala 
Lumpur. Jelita, the young “mak nyah” from Alor Setar, a town located in the 
northwestern part of Peninsular Malaysia, has come to Kuala Lumpur to realise his 
ultimate dream; that is, to become a “woman.” Throughout the film, the audience is 
introduced to a myriad of characters, including Kak Su and Kak Tipah as the elderly 
“mak nyahs” or “mak ayam” (“mamasan”) and Riena, the beautiful, yet temperamental, 
“mak nyah” who feels threatened by the newcomer, Jelita. The film highlights pertinent 
issues affecting various aspects of “mak nyahs” sex workers‟ lives such as cross-
dressing, sex reassignment surgery, HIV/AIDS, drug abuse, love and relationship, as 
103 
 
well as the legal implications and ramifications of identifying themselves as 
“transsexual.” The film ends with the death of Manisha, one of the “nyahs‟” closest 
members, who died after being pushed to the ground by a police officer during a police 
raid. But life goes on for this small community of “mak nyah” sex workers as they 
continue to remain strong through their love and support for each other.  
 
Although the film was originally produced to raise awareness about HIV/AIDS among 
local transsexual community, female sex workers, and drug users, I find that the film‟s 
depiction of “nyahs” provides meaningful insights into the various ways in which Jelita 
and other “mak nyahs” construct their own Malay ethnic identity. Jelita and Riena (see 
figs. 2 and 3), for example, have distinct views about their sense of self and identity. 
Akhirnya sampai jugak aku ke Kuala Lumpur ni. 
Sebuah kota impian bagi setiap insan yang mengejar sejuta impian. 
Namun, kedatangan ku ke kota ini dengan satu impian sahaja. 
Aku nak jadi perempuan sepuas-puasnya (Jelita, Bukak Api) 
 
[At last! I‟ve finally arrived in Kuala Lumpur. 
A “city of hope” for those seeking to realise their dreams 
But I‟ve come here with one dream only 
I want to be completely woman] (translation mine) 
 
Jadi mak nyah macam aku ni 
Banyak pulak angan-angan 
Nak jadi ratu, nak glamer, nak operation 
Hai, aku ni dah cantek, buat aper nak operation lagi? 
Kan mak ku kata operation tu tak bagus. Lawan kuasa tuhan… 
(Riena, Bukak Api) 
 
[Being a “mak nyah” like myself 
There are so many dreams 
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I want to be a queen, I want to be glamorous, I want to go for a sex change 
Well, I‟m already beautiful; why do I have to go for a sex change? 
My mum used to say that sex change operation is bad. It goes against God.] 
(translation mine) 
 
  
 
Fig.2. Jelita arrives in Kuala Lumpur in Bukak Api, with permission from Osman Ali. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3. Riena is getting ready for work in Bukak Api, with permission from Osman Ali. 
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What is especially evidenced here is that Jelita and Riena adopt different strategies in 
crafting their own sense of self-identification as “Malay.” Jelita, for instance, places 
greater emphasis on her strong desire to be a complete “woman” in configuring her 
own visions of being “Malay.” Riena, on the other hand, asserts and establishes her 
own sense of Malay identity by sustaining her transsexuality without necessarily 
discarding her religious beliefs. This is vividly expressed through Riena‟s fear of 
punishment for disobeying God‟s law against sex change operation. It is not wrong to 
say that the desire to be women and religion are important components of Malay “mak 
nyahs‟” self-definitions and self-identifications. This corroborates Khartini Slamah and 
Teh Yik Koon‟s assertion that Islam and transsexuality play a significant part in the 
lives of many Malay “mak nyahs” in present-day Malaysia. Malay “mak nyahs” in 
Teh‟s ethnographic study, for example, claim that their ultimate goal in life is to be 
completely women, which can be achieved by undergoing sex reassignment surgery. 
The Malay “mak nyahs” also claim that they continue to identify themselves as Muslim 
and “nyah” because they do not see themselves in conflict with religion as a result of 
their transsexuality. Such nuanced ways of being “Malay” which are forged through 
“nyahs‟” strategic renegotiations of ethnicity, religiosity, and transsexuality, radically 
transform pedagogical narratives of Malayness. This is especially true given that 
pedagogical notions of Malay ethnicity are produced, sustained, and normalized 
through gender, sexual, and religious normativities. Transsexualism (like lesbianism 
and male same-sex sexuality) is strictly prohibited in Islam on the basis that Muslims 
must fulfil and actualise their “fitrah” (“innate and unalterable human disposition”) by 
becoming “husbands/fathers” (and the heads of the households) or “wives/mothers.” 
More importantly, cross-dressing and the adoption of feminine behaviours by Muslim 
men, and masculine behaviours by Muslim women are frowned upon by the Prophet 
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Muhammad (S.A.W). The Hadith (“recorded deeds and sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad) in Sahih Bukhari states that “the Prophet cursed effeminate men and those 
women who assumed the manners of men, and he said, „Turn them out of your 
houses‟” (qtd. in Teh, “Politics in Islam” 91).The Hadith in Sunan Abu-Dawud, on the 
other hand, states that, “the Apostle of Allah cursed the man who dressed like a woman 
and the woman who dressed like a man” (qtd. in Teh, “Politics and Islam” 92). Reina 
and Jelita, however, radically redefine, rather than realign themselves with, pedagogical 
conceptions of Malay ethnic identity. This is most readily observed in the ways in 
which Riena and Jelita undermine their “fitrah” as Muslim men and even going against 
religious prohibitions against transsexualism by continuing to cross-dress and adopting 
feminine behaviours and mannerisms.  
 
It is important to emphasize that the film Bukak Api not only demonstrates how queer-
identified Malays radically reshape pedagogical formulations of Malayness, but offers 
useful information on the various ways in which queer-identified Malays challenge 
dominant local understandings of queerness. This coheres neatly with one of the central 
aims of my study, which is to examine how queer-identified Malays redress received 
ideas about being “queer” locally. Jelita, for example, develops a sexually dynamic 
description of herself in relation to others. Although Jelita has expressed her strong 
desire for sex reassignment surgery, she still wants to retain her penis simply because 
she enjoys “apom jantan” (“to fuck a man”). Jelita‟s preference for taking the active, 
penetrative role in same-sex sexual intercourse challenges the ways in which “mak 
nyahs” are often conflated with being exclusively sexually passive and submissive. 
This is particulary true when there is a widely held belief among many ethnic Malays 
living in Malaysia that “nyahs‟” sexual relations with men are configured primarily in 
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terms of the husband-wife relationship. Khartini Slamah herself admits that there needs 
to be someone in the „male‟ role and someone in the „female‟ role‟” in “nyahs‟” erotic 
and affectional bonds with their partners (107). Jelita, as mentioned earlier, subverts 
such beliefs by showing a strong preference for fucking her man. This demonstrates 
that “nyah-ness” cannot be defined solely in terms of the husband-wife relationship 
and/or “nyahs‟” passive, submissive roles in same-sex sexual relationship since there 
are diverse and multiple ways of being “nyahs” in present-day Malaysia. 
 
Gay and bisexual Malay men in Amy Ikram Ismail‟s short film Comolot (“Kiss the 
Lips”), on the other hand, also establish and maintain their own ethnic identities which 
radically redefine dominant pedagogical narratives of Malayness.
6
 The plot of the film 
revolves around the complex relationship between Aiman and Daniel, who is already 
engaged to his girlfriend, Juita. The film opens with a scene where Daniel, who is clad 
only in a bath towel around his waist, is shown smiling to himself whilst munching on a 
handful of grapes in the living room of his apartment. A few minutes later, Juita enters 
the apartment with the intention to surprise Daniel with a floral gift, but finds that he is 
nowhere to be seen. When Juita enters Daniel‟s bedroom, she is shocked to see men‟s 
underwear, a condom, and a tube of lubricating gel are strewn all over the bed. Juita 
then goes to the bathroom where she is about to get the biggest shock of her life: to see 
her fiancé making love to another man in the shower! (see fig. 4). Juita bursts into tears 
and runs off while Daniel rushes after her and calls her “sayang” (“dear”/“darling”) to 
explain what she has just seen. As they descend the stairs, Daniel begs Juita to listen to 
his explanation until the two enter her car as Daniel‟s lover, Aiman, sadly looks on 
from the apartment‟s balcony. What follows next is a scene where Aiman receives the 
news about Daniel and Juita‟s wedding from his friend, Khairul. Interestingly, this 
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scene is set in a park where many Malay men cruise each other in the dark, hold hands, 
and engage in erotic activities. Determined to rescue Daniel and salvage their 
relationship, Aiman rushes off to the wedding the following day. Aiman takes Daniel 
by the hand in the midst of “akad nikah” (“soleminising of the marriage contract”) and 
leaves behind Juita who is already in tears, as well as relatives and guests who are 
already seated at the “kenduri” (“wedding reception”). Some of the relatives and guests 
are so shocked that they all exclaim loudly, “Pengantin lelaki lari!” (“The groom is 
running away!”). The film ends with the two men holding hands as they run toward 
Aiman‟s car to flee from the wedding scene (see fig. 5).  
 
 
Fig.4. Juita‟s shocking discovery of Daniel and Aiman in Comolot, with permission  
           from Amy Ikram Ismail. 
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Fig.5. Daniel and Aiman fleeing from the wedding scene in Comolot, with permission 
           from Amy Ikram Ismail. 
 
Although the short film Comolot is intended to address the complexities of human 
desire and relationships on the premise that “Berahi tidak memiliki sempadan” (“Desire 
has no boundaries”), I find that its portrayal of Daniel and Aiman‟s relationship sheds 
interesting insights into the various ways in which they construct and perform their 
self-identities. Daniel, for instance, aligns himself with received narratives of 
Malayness by complying with dominant cultural expectations of Malay masculinity. 
This is particularly true when Daniel maintains a heterosexual relationship with 
girlfriend, Juita, and fulfils the social and familial pressures for marriage (although he 
does not get to recite the “lafaz nikah” (“wedding vows”) when Aiman grabs him by 
the hand during the “akad nikah” ceremony). Interestingly, despite being engaged to 
Juita, Daniel develops and maintains a loving, intimate relationship with Aiman. What 
is notable here is the strategy Daniel specifically uses to formulate his own visions of 
Malay male identity. Daniel incorporates his bisexual desires (as evidenced in his 
relationship with both Juita and Aiman) into his own definition of being a Malay man.  
Aiman, on the other hand, also adopts a distinct approach to creating his own ethnic 
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identity. This is evidenced in the way Aiman strategically reconciles his sexuality with 
his ethnic and religious heritages in crafting his own idea of being a Malay man. In the 
film Comolot, Aiman is not only portrayed as Daniel‟s lover, but is depicted as a man 
who identifies himself as “gay,” “Malay,” and “Muslim” in relation to others and to the 
world. For example, Aiman identifies himself as a gay Malay Muslim man in relation 
to his friend Khairul (who is also a self-identified gay Malay Muslim man) and to other 
indigenous men who engage in the cruising, pickup, and mating rituals in the park.
7
 It 
is possible to say Daniel and Aiman‟s own ideas about being “Malay” undermine 
pedagogical conceptions of Malay ethnicity that are configured and sustained through 
enforced normative ideas about Malay male subjectivity. Notions of being a Malay 
man, as mentioned earlier, remain predicated on the dominant cultural assumption that 
Malay men must be heterosexual and develop socially endorsed heterosexual 
relationships. Furthermore, a Malay man‟s sense of identity is visibly marked by, and 
expressed through, his role as the guardian of “rumah tangga” (“household”). This is 
precisely true when Malay men are expected to carry out their culturally designated 
roles and responsibilities to protect the sexual virtue and modesty of female members 
within their households. The prominent scholar of Malay society, Aihwa Ong, for 
example, contends that “rumah tangga–a “house served by a single staircase”–[is] 
considered essential to male adulthood…A basic aspect of a man‟s role [is] 
guardianship–of his sisters‟, wife‟s, and daughters‟ virtue” (“State versus Islam” 164, 
165).
8
 Queer-identified Malay men, however, radically subvert and reconfigure 
pedagogical notions of Malay male identity. Daniel in the film, Comolot, organizes his 
life and identity around his desires for both men and women, while Aiman creates his 
own notions of self and identity based on male same-sex sexuality and desire. Such 
“queer” narratives of Malayness validate the point I‟m trying to make in this study that 
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Malay ethnicity cannot be constructed solely by/through gender, sexual, cultural, and 
religious normativities. This is simply because Malay ethnicity is constantly inflected 
by other factors pertaining to subjectivity, which include ethnic Malays‟ diverse 
sexualities and sexual desires and practices. 
 
It is, however, necessary to mention that the film Comolot not only highlights the ways 
in which queer-identified Malay men radically redefine pedagogical formulations of 
Malay ethnicity, but demonstrates how queer-identified Malay men revise dominant 
local understandings of gayness. This is crucial because it helps to fill the gap in the 
literature on queer identities and queer cultures in local contexts, precisely by showing 
that queer-identified Malays constantly reshape and reconfigure settled ideas about 
being “queer” in present-day Malaysia. As discussed in Chapter 2, male same-sex 
sexuality in modern, Muslim-majority Malaysia is officially equated with same-sex 
sexual acts. Many members of the Malay Muslim community associate and conflate the 
term “gay” with “liwat” (“penetrative sexual acts between men”), which is one of the 
most heinous sins in Islam. Malay Muslims in Malaysia, like the vast majority of 
Muslims the world over, continue to regard the destruction of the Sodom and 
Gomorrah as God‟s wrath against homosexuality (male same-sex penetrative act in 
particular) which was widely practiced at the time. Although scholars, such as Scott 
Siraj al-Haqq Kugle, have argued that there are no specific words for “homosexuality” 
and that there is no explicit mention of punishment for homosexual relations in the 
Quran (199), many Muslims often turn to Quranic references to the people of the 
Prophet Lut (pbuh) simply because such references reinforce God‟s condemnation of 
homosexuality. As the Quran states: 
And (We sent) Lut when he said to his people: What! do you commit an 
indecency which anyone in the world has not done before you? Most surely 
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you come to males in lust besides females; nay you are an extravagant 
people. And the answer of his people was no other than that they said: Turn 
them out of your town, surely they are a people who seek to purify 
(themselves). So We delivered him and his followers, except his wife; she 
was of those who remained behind. And We rained upon them a rain; 
consider then what was the end of the guilty (7:80-82; trans. Shakir 850) 
 
 
While I do not intend to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the Quran, I would 
like to argue very strongly that Daniel, Aiman, and, perhaps, other gay-identified 
Malay men open up the possibility of radically subverting the conflation of 
homosexuality with “liwat.” This is because “liwat” is one, but not the only, paradigm 
for thinking about male same-sex sexuality locally. That is, notions of being “gay” or 
“homosexual,” as perceived and understood by many gay-identified Malay men, are 
composed of diverse elements, including ethnicity, religiosity, love, affection, and 
sexual intimacy, in addition to same-sex erotic acts. Although it is possible to say that 
Comolot offers new understanding of gayness in non-western indigenous contexts such 
as in Malaysia, it is important not to lose sight of how the film may have trivialised the 
actual material conditions and everyday struggles of many gay Malay men. For 
example, the film‟s “fairy tale ending” (where Daniel and Aiman flee from the wedding 
scene) cannot be fully realised in the material world simply because many gay Malay 
men face strong social and cultural pressures to marry and have children. Roslan and 
Ramli, as discussed earlier in regard to Ismail Baba‟s ethnographic research, have had 
several marriages and claim that they entered into heterosexual marriage to fulfil social 
and familial expectations. Roslan claims that “he got married because of societal 
pressures” while Ramli maintains that “heterosexual marriage is expected of Malay 
men and he did it out of duty” (Ismail 150, 153). I also believe the film, Comolot, may 
have trivialised the actual lived experiences of many Malay gay men, especially when 
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there are legal ramifications of being and becoming “gay” locally. This is because gay 
Malay men who develop and maintain same-sex erotic and affectional relationships, as 
well as those who engage in erotic acts in gay meeting places in Kuala Lumpur, face 
greater risks of prosecution if discovered or found out by the police and religious 
authorities. Gay Malay men who are found guilty of committing “liwat,” for instance, 
could be charged and punished under Section 25 of the Syariah Criminal Offences Act 
and under Sections 377A and 377B of the Malaysian Penal code. The question that I 
will address in the following chapter is whether gay-identified Malay men can protect 
themselves from being prosecuted for asserting and inhabiting a Malay identity marked 
by sexual difference in Muslim-majority Malaysia. 
 
While acknowledging that queer-identified Malays, particularly those featured in the 
works of Malaysian Malay scholars and filmmakers, used various strategies to 
construct their own ethnic identities, it is essential to emphasize that the processes of 
self-identification among queer-identified Malays are intimately entwined with 
indigenous religious and cultural beliefs and practices. This elucidates the central point 
of my study that there are diverse implications of identifying oneself as “queer” and 
“Malay,” especially when the lives of many ethnic Malays living in Malaysia continue 
to be governed by the hegemonic Malay culture and religion. Reina in Osman Ali‟s 
film Bukak Api, for example, is hesitant about going through sex change surgery, 
despite admitting that it is a crucial step toward realizing her ultimate dream of 
becoming a complete “woman.” This is mainly because Reina, a self-identified Malay 
Muslim “mak nyah,” fears the dreadful consequences for going against religious laws 
that prohibit sex change operations. One possible explanation for this fear is that 
transsexuality (like other forms of gender and sexual trangsression) is considered a sin 
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(“dosa”) in Islam and will be severely punished not only in this world (“dunia”), but 
also in the afterlife (“akhirat”). Michael G. Peletz, for instance, points out that Malay 
Muslims in Malaysia strongly believe in “hukum akhirat” (“the laws of the afterlife”), 
which states that one‟s deeds in “dunia” (“this world”) have divine punishments and 
rewards in “akhirat” (“the afterlife”) (Social History 51). Peletz contends further that, 
“[the] Islamic notions of sin (dosa) likewise place a premium on the concept of the 
individual and that, second to God, ultimate responsibility for one‟s fate in this world 
and in the Afterlife lies with the individual” (Islamic Modern 279). I agree with Peletz 
mainly because the religious concepts of “dosa,” “dunia,” and “akhirat,” in addition to 
“halal” (“religiousy lawful”), “haram” (“religiously unlawful”), “nafsu” (“passion”), 
and “akal” (“reasoning”) have become deeply engrained in the lives of many ethnic 
Malays and queer-identified Malays, to the extent that these concepts continue to have 
a pervasive influence on their notions of self and identity. Riena, whom I‟ve just 
mentioned, probably has a great deal of anxiety over her fate in “akhirat” because she 
knows very well that her “worldly” involvement in transsexual practices is both 
“haram” and “lawan kuasa Tuhan” (“go against God”). Some queer-identified Malays, 
particularly self-identified gay men in the local gay social networking website, 
“Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” (whom I shall discuss in the next chapter), even go to the 
extent of perceiving same-sex sexuality as “dosa besar” (“a mortal sin”), which can be 
eliminated easily through “taubat.” For example, a Malay Muslim member who calls 
himself “Toms” claims that gay Malay men could eliminate completely male same-sex 
desires and avoid punishments in the afterlife through “taubat nasuhah” (“true 
repentance and forswearing”). As “Toms” writes: 
harap2 taubat nasuhah…coz aku takut mati dengan keadaan berdosa beso 
cam sekarang nih!! … memang berdosa besar aku nih…padahal aku bleh 
lawan sifat2 gay ni… (Toms, “Kawin Sesama Lelaki” December 10, 2009) 
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[I really hope that I can truly repent…because I‟m afraid to die with the 
sins that I carry right now!!!...I am utterly sinful…I know I can resist these 
homosexual desires…] (translation mine) 
 
Interestingly, some gay Malay men in this social networking website view same-sex 
sexual desires as a momentary “nafsu,” which can be removed completely through 
“akal.”9 Malay Muslim members, who address themselves online as “TePPanyaki” and 
“ mus￣ ” (as written and appeared online), claim that gayness is “nafsu” that 
can be extinguished easily by restraining the self from being overwhelmed by male 
same-sexual desire. As “TePPanyaki” and “ mus￣ ” note: 
ni sume naluri semulajadi… kalo man rase xnak lukakan family n xnak 
langgar hukum, jgn cebur diri dalam dunia PLU, tapi kalo xleh tolak… man 
kena trima n pandai2 cover (TePPanyaki, “aku keliru” June 29, 2008). 
 
[These are all instinctual desires… if you do not want to hurt your family 
and defy religious law, then don‟t get yourself involved in the PLU world. 
But if you can‟t eliminate these desires…you need to accept the fact and 
know how to “cover up”] (translation mine) 
 
itu sema nafsu, hasutan yang menyesatkan manusia… yang peliknya, kite 
mudah sangat terperdaya dengan bende2 macam ni, kan? orang kata, ikut 
hati… mati, ikut rasa.binasa, ikut nafsu…lesu… ( mus￣ , “aku 
keliru” July 20, 2008). 
 
[These are all desires; the devil‟s instigation that leads people astray… the 
funny thing is, why are we so easily deceived by all these things? People 
say, follow your heart …and you shall perish. Follow your feelings and you 
shall be ruined, follow your desire… and you shall be listless] (translation 
mine) 
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“Toms,” “TePPanyaki,” and “ mus￣ ”‟s views of male same-sex sexuality as 
“instinctual desires” and as the instigation of the devil give the impression that some (if 
not many) queer-identified Malays in present-day Malaysia may not be able to identify 
themselves unproblematically and unconditionally as “queer” and “Malay.” This is 
mainly because queer-identified Malays‟ deeply held religious beliefs about sin and 
repentance, reason and passion, as well as the afterlife suppress, rather than proliferate, 
the potential for the creation and expression of their own notions of self and identity. 
This certainly validates my point in writing about the complex processes of queer 
Malay identity-formation, particularly the various ramifications of articulating a Malay 
ethnic identity marked by queerness. That is, although many queer-identified Malays 
(particularly those whom I discuss in this study) may be able to construct their own 
ethnic identities which radically challenge dominant pedagogical formulations of 
Malayness, they may not always be able to take these identities as subject positions 
within the Malay Muslim community. This is due to the fact that queer-identified 
Malays whose lives are strongly governed by Islam fear the repercussions of defying 
religious prohibitions against same-sex sexual identities, same-sex sexual desires, and 
practices. 
 
My examination of queer-identified Malays in this chapter has shown that the works 
(i.e. ethnographic studies and queer-themed films) by Malaysian Malay writers and 
filmmakers become a means through which they discuss various perfomative visions of 
being “Malay” as felt and experienced by self-identified gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transsexual Malays. This underscores my central argument that many queer-identified 
Malays in contemporary local forms of expression or popular culture radically 
undermine pedagogical narratives of Malay ethnicity by continually creating and 
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asserting their own notions of Malayness. Queer-identifying Malay men and women in 
works of Ismail Baba, Khartini Slamah, Osman Ali, and Amy Ikram Ismail, for 
instance, do not define themselves in terms of the dominant Malay ethnic identity, but 
instead constructed their own ethnic identities based on their actual lived experiences 
and everyday struggles of being “queer” and “Malay.” My analysis of queer-identified 
Malays in ethnographic studies and films by Malaysian Malay writers and scholars has 
also demonstrated that there are various implications of asserting and inhabiting a queer 
narrative of Malayness. What makes it more complicated is that queer-identified 
Malays may not be able to assert their own ethnic identities which are marked by 
queerness because of their deeply held religious and cultural beliefs and practices. This 
helps amplify the central assertion of this study that the complex processes of self-
identification among queer-identified Malays are fraught with difficulties and 
challenges. Such difficulties and challenges often become a major obstacle to 
formulation and assertion of queer-identified Malays‟ own self-identities. An 
interesting question to be addressed by future research would be whether a queer 
narrative of Malayness can still be created and even expressed, despite the 
pervasiveness of indigenous religious and cultural beliefs and practices. This, in my 
view, can provide a useful means through which one can understand more 
comprehensively how queer-identified Malays continue to define and align themselves 
as “queer” and “Malay” in this world. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Ruzy Suliza Hashim‟s article, entitled “Meniti Ranjau dan Duri: Pembikinan Gender 
dan Seksualiti dalam Konteks Dunia Melayu,” especially her discussion of “pondan,” which is often 
conflated with “mak nyahs” and that “pondan” is intimately entwined with homophobic and misogynist 
traces (i.e. “kewanitaan” and “tidak jantan) in the dominant Malay Muslim community. It is important to 
mention that masculinity is understood as “jantan” or “kejantanan” in hegemonic discourses about Malay 
male sexuality. See Shamsul Amri and Mohammad Fauzi‟s “Making Sense of Malay Sexuality: An 
Exploration,” especially p. 65 for their discussion of the way in which the dominantly heteronormative 
Malay community regards sex scandals (particularly those involving Malaysian Malay political leaders 
and their mistresses) as “bukti kejantanan” (“a proof of one‟s “maschismo”), and perceives “same-sex 
affairs” (particularly the alleged “same-sex scandals” involving the former deputy premier, Anwar 
Ibrahim, and other men) as “tidak jantan” (“unmanly”).  
2 The term mak nyah, as Teh Yik Koon posits, is derived from the word “mak” meaning  mother and 
“nyah” which refers to ladylike or feminine behavior (“Politics and Islam” 89).  
3 Obviously, there are various reasons why “lelaki lembuts” cross-dress. It would be interesting to hear 
what “lelaki lembuts” have to say about their own motivations for cross-dressing at drag shows or 
performances. This, I believe, may provide interesting insights into the ways in which cross-dressing 
function as a paradigm for thinking about the broad continuum of gay male sexuality in local contexts. 
See, for instance, the videos uploaded at <http://www.youtube.com/user/arezeo?blend=1&ob=4>.  Many 
YouTube viewers claim that “lelaki lembuts” who are featured in these videos are “handsome” by day 
and “beautiful” by night. This is especially true when these “lelaki lembuts” cross-dress for drag 
performances held at Blue Boy gay bar in Kuala Lumpur. In a video recorded on November 20, 2006, 
viewers are able to see these men in their “baju Melayu” (“Malay dress”) as they celebrated “Hari Raya 
Aidilfitri” (“the Muslim festival of Eid ul-Fitr”) with their self-identified gay friends. See the video at 
<http://www.youtube. com/watch?v= GhyD2je6v54&feature =channel_page>. 
4 I believe that more research should be carried out on “lelaki lembut” simply because there are diverse, 
yet possible, ways of being “lelaki lembut” within the borders of Malaysia. I say this because the 
dominant Malay society often conflates “lelaki lembut” with “mak nyahs” who act like women. Some 
“lelaki lembut” who behave feminine and see themselves as “women,” take on a gay, rather than a 
transsexual identity, for their self-identification and self-assertion. One of the many reasons why these 
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“lelaki lembuts” take on a gay identity (which often involves adopting a more masculine mannerism 
whilst simultaneously suppressing feminine behaviours) is that it enables them to find (more) potential 
partners and/or lovers. This is mainly because many gay-identified Malay men living in Malaysia prefer 
to develop same-sex sexual relationships with non-effeminate gay men. It is, however, important to 
emphasize that not all “lelaki lembuts” are homosexual. Some “lelaki lembut” are heterosexual who 
continue to maintain their “lembut” (“soft”) mannerism and behaviour. This, in my view, gives the 
impression that notions of being “lelaki lembut” are not fixed, but are instead configured through “lelaki 
lembuts‟” performances of various roles and identities.  
5 See the film “Bukak Api” by Osman Ali at <http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=dCPWtBfEwUA& 
playnext=1&list=PLCB56156BD8385140>. 
6 See the film “Comolot” by Amy Ikram Ismail at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v =D1rKtvq1nd0>.   
7 The park in the film, Comolot, is one of the many “port gay” (“gay meeting places”) in Kuala Lumpur 
and other metropolitan centers throughout Malaysia. Many gay Malay men living in Kuala Lumpur and 
in the Malaysian state of Selangor can be seen hanging out (“lepak”) and even making out (“beromen”) 
in popular gay meeting places such Taman Tasik Titiwangsa, Taman Tasik Permaisuri, and Taman Tasik 
Kelana Jaya; all of which are recreational public lake parks. 
8 Although Ong and Peletz have conducted ethnographic studies on gender and sexuality in rural Malay 
society, I find that their works can be used to demonstrate that notions of being “Malay” as envisioned 
and embraced by many ethnic Malays in Malaysia (both in rural and urban areas) remain predicated on 
heterosexuality and heteronormativity. 
9 The concepts of “akal” and “nafsu” figure prominently in the lives of ethnic Malays living in Malaysia. 
Many Malays, as Michael G. Peletz notes, believe that “nafsu” (“desire or passion”) is innately present in 
all humans and animals. The major difference between animals and human beings is that the latter are 
more superior because they are endowed by God with “akal” (“reason,” “rationality,” and “intelligence”) 
(Reason and Passion 205). Peletz maintains further that “nafsu” and “akal” play a very significant role in 
Malays‟ everyday lives, especially when “nafsu” and “akal” continually shape and influence various 
aspects of Malays‟ material existence, which include dietary consumption, gender relation, their psyches, 
and the ways in which they perceive themselves in relation to others and to the world. One of the 
ultimate goals in life for many Malays is to strive for self-restraint and control by making sure that they 
are not easily consumed by “nafsu.” This is because “unrestraint” or “uncontrollable” passions, as 
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evidenced in overindulgences in sex, food, and material possession, demonstrate one‟s absence of virtue, 
which is highly disapproved and condemned by the Malay society. This, in turn, explains why Malays 
claim that “akal” must work together with “hati” and “iman” in order to control “nafsu.” “Akal (hereafter 
“reason”), as Peletz asserts, “distinguishes human from the rest of the animal world and is [Malays‟] 
special gift from God; and that “reason” “cooperates” or “works together” with the hati (or liver, the seat 
of emotions) and with iman (faith, strong belief or trust in God, resoluteness, sincerity) to guide the 
individual along the proper path(s) (Reason and Passion 226). 
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Chapter 4 “Who Are Gay Melayu?”: Emerging Gay Male Identities and  
                  Cultural Practices in “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” 
 
 
What do we mean when we say gay in a world where hybridity and 
syncretism provide the grist of cultural production, distribution, and 
consumption? 
 –Martin F. Manalansan, In the Shadows of Stonewall: 
Examining Gay Transnational Politics and the Diasporic 
Dilemma 
 
What exactly does it mean to say that “gay Melayu” identity is a hybrid cultural 
construct? And what does it mean to say that notions of being “gay” and “Melayu” are 
configured through the process of hybridization under current trends of globalization?  
In this chapter, I broaden my earlier discussion of queer Malay identity-formation to 
include an examination of diverse and multiple notions of being “gay” and “Malay” as 
envisioned and embraced by members of the local gay social networking website, 
“Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” (hereafter cited as KWGM). More specifically, I would 
like to analyze the various strategies used by self-identified gay Malay men in KWGM 
in crafting their own self-identities. Such strategies include (but are not limited to) gay 
Malay men‟s selective reappropriations of both local and western forms of male same-
sex sexuality. I would also like to explore more deeply the production of gay male 
identities and cultural practices in non-western contexts such as Malaysia. Emerging 
gay male identities and gay male cultures as evidenced in KWGM, for instance, are not 
complete mimicries of those prevalent in the West, but are hybrid and heterogeneous 
cultural formations which are shaped by age, class, race, ethnicity, religion, and other 
factors pertaining to subjectivity. More importantly, gay male identities and gay male 
cultures as evidenced in KWGM are also influenced by western notions of gayness and 
the language which have been widely used to describe these notions within and outside 
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the western domains. Furthering the notion that gay Malay male identity is a hybrid 
cultural construct is necessary because it helps elucidate the central point of this study; 
that is, to show that “gayness” and “queerness” in present-day Malaysia cannot be 
officially conflated with, and propagated as, western decadence. The decision to 
examine the production of “gay Melayu” identity in KWGM is primarily motivated by 
the fact that everyday-defined (or performative) visions of Malayness take multiple 
“forms of popular expression” or “popular culture.” Shamsul Amri Baharuddin 
contends that everyday-defined beliefs about Malay identity, which are created based 
on ethnic Malays‟ everyday lived experiences of being “Malay,” can be found in 
various forms of popular expression or popular culture such as songs, poems, cartoons, 
and short stories. I would like to argue strongly that the Internet and gay social 
networking websites in particular are also sources of contemporary popular culture. 
Kevin Filo, for instance, asserts that Facebook, MySpace, Flikr, and other social 
networking websites are staples of popular culture because of their immense popularity 
among today‟s youth. Local gay social networking websites such as KWGM, however, 
cannot simply be regarded as a form of popular culture among gay Malay youth 
because they also function as a pivotal site for many young indigenous gay men to 
express their own sense of Malay identity that are created based on their actual lived 
experiences of being “gay” and “Malay.” This reinforces my argument throughout this 
study that ethnic Malays, particularly queer-identifying Malay men and women in 
contemporary Malaysian literature and culture, continue to redefine and reshape 
pedagogical narratives of Malayness, precisely by inventing ethnic identities marked by 
queerness. 
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It is, however, crucial to note that many self-identified gay Malay men in KWGM take 
on a visibly consumerist and western-style gay identity in expressing their gay male 
subjectivities. Moreover, some members of KWGM identify themselves more strongly 
as “gay sejati/gay tulen” (“authentic gay”) by replicating, to varying extents, western 
standards of masculine gayness. This compels a rethinking of “gay Melayu” as a hybrid 
cultural construction mainly because what it means to be “gay” for many gay Malay 
men challenge Homi K Bhabha‟s notion of hybridity as a form of resistance to fixed 
and essentialised cultural identities. This is especially true when many KWGM 
members sustain, rather than resist, western gay hegemony as they either take on the 
consumerist, western-style gay identity or “gay sejati/gay tulen” as a way of identifying 
and repositioning themselves online as “gay Melayu.” I will also argue in this chapter 
that not all gay-identified members of KWGM express male same-sex sexual identities 
through “gay sejati/gay tulen” or through the consumerist, western-style gay identity. 
There are, indeed, diverse and highly contested notions of being “gay” and “Melayu” 
as felt and practiced by many gay men in this emerging gay Malay online community. 
In brief, Komuniti Web Gay Melayu was the brainchild of Edie Mohamad, a self-
identified gay Malay man who developed the website primarily for gay Malay youths 
in Malaysia using Ning, one of the world‟s largest platforms for creating social 
websites. KWGM became an instant hit when it was launched in 2009, drawing 6184 
members, most of whom were gay-identified Malay men. Some of the website‟s major 
points of attraction were its online forum discussions and online personal ads. 
Interestingly, the website‟s huge popularity (I remembered it was dubbed at the time as 
“the best place” for gay Malay men to find potential partners or lovers compared to 
other local gay social networking websites such as www.gayromeo.com and 
www.manjam.com) had prompted some gay Malay men to establish their own offline 
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community of gay men in various Malaysian states such as Johor, Negeri Sembilan, 
and Malacca. Such initiatives enabled KWGM members to meet up and physically 
interact with other gay Malay men within their localities. 
 
Being “Gay” and “Malay” in “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” 
I have discussed in previous chapters the various strategies queer-identified Malays 
specifically employed in formulating their own forms of self-identification. These 
include queer-identified Malays‟ selective reappropriations of local and western queer 
identities and queer cultures. For example, many “lelaki lembuts” (“effeminate 
indigenous men”) whom I mentioned in Chapter 3, formulate their own gay male 
identity by reconceptualising local forms of “pondan-ness” on the one hand, and 
western standards of masculine gayness on the other. Interestingly, some “lelaki 
lembuts” neither necessarily adopt the practice of cross-dressing common among many 
“pondans,” nor reify images of western masculine gay men as a way of articulating 
their own notions of being “gay.” Such strategic reappropriation and 
reconceptualisation of disparate forms of male same-sex sexuality and culture 
demonstrate that gayness in Malaysia can be understood and elaborated as a product of 
hybridization which is queerly born out of “transnational” (Povenelli and Chauncey 
439) and “cross-cultural exchanges” (Jolly and Manderson 1) between local and 
western gay male identities and cultural formations. Dennis Altman, Diane Richardson, 
Gerard Sullivan, Peter Jackson, Steve Seidman, and others have argued that these 
exchanges are fostered and facilitated by globalization. These scholars contend further 
that the globalizing instruments such as international travel and tourism, and the 
advances in technologies such as the internet have increased and eased interactions 
between gay men and lesbians from different parts of the world. Gerard Sullivan, for 
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instance, points out that the interaction with/between gay men and lesbians through 
tourism and the internet are crucial to “the process of (trans)cultural (ex)change [which] 
provides knowledge of other possibilities and an understanding of their suitability for 
oneself” (262). This means that these transcultural and transnational sites of exchange 
open up advantageous possibilities for gay men and lesbians in both western and non-
western domains to formulate and express multiple forms of same-sex sexual self-
identification by renegotiating diverse ideas about same-sex sexuality, desire, and 
practice.   
 
But these transnational and transcultural sites of exchange may not always provide an 
adequate means for understanding the various ways in which gay identities are 
constructed and articulated locally. This is because what it means to be “gay,” or, at 
times, “PLU” (“People Like Us”) conjures up a multitude of meanings to many gay 
Malay men in Malaysia, particularly members of the emerging gay Malay online 
community, “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu.” Moreover, gay Malay men‟s diverse 
understandings of “gay,” “gay identity,” “gayness,” “gay sex,” and “gay relationship” 
are, on the one hand, influenced by various axes of social positioning and are, on the 
other, implicated by western gay male identities and the language which have been 
widely used to describe these identities within and outside the western domains. This is 
particularly true with regard to the widespread of western gay male identities and 
cultures under the current process of globalization, which continues to exert a pervasive 
influence on the production of male same-sex sexual subjectivities and cultural 
practices in non-western locales such as in Malaysia. In the online forum discussion 
“thread” (“topic”) on “Cara Utk Tahu Bagaimana Lelaki Itu Gay?” (“How To 
Know/Tell If A Man Is Gay?”), many gay Malay men in KWGM claim online that there 
126 
 
is a host of “identifiable” and “distinguishing” features which mark their gay male 
subjectivities. These include stylish, branded clothing, and accessories as well as 
expensive colognes that gay Malay men regularly wear. Many KWGM members 
maintain that a gay Malay man can easily be seen wearing a body fitting T-shirt (which 
shows off his toned and muscular physique), sporting a spiky “gay boy” hairstyle, 
carrying an oversized designer bag, and strutting in trendy “pointy” leather shoes in 
public spaces such as Bukit Bintang shopping and entertainment district or Tasik 
Permaisuri, Kuala Lumpur‟s popular “gay port” (“gay meeting place”). There are also 
some KWGM members who appropriate the western homosexual practice of wearing an 
earring on the right ear as a way of expressing a “sejati/tulen” (“authentic”) sense of 
gayness. As one KWGM member who refers to himself online as “comot” writes: 
i setuju yg pki subang belah kanan tuh gay. Kart amerika sane. Gay pki 
subang belah kanan. (comot, “Cara Utk Tahu Bagaimana Lelaki Itu Gay?” 
June 7, 2009) 
 
[I agree that those who wear earrings on their right ears are gay. Gays in 
America wear earrings on their right ears.] (translation mine) 
 
However, one can never really tell if a Malay man is “gay” based on these features 
alone (or any more than is the case in the West) which I believe only and narrowly 
configure coded appearances and behaviours of many young, urban, educated, middle-
class, and upwardly mobile members of KWGM whose sense of gayness is evidently 
influenced by western (i.e. American) fashion and consumer culture. Such a 
westernized notion of being “gay,” which does not necessarily represent the diversity of 
gay-identified Malay men‟s understandings of gayness, reinforces Dennis Altman‟s 
view on the emergence of a globalising gay identity in non-western societies which is 
“conceptualized in terms that are very much derived from recent American fashion and 
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intellectual style” (“Rupture or Continuity?” 20). Altman maintains further that the 
homogenising effects of queer globalization have fostered and proliferated the 
emergence of “highly consumerist” gay male identities, in addition to “lipstick 
lesbians” and “macho” gay men in indigenous contexts (“Globalization” 419). This is 
readily observed in the ways in which western-style gay and lesbian identities, which 
are transmitted through the instruments of globalization such as advertising and 
international mass media, are visibly appropriated and adopted by many gay men and 
lesbians in non-western settings as a way of identifying themselves as “gay/lesbian” 
while simultaneously becoming part of a globalised “gay/lesbian” community.1  
 
Obviously, fashion is not the only marker of gay male subjectivities in Malaysia. Many 
Malay gay men in KWGM maintain online that they do not always rely on specific 
styles of dress or appearance as a means of expressing their gay male identities. Malay 
gay men in KWGM claim online that eye contact is the most “reliable” and “effective” 
method of determining if a man is “gay,” especially when an eye contact that they 
initiate with another man is mutually acknowledged, rather than cruelly rejected. Such 
mutual acknowledgement not only signals same-sex physical and emotional attraction, 
but reaffirms and reassures the other man‟s same-sex sexual identity and preference. As 
one KWGM member who identifies himself online as “Micka29” explains: 
I can tell you it's from the eye contact...You can spot it there... 
The way he looks at yours [sic] eyes (at you basically) will make you feel 
unease...Why so: Guys generally not or less [sic] having an eye contact 
when someone saying something. They rather look down or pretend not to 
look interested. Tapi bagi gay, they'll look straight at [sic] your eyes..And 
you just feel different... Your instinct can tell you. (Micka29, “Cara Utk 
Tahu Bagaimana Lelaki Itu Gay?” August 22, 2009) 
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“Gayness,” or, at times, “PLU-ness” (“People Like Us”) is also said to be visually 
“identifiable” and easily “detectable” in the form of effeminate behaviours of “lelaki 
lembut” as compared to “str8 act”/“straight acting” gay Malay men who are more 
discreet about their same-sex sexual identity. Many KWGM members assert online that  
“lelaki lembuts” tend to express their sexual attraction to other men more openly than 
“str8”/”straight acting” Malay gay men. As one KWGM member who goes by his 
online name “Hazimie” asserts: 
Yang senang nak detect tu adalah golongan songsang yang patah riuk... 
lembot...atau pun yang tak kisah nak mengexposekan diri tp golongan plu 
yang str8 act...discreet ...yang nie susah nak detect...dan mempunyai 
„commercial value‟ yang tinggi di kalangan plu-plu. (Hazimie, “Cara Utk 
Tahu Bagaimana Lelaki Itu Gay?” July 6, 2009) 
 
[It is easy to detect “inverts” who are limp-wristed and effeminate or those 
who don‟t mind exposing themselves in the public. But discreet and 
straight-acting PLUs are difficult to detect and they have high commercial 
value among other PLUs.] (translation mine) 
 
Physical attractiveness, on the other hand, is also frequently cited (and highly disputed) 
as another visual marker of local gay male subjectivities. Many Malay gay men in 
KWGM claim online that “hensem/ensem” (“handsome”) and “cute” men are either 
“gay/PLU” or “bisek” (“bisexual”). Such claims are substantiated by Malay gay men‟s 
personal observations and experiences of socially mixing (and sexually engaging) with 
these “hensem/ensem” or “cute” men. It is pertinent to note that self-identified gay 
Malay men in KWGM and in the local gay community in particular place a strong 
emphasis on physical attractiveness, rather than on personality, when it comes to 
choosing potential partners or lovers. In his story short, entitled Sembang Ratu I, Nizam 
Zakaria maintains that many gay Malay men in modern-day Malaysia have a strong 
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tendency to prefer “hensem” (“handsome”) and, at times, “cans/can do” (“nice or 
average looking”) men as their lovers or partners (45). Nizam Zakaria, a Singapore-
born Malay scriptwriter, director, and producer of popular television dramas in 
Malaysia, is very well known in the local gay community for his gay erotic and 
romance fiction, all of which are written in Malay. Some of his most popular works 
include gay novels such as Nafas Aku, Rama-rama and Potret, and gay short fictions 
such as Sembang Ratu I and Sembang Ratu II, which I discussed in this chapter. I find 
that Nizam‟s fictional works reflect, to a great extent, gay Malay men‟s actual lived 
experiences in Malaysia. Azwan Ismail, the editor of Malaysia‟s first Malay anthology 
of queer short stories, Orang Macam Kita, himself claims that Nizam‟s gay short 
stories and novels have a deep resonance for gay Malay men and the gay Malay 
community in general. This is especially true when many gay Malay male readers 
identify themselves strongly with the characters, the language used, the conflicts, and 
even the settings in Nizam‟s fictional works. The gay Malay male characters‟ 
understandings of “hensem/ensem” in Sembang Ratu I, for instance, resonate with 
KGWM members‟ varied understandings of handsomeness. As Nizam writes: 
Apa nok? Ko kata yang penting personaliti bukan good looks nok? Nok… 
ko dah ting tong ke?...Bila ko bawa balik jantan berangkut, mesti nak yang 
can do. Nak yang macho dan jantan. Lepas main, ko terus call mak, cakap 
jantan tu cans lah, taste lah, handsome mautz lah…Ada ko cerita dekat mak 
yang dia ada personaliti yang vaasst? Nama betul dia pon ko tak kenal… 
(46) 
 
[What nok? You‟re saying that personality is more important than good 
looks? Are you out of your mind nok?...When you bring guys home, you 
definitely want those who are nice looking. You prefer the macho and 
manly type. After sex, you‟d call me and tell me that the guy is good 
looking, of your “taste” and is “deadly” handsome… But have you ever 
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told me that he has an exceptionally good personality? You don‟t even 
know his real name...] (translation mine).
2
  
 
While I agree with Nizam‟s view on the important role that physical attractiveness 
plays in courtship and mate selection processes among Malay gay men, I would like to 
argue that what is meant by “hensem” differ from one gay Malay man to another. First, 
handsomeness is subjective simply because it lies in the eye of the beholder. Gay 
Malay men whom I know perceive the concept of handsomeness differently. For 
instance, an average looking underweight (or overweight) guy is “handsome” in their 
eyes. In other words, what they find handsome or attractive in a man (in the physical 
sense) is not necessarily defined in terms of the culturally acceptable standard of 
handsomeness; that is, “tinggi lampai, berwajah tampan, berdada bidang, dan berbadan 
tegap” (“tall, handsome, broad-chested, and strongly built”). Second, handsomeness 
can also mean an inherent quality of the body. This is especially true when some gay 
Malay men maintain that “jejaka Melayu berdarah kacukan”; that is, mixed-blood 
Malay men of European-Malay or Pakistan/Arab-Malay parentage are “kacak/tampan” 
(“handsome”) mainly because most of the men are blessed with good looks and/or fine 
physiques.
3
 Third, handsomeness can be defined as a perfected and deliberate 
construction of an image. Some (if not many) members of the local gay Malay 
community have come to regard gay Malay men with well-groomed beard and 
moustache, and who maintain lean and toned physiques, and adopt masculine 
mannerism as “hensem.” What is interesting is that some well-groomed gay Malay men 
construct and perform an image of handsomeness in order to give the illusion that it is 
an objective quality of the body. This, in my view, illuminates the idea that “hensem” 
can be thought of as performative. Judith Butler contends that gender is performative, 
rather than innate or naturally given. Gender performativity, as Butler points out, “is a 
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matter of reiterating or repeating the norms by which one is constituted... [These 
gender] norms operate by requiring the embodiment of certain ideals of femininity and 
masculinity” (“Critically Queer” 21). Although Butler uses the concept of gender 
performativity to subvert notions of stable gender identities, I find that the same 
concept can be employed to demonstrate that being “hensem” is constructed through 
the reiteration of the ideals or the norms pertaining to physical attractiveness as 
envisioned by the local gay Malay community. This is especially salient in the case of 
some (if not many) Malay gay men who establish and present an image of 
“kehensemen/kekacakan/ ketampanan” (“handsomeness”) through the maintenance of 
facial hair and muscular physique and through the appropriation of masculine 
mannerisms.  
 
My point here is that Malay gay men employ various strategies to express their gay 
male identities. Such strategies include Malay gay men‟s reappropriation of visibly 
consumerist and westernized markers of gayness and the adoption of specific styles of 
dress or appearance. As some KWGM members assert, “it is hard to know about a gay 
person personality” simply because “there is no spesific [sic] way/method to determine 
the “gayness” of one guy.” This butresses the point I‟m trying to make in this chapter 
and throughout the study that male same-sex sexual identities in non-western contexts 
are culturally and historically specific constructions and, therefore, cannot be officially 
conflated with western decadence, nor can they be regarded as absolute renditions of 
gay identities and gay cultures in the West. As Diane Richardson and Steve Seidman 
maintain, “[i]ndividuals never experience being gay in a general way, but in a specific 
and varied ways” (4). My point on the various ways in which gay-identified Malay men 
conceive and articulate their gay male subjectivities, on the other hand, calls into 
132 
 
question William Leap and Tom Boellstroff‟s assertion on the use of the English term 
“gay” as the already existing and universalized way of talking about male same-sex 
sexuality and desire within and outside the Euro-American contexts.
4
 This is because 
the term “gay” may or may not be employed and understood in the same way in non-
western locales such as Malaysia. The word “gay” is not only differently appropriated 
and locally adopted in the process of gay Malay identity-formation, but conjures up a 
wide range of meanings to many gay-identified Malay men in general, and KWGM 
members in particular. In the forum discussion thread on “Sejak Bila Korang Jd Gay 
Nih?” (“Since When Did You Become Gay?”), many gay Malay men in KWGM claim 
online that they became “gay” as a result of direct physical contacts with male siblings, 
male relatives, and male peers. These forms of physical contact, which were mostly 
experienced during childhood and adolescent years, include being coerced into fondling 
another male‟s genitalia, assisted and/or mutual masturbation, and oral and/or anal sex. 
However, many gay Malay men did not have a specific word or vocabulary at the time 
to describe, explain, and express their firsthand same-sex sexual encounters and 
experiences. It was when Malay gay men entered secondary school and, later, the 
university, that they eventually acquired the knowledge and information about “gay” 
and the “gay world” mostly through peers and library references. Many KWGM 
members also maintain online that they initially became “gay” in all-boys boarding 
school dormitories, which provided a conducive environment for same-sex sexual 
experimentation, and embraced gradually or fully a “gay lifestyle” during and after 
university years primarily by engaging in same-sex erotic acts with other gay-identified 
men. Although gay indigenous men on KWGM assert that they are gay because of 
having been touched, fondled, abused, and/or attended boys‟ boarding schools, it is 
important to emphasize that there is no obvious origin to being “gay” in Malaysia. If, as 
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Philip Brian Harper contends, sexual orientation should not be conceived as a primary 
identificatory marker of sexual identity, then the same can be said of how sexual 
identity among gay Malay men cannot be constructed solely through/by same-sex 
sexual encounters and experiences. This is because some gay indigenous men on 
KWGM maintain online that they did not become “gay” as a result of being sexually 
abused by siblings, male relatives, or peers, or through experiences in all boys‟ schools. 
The members claim that they realized that they were “gay” after watching gay porn 
and/or after “cuba-cuba gay sek” (“experimenting with gay sex”). Other members claim 
online that they decided to be “gay” after many failed attempts to maintain intimate 
relationships with women. The members believe that developing and maintaining 
intimacy with men is far less complicated than with women on the basis that “hanya 
lelaki sahaja yang memahami lelaki” (“only men can understand men”) and women 
simply don‟t.  
 
Although it is evidenced here that many KWGM members frequently and extensively 
rely on the term “gay” to define erotic encounters with men as a salient marker of 
gayness, it would be rather fallacious to assert that this western-derived terminology 
has become a standard nomenclature for describing what being “gay” means locally. 
This is because western gay male identities are not always helpful in describing the 
plurality and particularity of indigenous gay male experiences and cultural practices. 
Many Malay gay men, particularly those in KWGM, not only appropriate and adopt the 
word “gay,” but often use this word alongside local idioms to formulate a multitude of 
male same-sex sexual self-inscriptions and self-representations. This is readily 
observed in the ways in which local and western expressions of gayness are enmeshed, 
conjoined, and/or used interdependently by many Malay gay men in KWGM  in 
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constructing a plethora of gay male identities and practices. These include 
“Geiboi/Gayboy,” „Lelaki Lembut,” “Lelaki Rempit PLU,” “Bisek,” “Str8,” “Anak 
Ikan,” “Abang Polis/Askar,” “Gay Sarawakian,” “Gay Tahfiz,” “Chubs,” “BDSM,” to 
name just a few. It is important to understand that these gay male identities and cultural 
practices are mediated by age, class, and various axes of social positioning, in addition 
to male same-sex sexuality and desires. “Gay Tahfiz,” for instance, is a term that is 
used to describe gay-identified Malay Muslim members of KWGM who preach the 
word of God online to encourage other Malay Muslim members to repent and to live in 
accordance with the standard teachings of Islam. Some “Gay Tahfizs” may use religion 
as a façade to find sexual partners online. “Gay Tahfizs” may offer help and advice to 
emotionally vulnerable and confused Malay Muslim members of KWGM and may 
gradually develop relationships with them, which often veer off into sexual intimacy. 
“Anak Ikan,” on the other hand, is a term that can be used to address young Malay boys 
who are both desirable and desired by older men. Some “Anak Ikan” may be 
financially supported by wealthy (often older) men in exchange for companionship or 
sexual favours. “Abang Polis/Askar” is another term that is often used to refer to men 
in the police and armed forces who engage in same-sex erotic acts without necessarily 
identifying themselves as “gay” or “bisexual.” Many KWGM members, who post their 
comments in the online forum discussion “thread” on “Abang-Abang Askar… 
ALOHA!!!”, claim that “Abang Askars” are highly desired by the local gay 
community. This is because it has been proven (mostly through KWGM members‟ 
personal experiences) that “Abang Askars” who engage in “gay sex” are exceptionally 
good at it. Unlike “hensem” and “cute” gay men whom I mentioned earlier, “Abang 
Askars” are especially fetishized and, to an extent, iconicised because of their “jantan-
ness” (“manliness”) and also because of the militaristic style of dress which helps 
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enhance “Abang Askars‟” “jantan” (“manly”) appearances. As one KWGM member 
who identifies himself online as “VoLuptuous,” maintains: 
cuma yg menjadi kan mereka (abg2 askar) ni jadi idaman aku rasa pada 
UNIFORM yg mereka pakai ni...tak kira lah askar ker.. air force ker... navy 
ker....pdrm ker... kastam ker...bila dia org pakai uniform ni ader sesuatu yg 
menarik perhatian kita semua....first impression kita nmpk askar 
beruniform....WOW abg2 askar! (Voluptuous, “Abang-Abang Askar… 
ALOHA!!!” June 21, 2009) 
 
[I think what makes them (abg2 askar) the object of desire lies in the 
UNIFORM that they wear…It doesn‟t really matter if these men are in the 
military, air, or naval forces… Royal Malaysian Police… or Royal 
Malaysian Customs…There‟s always something that captivates our 
attention whenever these men put on their uniforms…Our first impression 
when we see these men in their uniforms: WOW abg2 askar!] (translation 
mine) 
 
Such fetishization is largely attributed to the fact that many gay Malay men in general, 
and members of KWGM in particular, place greater emphasis on developing erotic 
and/or affectional relationship with “macho” or “jantan,” rather than with “lembut” or 
“effeminate” gay men. Many gay Malay men who sexually engage with “macho” or 
“jantan” gay men do so as a way of disidentifying and disassociating themselves from 
“lelaki lembut” who are often conflated with being “kewanitaan” (“womanly”) and 
“tidak jantan” (“unmanly”). There seems to be a widely accepted belief among many 
Malay gay men in Malaysia that “main” or “beromen” (“having sex”) with “lelaki 
lembut” is similar to “berlesbo” (“engaging in lesbian sex”). This is probably because 
many Malay gay men regard themselves as womanly for desiring men (and “womanly” 
for being “gay”) and cannot accept the idea of making love to “lelaki lembuts” who are 
already equated with being “kewanitaan.” As some KWGM members maintain online: 
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“How can two “womanly” men make love?” 5 The conflation of “beromen dengan 
lelaki lembut” with “berlesbo” gives the impression that gay Malay men tend to prefer 
“macho” or “jantan” gay men as partners or lovers, rather than to be involved in a so-
called “lesbian” relationship with “lelaki lembut.”6 Such attitudes towards “lelaki 
lembut,” a point to which I shall elaborate shortly, shed crucial insights into the ways in 
which many KWGM members marginalize effeminate gay Malay men whilst 
simultaneously privileging “gay sejati/gay tulen” (“authentic gay”) as an “authentic” 
marker of “gay Melayu” identity.  
 
My discussion of diverse notions of being “gay” as felt, experienced, and understood 
by gay-identified members of KWGM is important for two reasons. First, it helps to fill 
lacunae in the literature on queer identities and cultural formations in Malaysia by 
showing that many queer-identified Malays (gay Malay men in particular) create their 
own sense of being “queer” that radically reshape and redefine dominant local 
understandings of queerness. I say this because studies on local forms of queerness 
have not explored fully the multiple, competing meanings of being “queer” as 
envisioned by many queer-identifying indigenous men and women. Second, my 
discussion of gay Malay men‟s diverse ideas about being “gay” also adds to the 
literature by demonstrating that queerness in local contexts cannot be rendered as 
absolute mimicries of those existing in the West. This is simply because western gay 
male identities, and the language which has been universally used to describe these 
identities, neither dominate nor homogenise local understandings of male same-sex 
sexuality and desire. Arjun Appadurai posits that local-global interaction is never a 
unidirectional process, but one that is often fraught with the dialogical conflict between 
cultural homogenisation and cultural heterogenisation. The West, as Appadurai 
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contends further, does not fully homogenize indigenous culture simply because forces 
that flow from western domains “tend to become indigenized” in non-western societies 
(51). Although Appadurai does not specifically address male same-sex sexuality and 
desire, his view on cultural homogenisation-heterogenisation opens up a viable lens 
through which to think of gay male identities in Malaysia as hybrid and heterogeneous 
cultural formations which are assembled through transnational and transcultural 
exchange of/between local and western forms of gayness. The consumerist, western-
style gay male identity, “Anak Ikan,” and “Gay Tahfiz” which I have mentioned earlier 
help illuminate what is “global” and what is “local” (Jyoti, “Gay Sexualities” 62), and 
what counts as “same” or “different” (Leap and Boellstroff 6) in understanding the 
characteristically hybridised and heterogenized local forms of gay identities and 
cultural practices. But many gay-identified Malay men and KWGM members in 
particular take on the consumerist, western style gay identity and “gay sejati/gay tulen” 
(“authentic gay”) in expressing their notions of being “gay.” This compels a rethinking 
of “gay Melayu” as a hybrid cultural formation because what it means to be “gay” for 
these gay Malay men challenge Bhabha‟s notion of hybridity as a form of resistance to 
essentialised and fixed cultural identities. Moreover, the ways in which many gay 
Malay men in KWGM view “gay sejati/gay tulen” as an essential marker of “gay 
Melayu” identity calls into question who and what (exactly) is “gay Melayu,” and 
whether “gay Melayu” identity is useful in articulating competing narratives of being 
“gay” and “Melayu” as envisioned by both Malay and non-Malay members of this 
local gay social networking website. 
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Who Are “Gay Melayu”? 
KWGM  has become an increasingly popular gay social networking website among 
many Malay gay men in Malaysia over the last couple of years. The website‟s 
popularity is largely attributed to the increased public access to computers and the 
internet. To date, there are 16.9 million internet users in Malaysia and the number of 
internet users is expected to rise in the next few years following the government‟s 
commitment to upgrading high speed broadband infrastructure on a national scale. This 
is in line with the national vision to transform Malaysia into a fully developed and 
technologically advanced nation by the year 2020. Now, with the availability and 
variability of highly advanced broadband services such as TMnet Streamyx, P1-
WiMAX, and Maxis Wireless Lan throughout the country, in addition to unrestricted 
access to unfiltered information over the internet, more and more people are able to log 
on to KWGM’s website and other locally produced and maintained gay social 
networking websites.
7
 However, the highly debated government proposal to install 
internet filters to block access to pornographic and other “inappropriate” websites may 
affect people‟s access to KWGM in the near future. 8 To make matters worse, KWGM 
has already been blocked on several occasions even before the installation of these 
internet filters take place.
 
It is crucial to point out that the internet functions as a highly 
effective means for gay Malay men to communicate and socialise, as well as to discuss 
and reflect on issues pertaining to same-sex sexuality and desires with relative ease and 
safety, especially when homosexuality remains legally and religiously prohibited in the 
modern Malaysian nation-state. Dennis Altman, Helmut Graupner, Olivia Khoo, and 
Philip Tahmindjis have argued that the internet has facilitated the construction of 
“online” or “virtual” gay and lesbian communities in Malaysia. These scholars contend 
further that the internet has provided gay and lesbian Malaysians with advantageous 
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opportunities to exercise their sexual agency and erotic autonomy in expressing same-
sex sexualities and desires online as a way of resisting juridical surveillance and 
control. Olivia Khoo, for example, maintains that despite governmental containment of 
homosexuality, gay men and lesbians in Malaysia are able to find new ways of voicing 
same-sex sexualities and desires through online communities. “Online participation,” as 
Khoo points out, “is a way for local [gay and lesbian] community to assert agency 
through integration, collaboration, and [the] sharing of differences…” (235). Such 
integrative and collaborative online participations are readily observed in KWGM 
which has so far recruited almost ten thousand members, comprising gay Malaysian 
Malay men, gay Malay men from the countries in the Malay Archipelago such as 
Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei, and other gay Malay men from diasporic Malay 
communities. KWGM also extends its membership to non-Malay Malaysian and non-
Malay non-Malaysian gay men who wish to develop social, political, erotic, and/or 
affectional ties with gay Malay men. Interestingly, KWGM has recently gone more 
global in its appeal by setting up its very own Facebook webpage under the 
organization (clubs and societies) category which is crucial in its attempt to recruit new 
members from all over the world (see fig. 6). I believe that the setting up of KWGM‟s 
own Facebook website is also important because it provides a useful means through 
which Malay gay men can resist excessive governmental monitoring and the social 
control of homosexuality. This is especially true when gay Malay men continue to 
negotiate and organize same-sex sexual activities with other gay men on and off 
KWGM‟s Facebook webpage, despite the possibilities of arrest if found out or 
discovered. For instance, many Malay gay men continue to post and publish 
information such as contact and meeting details, as well as nude and semi nude profile 
pictures on KWGM’s Facebook webpage, regardless of the fact that this information 
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and the photos can be easily accessed or used by the local police and religious 
authorities as substantial evidence to carry out prosecutions against them (see fig. 7).
9
 
 
Fig. 6. “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” on Facebook.  
 
 
Fig.7.  Email and postal addresses, mobile phone numbers and other personal contact  
            details which  members have posted and published on KWGM‟s Facebook webpage. 
 
It is possible to say that the internet is not just a staple of popular culture among/for gay 
Malay youth, but functions as a critical site where Malay gay men create and express 
visible and assertive gay male identities. The internet, in my view, has also enabled 
Malay gay men to develop a hybrid form of resistance to juridical surveillance which 
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is, at times, infused with western understanding of agency and defiance. In other words, 
gay Malay men do not materially enact their resistance in the form of gay pride 
marches or gay lobbying as evidenced in the West, but instead, utilise gay social 
networking websites as a hybrid space in which to assert various forms of sexual 
agency in defying the laws prohibiting same-sex sexuality in Malaysia.  
 
But I argue that despite its growing popularity among many Malay and non-Malay gay 
men, KWGM is evidently fraught with “double standard practices” which contradict its 
role in representing a diverse membership through the use of the term “gay Melayu.” 
This is because many gay-identified Malaysian Malay members of KWGM privilege 
“gay sejati/gay tulen” (“authentic gay”) as an essential marker of “gay Melayu” identity 
whilst marginalizing “lelaki lembut,” “pondan,” and “bisek” who do not fit this so-
called “authentic” gayness. Although there is no single, satisfactory definition of “gay 
sejati/tulen,” many KWGM members claim that “gay sejati/gay tulen” is produced 
through the reinstantiation of “macho” and “tough” appearances and mannerisms. 
These KWGM members also claim that they often look up to idealised images of 
muscular and masculine gay men, and try to emulate such images as a way of 
disassociating themselves from the more effeminate behaviours of “lelaki lembut” and 
“pondan.” What is especially evidenced here is that effeminacy has always been 
regarded by many gay Malay men in Malaysia (and gay men elsewhere) as a 
problematic trope in the formation and expression of male same-sex sexual identities. 
Eve Kosofsky Segdwick, Tim Bergling, and others have argued that there is a 
problematic relationship between effeminacy and male homosexuality. In “How to 
Bring Your Kids Up Gay,” Sedgwick argues that effeminate boys (and effeminate gay 
men in general) have always been marginalized or stigmatized by and within the 
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western gay community. As Sedgwick writes, “…the official gay movement has never 
been quick to attend to issues concerning effeminate boys. There is a discreditable 
reason for this in the marginal or stigmatized position to which even adult men who are 
effeminate have often been relegated in the movement” (20). Such marginalization and 
stigmatization are largely attributed to what Sedgwick describes as effeminophobia; 
that is, the fear of effeminate boys in general and effeminacy in particular among many 
western gay men. I believe that the same holds true for effeminacy in KWGM, 
particularly in the ways in which many KWGM members express their gay 
subjectivities through the hypermasculine model of “gay sejati/tulen,” rather than 
through the effeminate models of “lelaki lembut” and “pondan.” This is mainly because 
many KWGM members fear of being perceived or identified as “lelaki lembut” and 
“pondan” which have always been stigmatized as being “kewanitaan” and “tidak 
jantan.” It is this fear of effeminacy or effeminophobia that probably compels self-
identifying “gay sejati/gay tulen” members of KWGM to look for “macho,” “tough,” 
and/or “straight-acting” gay men as a potential partner or a lover. 
  
Effeminophobia among many Malay gay men has negative impacts on effeminate 
members of KWGM. For instance, one self-identified “lelaki lembut” laments that he 
finds it very difficult to find a partner (not to mention a decent friend!) mainly because 
many KWGM members are more interested in developing erotic and/or affectional 
relationship with “sejati/tulen” gay men. It is essential to point to out that the 
hypermasculine model of “gay sejati/gay tulen” which many KWGM members take on 
as a marker of their gayness is also repressive because it fixes gay male identity and 
further devalues gender fluidity. This is especially true when the privileging of “gay 
sejati/gay tulen” among many gay-identified members of KWGM gives the impression 
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that what it means to be “gay” online (and even offline) is essentially and rigidly 
configured through the reification of hegemonic masculinity. This, I believe, creates 
another impression that other forms of gay subjectivities, particularly those which are 
marked by more fluid forms of gender, are not “gay” and would probably continue to 
be regarded by many KWGM members as “kewanitaan” and “tidak jantan.” The 
question is whether lembut-identified and pondan-identified Malay men will ever be 
able to resist the repressive hypermasculine model of “gay sejati/gay tulen” and take on 
femininity as a way of being “gay” in this gay Malay online community.   
 
“Bisek” or bisexual-identified Malay men, on the other hand, are also marginalized by 
many gay Malay men in KWGM who maintain that “biseks” are not “gay sejati” (“real 
gay”) and may not be able to “truly” self-identify as “gay” because of “biseks‟” sexual 
preferences for both men and women. In the forum discussion thread on “LelaKi 
bIseK” (“Bisexual Men”), many KWGM members assert online that bisexual Malay 
men are not able to identify themselves as “gay sejati,” let alone commit themselves 
fully to a “gay relationship.” This is mainly because bisexual Malay men continue to 
“main puki/cari perempuan” (“have sex with women/look for women”) whilst engaging 
in same-sex erotic practices. Furthermore, the ways in which “biseks” conceal or hide 
their sexuality from their female spouses or partners have prompted many KWGM 
members to regard “biseks” as “penipu” (“liars”). Rather than calling bisexual Malay 
men liars and deceitful, it may be more useful to understand the very act of concealing 
same-sex sexual preferences as primarily motivated by bisexual Malay men‟s fear of 
being revealed and/or identified as “bisexual.” The same holds true for many gay-
identified KWGM members who also conceal their same-sex sexuality and continue to 
keep it as a secret because they do not want to be stigmatized, harassed, and even 
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humiliated for being found out. This corroborates Ismail Baba‟s contention that many 
gay Malay men living in Malaysia conceal their same-sex sexuality for fear of social 
stigmatization and discrimination. Gay Malay men in Ismail‟s ethnographic study, for 
example, construct their sense of gayness based on the notion that “one must act like a 
“straight man”” (157) and adopt straight acting behaviour to avoid the consequences of 
being identified as “gay,” which include the estrangement from family and friends. It 
can be said, then, that the act of covering up same-sex sexuality or “cover,” a term 
which many KWGM members regularly use to describe this very act, cannot simply be 
taken as a form of self-deception or denialism. The term “cover” provides a veil or a 
screen through which many gay-identified and bisexual-identified Malay men can 
circumvent social prejudices against homosexuality and bisexuality. Moreover, it 
would be wrong to assert that bisexual Malay men in KWGM are not be able to “truly” 
self-identify as “gay,” let alone commit themselves fully to a gay relationship as a 
result of their sexual preferences for both men and women. I believe that it would be 
more appropriate to think that bisexuality opens up advantageous possibilities for 
bisexual-identified Malay men in KWGM to resist normative notions of gender and 
sexuality. In Bisexual Spaces: A Geography of Sexuality and Gender, Clare Hemmings 
maintains that although bisexuality has always been perceived as inhabiting the middle 
ground between sexes, genders, and sexualities, it is from this middle ground that 
bisexual-identified men and women are able to engender “the great bisexual escape” in 
resisting, subverting, and transcending normative gender and sexual categories (2-3). 
Hemmings‟s notion of “the great bisexual escape,” in my view, can be used to explain 
how bisexual Malay men engender a similar form of escapism from rigid notions of 
gender and sexuality. This is evidenced in the ways in which bisexual Malay men, 
particularly those in KWGM, do not conform to the cultural and religious expectations 
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of being “a heterosexual Malay man.” Rather than adhering to gender and sexual norms 
as inscribed and enforced by Malay culture and religion, bisexual-identified Malay men 
redefine and reshape dominant Malay male identity by continually engaging in erotic 
and affectional relationships with both women and men. As one bisexual-identified 
member of KWGM, Azri, writes: 
aku lelaki boleh pompuan pun boleh gak tapi perasaan aku more kepada 
lelaki ..... ntahlah kekeliruan perasaan... pernah bercinta ngan 2 orang lelaki 
ngan 1 perempuan semuanya putus tengah jalan tapi bukan dalam masa 
yang sama le..... i hope will found true love one day... jgn ler benci lelaki bi 
mcm kami nih :) peace (azri, “LelaKi bIseK” February 7, 2009) 
 
[I can be with both men and women but I feel more attracted to men… 
I don‟t know, maybe I‟m still confused about my feelings… I‟ve been in 
love with two men and a woman but these relationships didn‟t last and they 
didn‟t take place at the same time…I hope I will found [sic] true love one 
day… please, don‟t hate bisexual men like us :) peace.] (translation mine) 
 
It is important to highlight that many non-Malay Malaysian and non-Malay non-
Malaysian gay men, as well as Malay gay men from the Malay Archipelago and the 
diasporic Malay communities often find themselves marginalized by the dominant 
Malaysian Malay members of KWGM. A gay Malay man who identifies himself online 
as “KoolMalay” is a case in point. KoolMalay who currently resides in San Francisco 
fails to draw KWGM members‟ attention to his discussion “thread” on what it means to 
be “gay” in the West. Such a failure is due to the medium of expression (i.e. English 
language) that KoolMalay uses to recount his experiences of being “gay” in a western 
homosexual metropolitan centre. Moreover, KoolMalay‟s inability to direct KWGM 
members‟ attention to his discussion “thread” is also due to the fact that many gay 
Malay men in KWGM are more interested to discuss issues which are closer to “home” 
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such as popular local “port gay” (“gay meeting places”), local gay clubs and massage 
centres, erotic and romantic relationships, homosexuality and religion, to name just a 
few. Since these issues are discussed online in colloquial Malay spoken by a large 
number of urban gay Malaysian Malay men, it is possible to assert that language 
becomes an obstacle to developing a “genuine” feeling of community and a sense of 
belonging for many non-Malay speaking members of KWGM. In his discussion of what 
characterizes a gay community, Laszlo Toth contends that “[A] genuine (gay) 
community requires the existence of specific institutions within which a common 
consciousness can be expressed, which may include a community-specific language 
(true of many homosexual subcultures, and now apparent in the emergence of clearly 
defined gay slang(s) in Indonesia and the Philippines)” (qtd. in Altman, “Global Gaze” 
103). Such a common consciousness which is expressed through a community-specific 
language is evidenced in KWGM, especially in the ways in which young, urban, gay 
Malay men who make up a large portion of KWGM membership frequently and 
extensively use colloquial Malay to communicate with each other online.  
 
While standard Malay and English are also used by these members and KWGM 
administrators in writing the contents of the website‟s main sections, I believe that the 
use of colloquial Malay (which incorporates standard Malay and other languages, and 
the practices of code-switching between English and Malay) specifically develops a 
sense of community and belonging among young, urban, gay Malaysian Malay 
members of this gay Malay online community (see figs. 8 and 9).  
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Fig.8. The main section of “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” website.  
 
 
Fig.9. The use of standard Malay and English, as well as colloquial Malay in one of the   
            website‟s main sections. 
 
I say this because many KWGM members, most of whom are young and urban gay 
Malay men living in Kuala Lumpur, often use non-standard Malay as a way of 
communicating with each other online. This can be seen in almost all online forum 
discussion “threads,” where these members debate and deliberate the problems and 
issues primarily affecting their lives. Other members of KWGM, however, may not be 
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able to participate in these online forum discussions. Non-Muslim members, for 
example, may not be able to respond to the “threads” on matters concerning religion 
simply because they do not possess adequate knowledge of Islam. Non-Malay speaking 
members from countries such as Spain, Brazil, and Portugal may not be able contribute 
to, and participate in, these online discussion forums mainly because they do not 
understand the language used by young, urban, Malay gay men. Race and ethnicity, on 
the other hand, present another challenge to some non-Malay Malaysian members who, 
like “lelaki lembut” and “pondan,” struggle for acceptance in KWGM. For instance, a 
young, gay Malaysian Chinese man literally “begs” KWGM administrators not to 
terminate his membership because he is a non-Malay man who desires and loves Malay 
men. There is another notable case where a Malaysian Malay member strongly cautions 
Malaysian Indians not to add him to their friends‟ lists because he is not sexually 
attracted to these men. Clearly, race and ethnicity, in addition to language, become a 
hindrance to the very process of creating a genuine feeling of community in KWGM. 
Some non-Malay Malaysian members face difficulties in gaining acceptance and 
developing a sense of belonging to KWGM given the tendency among many gay Malay 
men to exclude these members because of their race. But such exclusion, in my view, is 
central to the formation of KWGM as a gay online community and gay Malay men‟s 
sense of identity. By keeping out Indians and Chinese Malaysian members, gay Malay 
men in KWGM are able to secure their racial identity by using this identity to 
differentiate themselves from others (in this case racial others). More importantly, gay 
Malay men exclude Indians and Chinese Malaysians as a way of exerting their 
superiority over racial others, which I believe is crucial to maintaining their rightful 
place and sense of exclusivity in a social networking website which was created 
primarily for gay Malays in Malaysia. However, there remains the vital question: why 
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does racial identity remain prior and, to a certain extent, take over sexuality even within 
a group that is marginalised by the official formulations of that racial identity? One 
tentative answer might be that despite being called “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” 
because of their sexuality, many Malay gay men in KWGM demonstrate a strong sense 
of Malayness (“semangat kemelayuan”) by identifying themselves strongly in terms of 
their racial rather than sexual identity. Such a strong racial self-identification is still 
very salient in the lives of many Malays in Malaysia who have come to regard 
themselves as Malays living in a multiracial, multiethnic, and multireligious country 
such as Malaysia. Another vital question that needs to be asked is whether KWGM as 
an emerging gay Malay online community can represent a sexually, linguistically, 
geographically, and ethnically diversified membership through the term “gay Melayu.” 
Who and what exactly is “gay Melayu” then? What constitutes “gay Melayu” as a gay 
male identity and as a gay online community?  
 
My point here is that the privileging of “gay sejati/gay tulen” as an essential marker of 
“gay Melayu” identity compels a rethinking of “gay Melayu” as a hybrid cultural 
construct. “Gay sejati/gay tulen,” as discussed earlier, sustains, rather than resists, 
western gay hegemony. This, I believe, reevaluates Homi K. Bhabha‟s notion of 
hybridity as a form of resistance against essentialised and fixed cultural identities. Gay 
Malay men‟s reification of the images of western masculine gay men reinforce Feroza 
Jussawalla‟s view on how “true hybridity cannot be achieved because those who would 
most speak for hybridity most want to retain their essentialisms…” (qtd. in Dirlik 109). 
Many Malay gay men in KWGM who replicate, to varying extents, western standards of 
masculine gayness, do so because this would enable them to “truly” self-identify as 
“gay” as understood in the West. More importantly, many Malay gay men believe that 
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they could assimilate into and become part of the larger western homosexual world, 
which has been perceived as the epicentre of/for gay community, by replicating western 
models of masculine gayness. However, this is not to suggest that gay Malay men 
would want to be more like “gay kat Amerika/Negara Barat” (“gay men in the West”). 
This is because gay Malay men look up to homosexual westerners as some sort of a 
role model of how they would like to live their lives as gay men in Malaysia. In his 
article on “Gay and Lesbian Couples in Malaysia,” Ismail Baba points out that one of 
the psychosocial issues that continue to affect actual lived conditions and material 
struggles of many gay-identified Malay men in present-day Malaysia is the apparent 
lack of positive gay role models (156). Baba argues that although there already exists a 
traditional model of expressing male same-sex sexuality, which is in the form of 
“pondan” tradition, many gay Malay men find that this model is not always helpful in 
expressing their sense of gay male identity and gayness. Being “gay” and what it means 
to be “gay” for many gay Malay men within the borders of Malaysia, then, may neither 
be appropriately articulated through the effeminate behaviours of “pondan,” nor 
expressed through “pondan‟s” daily routine of cross-dressing. Because of the apparent 
lack of positive local gay role models, many gay Malay men in KWGM consider 
western masculine gay men as a role model whom they can emulate and with whom 
they can identify as a way of expressing a gay male identity in a more “masculine,” 
rather than in a “feminine,” manner. 
 
But if one acknowledges Michel Foucault‟s contention on “the plurality of resistances” 
(96); that is, how resistance may take multiple shapes and forms, it would be more 
productive to view how “gay Melayu” is configured along a broad continuum of 
hybridities and resistances. In Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange, Jan 
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Nederveen Pieterse argues that local-global interactions under recent conditions of 
globalization produce a multitude of hybridities that may range from “assimilationist” 
to “destabilizing” types. These include “on one end, an assimilationist hybridity that 
leans towards the center, adopts the canon and mimics the hegemony and, at the other 
end, a destabilizing hybridity that blurs the canon, reverses the current, [and] subverts 
the center” (79). The privileged “gay sejati/gay tulen” may be read as an assimilationist 
hybrid gay male identity which not only appropriates, but, to an extent, imitates images 
of western masculine gay men, while the marginalized “lelaki lembut” may be read as a 
destabilizing hybrid type that resists and subverts these images simply because 
masculine and muscular features are not necessarily salient markers of gayness for 
many “lelaki lembuts.” This, in turn, demonstrates that gay male identities in Malaysia 
are culturally and historically specific constructions which take on multiple forms of 
hybridity and resistance. The ways in which “gay Melayu” is constructed along a wide 
spectrum of hybridities also help demonstrate that the process of constructing local gay 
male identities is visibly fraught with the tensions between localization and 
globalization, between assimilation and de-assimilation, and, most importantly, 
between reproducing and resisting western gay hegemony. This, I believe, amplifies 
Martin Manalansan‟s assertion that notions of being “gay” in the contemporary world 
are affected by hybridity and syncretism (“Shadows of Stonewall” 213), where 
transnational and transcultural interactions under current globalization conditions have 
eased and expedited the formation, the dissemination, and the deployment of hybridised 
and syncretic gay male identities in local settings such as in Malaysia.
10
 
 
My point on the marginalization of “lelaki lembut,” “pondan,” and “bisek,” as well as 
non-Malaysian Malay, non-Malay Malaysian, and non-Malay non-Malaysian members 
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of KWGM, on the other hand, raises pertinent issues concerning the role that this 
emerging gay Malay online community plays in representing a diversified membership 
through the use of the term “gay Melayu.” In “Survival through Pluralism: Emerging 
Gay Communities in the Philippines,” Michael L. Tan contends that the terms “gay,” 
“lesbian,” and “communities” run the risk of becoming monolithic simply because 
these terms are often used to describe “emerging,” middle-class gay and lesbian 
Filipinos who have sought to live their lives as homosexuals as understood in the West 
(129). Many middle-class Filipino gay men, as Tan cogently argues, reiterate western 
standards of masculine gay identity as a way for articulating their sense of “gayness.” 
He maintain further that “variables” such as age and ethnicity, in addition to class, are 
not only significant in shaping and differentiating gay “communities,” but also crucial 
to understanding emerging and evolving gay subcultures in the present-day Philippines, 
which include “bakla” (“effeminate men”) and “silahis” (“bisexual men”) (131). Tan‟s 
view coheres neatly with Martin Manalansan‟s argument that social class, ethnic/racial 
affiliations, and varying cultural traditions and practices are crucial in defining what it 
means to be “gay” and “Filipino” for many gay-identified Filipino men (qtd. in Jyoti, 
Encountering Nationalism 434). The same holds true for KWGM, particularly in 
relation to how this gay Malay online community may not be able to represent 
members from diverse socio-cultural and economic backgrounds through the use of the 
term “gay Melayu.” Feelings of marginalization as felt and experienced by non-Malay 
Malaysian members whom I mentioned earlier, give the impression that KWGM  may, 
after all, function as a gay social networking website which is created by “gay Melayu” 
and for “gay Melayu” only. This, in my view, demonstrates that it is impossible to 
speak of KWGM as a homogenous gay online community, let alone maintain that “gay 
Melayu” is a homogeneous term. But rather than conceding that the term “gay Melayu” 
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cannot be used to represent the diversified KWGM membership (hence its limited and 
limiting features), it would be more productive, I think, to discuss how KWGM 
members may be able to formulate an “exclusive” and “inclusive” vision of “gay 
Melayu” identity through collaboration, integration, and the sharing of differences. 
“Exclusive” in the sense that the term “gay Melayu” can be employed specifically to 
address gay Malaysian Malay men, and “inclusive” to the extent that the same term can 
be used to include and acknowledge gay Malay men from different parts of the world, 
as well as non-Malay Malaysian and non-Malay non-Malaysians gay men who seek to 
affiliate with gay Malay men without necessarily identifying themselves as “Malay” as 
understood in the Malaysia. Non-Malay members of KWGM, for instance, can identify 
themselves as “gay Melayu” without necessarily fulfilling religious, language, and 
cultural requirements of being “Malay” as inscribed in the Malaysian Constitution. The 
same can be said of Singaporean gay Malay men who can regard themselves as “gay 
Melayu” in KWGM without compulsorily conforming to the legal markers of 
Malaysian Malayness. This is because, unlike the Malaysian Constitution that defines 
“Malay” in terms of Muslim religion, in addition to Malay language and custom, there 
is no specific mention of Islam in the Singapore Constitution as an identificatory 
marker of Singaporean Malayness.
 11
 This in turn demonstrates that Singaporean Malay 
gay men and other gay Malay men who live outside of the Malaysian national borders 
are able to assert “gay Melayu” and take it on as a subject position without necessary 
identifying themselves as “Malay” as conflated with Malays living in Malaysia (I will 
discuss this further in Chapter 6). Moreover, the creation of an “exclusive/inclusive” 
vision of “gay Melayu,” I believe, can help KWGM to live up to its claim of being “the 
most popular community especially for Malay guys around the world.” But the problem 
is that not all KWGM members construct and articulate an “exclusive/inclusive” gay 
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Malay identity, let alone view their gay male identities as hybrid cultural formations. 
This is mainly because many KWGM members, regardless of their apparent socio-
cultural differences, have come to the website in order to fulfil primary goals which 
include finding sexual partners and potential lovers, developing erotic and affectional 
bonds, and experimenting with “gay sex.” Furthermore, many KWGM members are 
apparently more interested in being “gay” rather than “Malay,” while some KWGM 
members aspire to be “gay suci” (“pure gay”) by developing same-sex romantic 
relationship or engaging in gay sex. Such a strong sense of gayness, in my view, is 
important because it helps one to understand the complex creation of gay Malay 
identity. Notions of self and identity among gay Malay men in KWGM are evidently 
dynamic and fluid. For instance, racial identity as mentioned earlier may take priority 
over sexual identity in the process of self-identification among gay Malay men, 
particularly those who demonstrate a strong sense of Malayness as a way of 
distinguishing themselves from racial others in Malaysia. Gayness, on the other hand, 
may take precedence over race in the creation of identity for Malay gay men who 
identify more strongly with being gay rather than being Malay. This is probably 
because sexuality is more important than anything else for this group of Malay gay 
men. Interestingly, there are some gay Malay men who display a more fluid and 
context-based self-identification by calling themselves Malay in one situation (e.g. 
when identifying themselves in racially mixed spaces) and “gay” in another (e.g. when 
identifying themselves in gay or gay-friendly establishments). 
 
It is possible to say that there can never be a completely satisfactory answer to what it 
means to be “gay” in modern-day Malaysia. This is because notions of being “gay” as 
envisioned and embraced by many gay Malay men whom I‟ve discussed in this chapter 
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are constantly shaped by various factors pertaining to subjectivity, and are also 
influenced by western gay identities and the language that has been universally 
employed to explain these identities within and outside the western domains. What I 
have found particularly interesting is that gay Malay men, particularly members of the 
local gay Malay online community, “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu,” employed a 
multitude of strategies in formulating and expressing a plethora of gay male identities 
and cultural practices. This can be seen in the ways in which many gay-identified 
members of “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” strategically reappropriated local and 
western forms of gayness in crafting and expressing hybrid and heterogenous gay male 
identities. Some gay-identified members used the knowledge they have gained about 
indigenous and western gay male identities, and drew on local idioms and expressions 
in articulating their own particular and unique ways of being “gay” which are not 
wholly dependent on western-derived gay terminology. These include “Gay Tahfiz,” 
“Anak Ikan,” and “Abang Polis/Askar.” This, in my view, validates the main argument 
in this chapter and in this study more specifically that queer-identified Malays in 
contemporary popular culture (i.e. local gay social networking websites) invent their 
own self-identities and use them as a means of redressing received ideas about 
queerness in local contexts, particularly its conflation with western cultural influences. 
My discussion of what it means to be “gay” and “Malay” has also shown that many 
Malay gay men in “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” are able to construct an “exclusive” 
and “inclusive” vision of “gay Melayu” identity, which can be used to represent both 
Malays and non-Malay members of this emerging gay Malay online community. Such 
an “exclusive/inclusive” vision of “gay Melayu,” a point to which I shall argue in 
Chapter  6, opens up a critical lens through to think of how Malays living in the 
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diaspora revise and transform official versions of Malaysian Malayness by specifically 
creating a queer Malay diasporic identity.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 See Dennis Altman‟s Global Sex, “Globalization and the International Gay/Lesbian Movement” and 
“Global Gaze/Global Gays” for his substantive research on the emergence of “global gay” identities and 
communities in non-western societies under conditions of economic and cultural globalization. 
2 See Nizam Zakaria‟s short story, Sembang Ratu I, especially p. 45 for his discussion of indigenous gay 
men‟s diverse understandings of “handsome-ness” and “can do-ness” and their different “tastes” in men.  
It is important to note that the term “nok” (and, at times, “puki”) is a Malay equivalent word for “vagina” 
which is often used by queer-identified Malay men (“pondans” and “mak nyahs” in particular) when 
communicating with each other. “Nok,” in addition to “nyah,” “perem/puan” (“woman”), “sundal” 
(“bitch”) and “pelacur” (“prostitute”) do not necessarily carry derogative meanings simply because these 
terms have been used by many queer-identified Malay men as common forms of address. 
3 Ashraf Sinclair, Jimmy Shanley Norjahan Saleh, Stephen Rahman-Hughes are some Malaysian Malay 
male celebrities of mixed Malay and European parentage who are considered by some (if not many) gay 
Malay men as “hensem.”   
4 See William Leap and Tom Boellstroff‟s Speaking in Queer Tongues: Globalization and Gay 
Language, for discussion of the global circulation of the term “gay” or “a gay men‟s English,” which 
originates in the U.S. Leap and Boellstroff, along with other scholars in this volume, have demonstrated 
how this term interacts with the already-existing ways of talking about same-sex sexuality and desire 
outside of and even within the western (i.e. North American) domains. This is most readily observed in 
the ways in which “people who have same-sex desires, subjectivities, and/or communities mediate and 
renegotiate linguistic process and product under conditions of the ostensible globalization of gay 
English” (Leap and Boellstroff 4; emphasis added). I agree with Leap and Boellstroff mainly because the 
term “gay” has also been reappropriated and recontextualised by many gay Malay men whom I discuss 
in this chapter, to the extent that the term does carry different meanings to different people in different 
contexts, particularly in non-western settings such as in Malaysia. 
5 See Nizam Zakaria‟s short story, Sembang Ratu II, especially p. 201 for his discussion of why many 
gay Malay men avoid becoming intimately involved with “lelaki lembut.”  
6 I believe that there is some evidence of internalized homophobia, particularly effeminophobia, 
misogyny, and even lesbian phobia among many gay Malay men in KWGM. It would be interesting to 
investigate how all these affect the ways in which gay Malay men in KWGM and other gay Malay men in 
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Malaysia identify themselves as “gay” in relation to others, especially in the local gay and lesbian 
community.  
7 See an overview of Malaysia‟s broadband services at <http://point-topic.com/content/ operatorSource/ 
profiles2/malaysia-broadband-overview.htm> and a list of leading broadband internet service providers 
in Malaysia at <http://www.mycen.com.my/ malaysia/isp.html>. 
8 See Royce Cheah‟s “Malaysia Denies Internet Filters Will Curb Dissent” and Daniel 
Chandranayagam‟s “Malaysia: A Step Closer to Internet Censorship?” for their arguments regarding 
Malaysia‟s stand on Internet censorship, which many believe presents an obstacle to the vision of 
transforming Malaysia into a fully technological and developed nation by the year 2020.  
9 Although no one in Malaysia has ever been arrested for posting and publishing, for instance, nude 
and/or semi nude profile photos on Facebook, there is always a risk of prosecution. This is because many 
Malaysians have actually been arrested because of their Facebook profiles. For instance, in August 2010, 
two men were prosecuted by the police in the Malaysian state of Johor for impersonating the Johor 
Prince, Tunku Ismail Idris Sultan Ibrahim, on their Facebook profiles. See the article, entitled “Two 
Arrested for Johor Prince Impersonation on Facebook,” on The Star‟s website at <http://thestar. com.my/ 
news/story.asp?file=/2010/8/31/nation/ 20100831133132& sec=nation>. In 2009, the council officers in 
the Malaysian state of Terengganu raided a booze-and-drug party attended by more than 200 teenagers 
who had been invited to the party via their Facebook profiles. See the article, entitled “Council Officers 
Cut Short Beachfront Wild Party For Teens,” on The Star‟s website at <http://thestar.com.my/news/story 
.asp?file=/ 2009/5/17/ nation/ 3925835 &sec=nation>.  
10 See Martin F. Manalansan‟s article, entitled “In the Shadow of Stonewall: Examining Gay 
Transnational Politic and the Diasporic Dilemma,” especially p. 213 for his in-depth discussion of  
hybridised and syncretic notions of being “gay” as conceived and enacted by Filipino gay men in the 
Philippines.  
11 See David C.L. Lim‟s “Race, Multi-Cultural and Accommodation and the Constitutions on Singapore 
and Malaysia,” Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied‟s “Making Sense of An Evolving Identity: A Survey of 
Studies on Identity and Identity Formation Among Malay-Muslims in Singapore,” and Cheu Hock Tong 
and Teoh Boon Seong‟s “Malay Studies in Language, Literature, Culture and Society” for their 
discussions of the way in which “Malay” is both legally and differentially defined in Malaysia and 
Singapore.  
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Chapter 5 The Articulation of Queer Malay Identity and Its Material Impact on  
                  Queer Malays‟ Lives and Their Sense of Belonging to “Bangsa Melayu” 
 
However, the articulation of a subcultural identity has been, in the case of 
lesbian and gay subject, a practice always threatened by the intervention of 
a dominant heterosexist culture. The threats that emanate from the attempt 
at the closure of discourse to the articulation of a gay identity have material 
reality that impacts directly upon the subject. 
               – Carl F. Stychin, Law’s Desire: Sexuality  
                  and the Limits of Justice 
 
While acknowledging that queer-identified Malays adopt diverse strategies to 
formulate and express their own notions of being “queer” and “Malay,” it is 
crucial not to disregard important issues surrounding the actual material 
articulation of queer Malay identity in present-day Malaysia. In this chapter, I 
will demonstrate that there are various ramifications of establishing and asserting 
a queer narrative of Malayness in a Muslim majority country such as in Malaysia. 
I will argue that, although queer-identified Malays are able to construct a queer 
Malay identity through, for instance, strategic renegotiations of ethnicity, 
religion, and queer sexuality, there are diverse material implications of inhabiting 
this identity and taking it on as a subject position in a country where queerness 
remains subject to lived social and juridical surveillance. I will also demonstrate 
how the very articulation of a queer Malay identity deeply affects queer-
identified Malays‟ sense of belonging and attachment to the Malay Muslim 
community, in particular, and to the Malaysian nation-state, in general. To 
buttress my argument about the articulation of a queer narrative of Malayness and 
its diverse material impacts on queer-identified Malays‟ lives and their self-
identities, I shall address the following questions: what are the material 
ramifications of identifying oneself as “queer” and “Malay” in a world that 
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remains heteronormative and, at times, homophobic? Do material conditions of 
queer-identified Malays change as a result of taking on a queer Malay identity? 
Can strategic renegotiations and reassertions of ethnicity, religiosity, and queer 
sexuality protect queer-identified Malays from being persecuted, harassed, and 
even humiliated by the police and religious authorities? Can queer-identified 
Malays enact a hybrid form of resistance, which is not an absolute duplicate of 
western forms of resistance, but is, at times, overlaid, with western notions of 
agency and defiance, against juridical surveillance and monitoring? Can queer-
identified Malays resist received narratives of Malayness, on the one hand, and 
queerness, on the other, by formulating and articulating their own notions of 
“queerness” and “Malayness”? In what ways does the articulation of a queer 
Malay identity affect queer-identified Malays‟ sense of belonging and attachment 
to the Malay Muslim community and to the Malaysian nation-state? My 
discussion of the material implications of articulating queer Malay identity is 
important because it shows that my study on queer Malay identity-formation not 
only examines how self-identified gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered 
Malays formulate and articulate their identities, but also pays specific attention to 
the ways in which the hegemonic Malay culture, religion, and the state affect 
their creation and expression. This, I believe, can provide a better understanding 
and further insights into the complexity of identity creation among ethnic Malays 
(queer-identifying Malay men and women in particular) within Malaysia‟s 
territorial boundaries.  
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Being “Queer” and “Malay”: Implications and Ramifications 
One of my central arguments and assertions throughout this thesis has been that notions 
of being “queer” and “Malay” as envisioned and embraced by many queer-identified 
Malays are configured through strategic renegotiations of conflicting elements such as 
queer sexuality, ethnicity, and religion. Such renegotiations amplify Homi K. Bhabha‟s 
assertion that the reconciliation of diverse and competing elements is crucial to the 
construction of a hybrid cultural identity. In Nation and Narration, Bhabha describes 
cultural hybridity as a process that engenders “something different, something new and 
unrecognizable, [and] a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation” (211). 
In other words, cultural hybridity opens up an interstitial site in which antagonistic or 
contradictory elements of the colonizer and the colonized (i.e. colonial culture, the 
experiences of colonized people, and the ongoing effects of colonialism) are 
(re)negotiated in constructing a new hybrid identity which stands as a challenge to 
fixed and essentialised notions of cultural identity. This is especially true when the 
colonized subjects take this new hybrid identity as a form of resistance against the 
colonizer‟s designation of the colonized as “uncivilized” and “inferior” (Said 207, 300). 
Although Bhabha discusses the process of cultural hybridity in relation to the history of 
colonialism in India, I find that his notion of hybridity, particularly the accommodation 
of conflicting elements, provides a useful means through which to examine and 
understand the complex processes of self-identification among queer-identified Malays 
living in Malaysia. Many queer-identified Malays, whom I discussed in this thesis, 
construct their own visions of being “queer” and “Malay” by reconciling multiple 
competing elements including same-sex sexuality and cultural and religious heritages. 
The reconciliations of diverse and contradictory elements enable many queer-identified 
Malays to invent new narratives of Malay ethnicity which resist and radically transform 
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pedagogical configurations of Malayness. This is particularly true when queer-
identified Malays formulate a Malay identity marked by queerness and use it as a 
means of resisting and redefining dominant ideas about Malayness, where Malays are 
officially designated as Muslims who must fulfil their “fitrah” as heterosexual Muslim 
men and women. It is pertinent to point out that Bhabha‟s concept of hybridity also 
provides a useful tool for understanding queer identities in non-western indigenous 
contexts such as in Malaysia. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that gay male identities and 
gay male cultures in modern-day Malaysia are hybrid and heterogeneous cultural 
formation. Notions of being “gay” as experienced and practiced by some “lelaki 
lembut,” for instance, are characteristically hybrid simply because they are deeply 
shaped by the indigenous tradition of “pondan” and western forms of gayness which 
have been brought into the local social landscape via colonialism and globalisation. 
What is more important is that some “lelaki lembut” selectively reappropriate both 
local and western forms of gay male identities and cultures in configuring their own 
visions of gay male identity. These characteristically hybrid forms of gayness challenge 
and radically reshape the western aberration argument used by the Malay nationalist 
elites. This is because gayness in Malaysia cannot be officially perpetuated as a 
degenerative western influence because it is a hybrid cultural formation that is 
constantly being shaped and reshaped by a multitude of factors, including western 
forms of gay identity,  “pondan-ness,” indigenous religious and cultural beliefs and 
practices. 
 
But it would be incorrect to assume that queer Malays can identify themselves 
unproblematically and unconditionally as “queer” and “Malay” by asserting a sexually 
dissident notion of Malay ethnicity. This is because there are various ramifications of 
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identifying oneself as “queer” and “Malay” in modern-day Malaysia, given that queer 
identities and practices remain subject to social and legal sanctions. Many queer-
identified Malays, as I‟ve discussed in this thesis, continue to be discriminated against 
on the basis of their sexuality. “Lelaki lembuts,” (“effeminate indigenous men”), “mak 
nyahs” (“male-to-female transsexuals”), and Malay gay men, for example, cannot 
adequately protect themselves from being humiliated by many members of the 
dominant Malay Muslim community. Ethnic Malays in Malaysia often use derogative 
and highly discriminatory terms such as “pondan,” “bapuk,” “kedi,” and “darai” to 
mock and degrade “lelaki lembuts” and “mak nyahs‟” for cross-dressing and/or 
behaving like women. The term “pondan” is also frequently used to deride Malay gay 
men for desiring other men. The very act of shaming queer-identified Malay men 
through derogatory terms corresponds with Judith Butler‟s contention that sexuality is 
regulated through the policing and the shaming of gender. Calling gay men “feminine,” 
as Butler contends, is indeed a result of shaming gay men for failing to be a real or a 
proper man (Bodies that Matter 238). The same holds true for Malay gay men, “lelaki 
lembuts,” and “mak nyahs” who are often disparaged as/for being “kewanitaan” 
(“womanly”) and “tidak jantan” (“unmanly”) for failing to live up to culturally 
normative conceptions of Malay masculinity. It is also pertinent to note that queer-
identified Malay men and women continue to be perceived by the dominant Malay 
Muslim community to be “less Malay” and “less Muslim.” This is because queer-
identified Malay men and women do not adhere strictly to heteronormative cultural and 
religious practices, which have become potent markers of Malay Muslim subjectivity. 
Ruzy Suliza Hashim and Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf have argued that the concept of 
Malay Muslim subjectivity within the context of “dunia Melayu” (“Malay world”) is 
profoundly shaped by culture and religion.
1
 Ruzy, for instance, maintains that Malay 
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Muslim women are expected to comply with and actualise their “fitrah” (“innate and 
unalterable gender dispositions”) by becoming “isteri” (“wives”) and “ibu” 
(“mothers”), while Malay Muslim men are expected to become fathers and the heads of 
the households (“Meniti Duri”16). Ruzy contends further that sexual relations between 
Malay Muslim husbands and wives are governed and regulated by the principles of the 
Quran and Hadith. This is especially true when marriage and conjugal relations are 
culturally endorsed and religiously sanctified as the legitimate means of sexual 
gratification. It is correct to say that the actualisation of “fitrah,” which is conceived 
through the fulfilment of cultural and religious expectations of masculinity/femininity 
including the social and familial pressures for marriage, is crucial to dominant 
heteronormative configurations of Malay Muslim subjectivity.  
 
But the failure to actualise or fulfil one‟s “fitrah” often calls into question one‟s identity 
as “Malay” and “Muslim” within the dominant Malay Muslim community. This is 
readily observed in the ways in which queer-identified Malays have always been 
criticised for being “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” on the grounds that queer-identified 
Malays defy their “fitrah” by articulating a sexually dissident notion of Malay identity. 
Queer-identified Malays‟ involvement in same-sex sexual practices, on the other hand, 
has been viewed by many Malays in Malaysia as a failure to possess adequate “iman” 
(“religious beliefs”), “taqwa” (“God consciousness”), and “ahlaq” (“good moral 
behaviours”). Asrul Zamani, Zeenath Kausar, and others have pointed out that “iman,” 
“ahlaq,” and “taqwa” are distinctive features of Malay Muslim identity. Asrul, for 
example, maintains that homosexuality, cohabitation, and other forms of social ill, 
which are prevalent in the Malay Muslim community, are largely attributed to the 
declining levels of religiosity and morality among many Malay Muslim youth.
2
 Asrul 
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asserts further that “those who are engrossed in these social ills, are the ones who 
hardly ever pray. If they are Muslims, they are nominal Muslims. There is no faith or 
God-consciousness within their hearts. There is no fear of God” (351; emphasis added). 
Asrul maintains that Malay Muslim youths can ultimately prevent social ills through 
“iman,” “taqwa,” and “ahlaq” and return to the teachings of Islam as way of becoming 
“true” Muslims.3 While I do not intend to determine whether queer-identified Malays 
are still Muslims or otherwise, I believe that Asrul‟s view helps explain why many 
Malays regard queer-identified Malays as “Muslim” only in or by name at the least. In 
the eyes of many Malays, queer-identified Malays fail to practice the Muslim faith on 
the premise that queerness contradicts with Islamic principles and practices. This raises 
the question of whether queer-identified Malay men and women can assert their 
identity and mark their difference unproblematically and/or unconditionally within the 
dominant Malay Muslim community. Can queer-identified Malays identify themselves 
as “queer” and “Malay” regardless of the official conflations of queerness with being 
“less Malay” and “less Muslim,” on the one hand, and with being “less of a man” or 
“less of a woman,” on the other? Can queer-identified Malays express and inhabit 
identities marked by sexual difference without the fear of being stigmatized and 
discriminated against on the basis of sexual difference? 
 
It is important to emphasize that queer-identified Malays‟ material conditions may not 
necessarily change or improve as a result of articulating a queer narrative of Malayness. 
This is mainly because queer-identified Malay men and women‟s public and private 
lives continue to be monitored and policed by the state governing bodies and religious 
authorities. Azza Basarudin, Farish A. Noor, Julian C. H. Lee, and others have argued 
that the private and public lives of Malays in modern Malaysian nation-state are 
166 
 
governed and circumscribed by socio-juridical practices. Farish, for instance, asserts 
that the intimate aspects of Malays‟ everyday lives are regularly intervened by the 
state-employed “morality police” and “shariah enforcers.”4 Such interventions, which 
are in accordance with the state-sanctioned Shariah law, are crucial to maintaining and 
policing Malay Muslims‟ morality in an Islamic nation-state such as Malaysia. It 
is important to mention that Islam in Malaysia is different culturally and socially from 
Islam in the Near and Middle East. Although it may be getting more conservative now 
in Malaysia, this does not necessarily mean that Islam as practised by many Muslims 
here, is synonymous with the so-called “radical” Islam. Afsaneh Najmabadi, Osman 
Bakar, Suad Joseph, and others have pointed out that almost all Malay Muslims in 
Malaysia are Ash„arite Sunni who follow the Shafi‟ite school of thought in their 
interpretation and practice of Islamic law. Other Shafi‟ites; that is, the followers of the 
Shafi‟ite school of law, can also be found in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. 
Many scholars have noted that Malaysia is a moderate and progressive Muslim state. 
This is mainly because the Malay-dominated government, led by the ruling Malay party 
UMNO (United Malay National Organization), adopts a more “liberal” approach 
toward Islam. But the intense Islamisation of the Malaysian nation-state and the Malay 
Muslim community in particular in recent years (as evidenced in the greater policing of 
Malay Muslims‟ public and private lives) can be said to be intimately linked with 
“political Islam” in Malaysia. Osman Bakar, for instance, maintains that political Islam 
has long been a key feature of the Malay-dominated Malaysian politics. This is 
especially true when Islam, as Osman contends, figures prominently in political ideas, 
values, and practices of/among Malaysian Malay Muslim leaders. What makes it more 
interesting is that Islam has often been used by the two dominant Malay Muslim 
political parties; namely, UMNO and PAS, to gain support from Malay Muslim voters. 
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Both the ruling Malay party UMNO, and the opposition Islamic party PAS (Partai 
Islam Se-Malaya), have different visions of Malaysia as an Islamic nation-state – the 
former is dedicated to develop a liberal, modern, and progressive Muslim nation, while 
the latter advocates a more traditional and religiously conservative vision of an Islamic 
state. But a major shift of Malay Muslim voters to PAS in recent years has, in many 
ways, forced UMNO to revise its vision of Malaysia as a Muslim state (that it can be 
modern and progressive, but must adhere to the normative tenets of Islam) as a way of 
gaining more voters‟ support to strengthen its political power and maintains its rule 
over the country. This is most readily observed in the ruling Malay party‟s enforcement 
of more stringent Islamic laws which regulate, monitor, and police both the public and 
private lives of Malay Muslims living in Malaysia.
5
  
 
The “morality police” and “shariah enforcers” as mentioned earlier also form a 
significant part of the state‟s project of Islamization, which has set out to monitor and 
police queer-identified Malay Muslims‟ private lives and sexualities through regimes of 
control and surveillance. The state project of Islamization was a move taken by Malay 
nationalist elites in the 1980s as a way of responding to the growing influence of 
“dakwah” (“religious Islamic proselytizing movement”) at the time.1 Shamsul Amri 
Baharuddin has argued that this movement was originally initiated by young Muslim 
graduates from University of Malaya in the early 1970s through the establishment of 
the Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement or Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM). 
One of the central assertions (and demands) of ABIM was to urge Malay Muslims to 
create a better society based on Islamic principles, while simultaneously strengthening 
their religious identity and Islamic faiths (Shamsul, “Islamic Revivalism” 213). ABIM 
gained momentum and influence throughout the 1970s and 1980s, to the extent that it 
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not only radically changed the local social milieu (as evidenced in the phenomena of 
donning the “mini-telekung” (“head veil”) among many Malay Muslim women), but 
had extended its reach into the local political arena. In order to cope with the growing 
social and political influences of ABIM and other Muslim youth organizations, the 
former Malaysian premier, Mahathir Muhamad, and other Malay state elites at the time 
developed their own version of “dakwah” by implementing state-sponsored 
Islamisation policies and programmes. These included the introduction of Islamic 
banking system and the establishments of the Southeast Asian Islamic Research Center 
and the International Islamic University in Malaysia. The lives of many Malay Muslims 
in Malaysia were (and still are) deeply affected by the nationalist project of 
“Islamisizing” the Malaysian nation-state in general, and Malay society in particular. 
For instance, “un-Islamic” activities such as drinking and gambling, as well as pre-
marital and extra-marital sex are all prohibited under the state-sanctioned Shariah law. 
Cross-dressing and other transgressive forms of gender, on the other hand, are not only 
criminalized, but remain under constant governmental surveillance via state religious 
authorities throughout Malaysia. In recent years, there has been a series of police raids 
on many gay and lesbian establishments in Kuala Lumpur and other cosmopolitan 
centres throughout Malaysia. These police raids are conducted and carried out on 
commercial premises and on private homes and residences.
6
 Gay Malay men and 
lesbian Malay women who have been arrested during these police raids could be 
charged and punished under Section 25 and Section 26 of the Shariah Offences 
(Federal Territories) Act 1997 for engaging in “liwat” (“sexual relations between male 
persons”) or “musahaqah” (“sexual relations between female person”). Section 25 
clearly states that, “[a]ny male person who commits liwat shall be guilty of an offence 
and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit or to 
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imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to whipping not exceeding six 
strokes or to any combination thereof (“Shariah Offences” 17). Malay gay men who 
have been found guilty of engaging in “sodomy” during these police raids could also be 
prosecuted under Sections 377A and 377B of the Malaysian Penal Code for committing 
the “carnal intercourse against the order of nature.” Section 377B, as inherited from 
British colonial rule, explicitly states that, “[w]hoever voluntarily commits carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature (i.e. the insertion of the penis into the anus or the 
mouth of the other person) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may 
extend to twenty years, and shall also be liable to whipping.
7
 Malay “mak nyahs,” on 
the other hand, are liable to a hefty fine and/or to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding three years under Section 28 of the Shariah Criminal Offences Enactment if 
they are charged for wearing women‟s attire or posing as a woman for “immoral 
purposes” in the public.8 Similar punishments will be imposed on lesbian Malay 
women, particularly “pengkids” and “tomboys,” for engaging in cross-dressing and 
other forms of transgressive gender behaviour. To aggravate matters further, the 
Malaysian National Fatwa Council has recently issued a “fatwa” (“religious ruling”) 
which prohibits “pengkid” and “tomboyism” on the premise that cross-gendered 
appearances and same-sex sexuality among Malay Muslim women are “haram” 
(“religiously prohibited”) in Islam. As the English version of the “fatwa” reads: 
The committee has decided that tomboy, women whose appearance, 
behaviour and sexual inclination are like men is forbidden in Islam. The 
committee urged the public to educate young girls properly especially in 
matters pertaining to dressing, behaviour and appearance so that this 
phenomenon can be prevented as this phenomenon can be prevented [sic] 
as this act [sic] contradictory to nature and sunnatullah (God‟s laws).9 
 
170 
 
What is clearly evidenced here is that the actual material conditions of queer-identified 
Malays may not necessarily change or improve as a result of taking on a sexually 
dissident notion of Malay identity. This is precisely true when many queer-identifying 
Malay men and women cannot completely prevent regulatory and, at times, 
unwarranted, governmental invasion into their private lives. The unprecedented police 
raids on private homes and residences and on local queer establishments give the 
impression that queer-identified Malays face the risk of losing their personal privacy 
and, most importantly, their rights to privacy. Scholars such as Michael Warner and 
Vincent J. Samar have argued that the rights to privacy of queer-identified men and 
women in the U.S. have been and continue to be violated by the state law. This is 
mainly because the law of privacy in America, as Samar points out, protects only 
specific “states of affairs” and “human actions” (14), which include sexual relations 
and sexual practices between heterosexual married couples. This means that people 
who engage in sexual relations and sexual practices (and their rights to engage in these 
sexual relations and sexual practices) which take place outside of heterosexual marriage 
are not fully protected by the said law and, therefore, remain subject to state 
surveillance and control. As Warner rightly asserts:  
As long as people marry, the (U.S.) state will continue to regulate the 
sexual lives of those who do not marry. It will continue to refuse to 
recognize our intimate relations – including cohabiting partnerships – as 
having the same rights or validity of married couple […] All this and more 
the state will justify because these relations take place outside of marriage. 
In the modern era, marriage has become the central legitimating institution 
by which the state regulates and permeates people‟s most intimate lives; it 
is the zone of privacy outside of which sex is unprotected” (The Trouble 
with Normal  96; emphases added). 
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The same can be said of the ways in which the Malaysian nation-state continues to 
infringe and encroach upon queer-identified Malay men and women‟s rights to privacy 
on the basis that same-sex sexual relations and sexual practices take place outside the 
legitimate and legitimised zone of privacy; that is, heterosexual marriage. This is 
because the Muslim-majority Malaysian nation-state, as I have mentioned, recognizes 
heterosexual marriage and conjugal relations as the only legitimate means of sexual 
gratification. But I would like to argue very strongly that queer-identified Malay men 
and women‟s rights to privacy must be recognized and protected because this will 
enable queer-identified Malays to articulate identities characterized by queerness and to 
engage in same-sex sexual relations and sexual practices with relative ease and safety 
in private spaces, especially when it is still illegal to be openly “queer” locally, and to 
claim erotic autonomy as a human right. I say this because there are still significant 
problems concerning the implementation or the enforcement of human rights locally. 
Despite claiming to be a democratic nation, many scholars have pointed out that 
Malaysia remains quasi-autocratic under the control of the Malay-dominated 
government, led by the ruling Malay party, UMNO (Ansell 248). Local NGOs (Non-
Governmental Organizations) including Suara Rakyat Malaysia (People‟s Voice or 
SUARAM) challenge the practice of democracy in Malaysia mainly because there is 
still an apparent lack of protection of basic human rights, in addition to the limited 
freedom of the mass media, the denial of cultural rights to certain ethnic communities, 
and the repressive laws by the regime (Ramasamy 209). All these help illuminate the 
continuing presence of autocratic governmental policies and practices in present-day 
Malaysia. For instance, scholars have argued that the state-sanctioned Internal Security 
Act (ISA) is a draconian law, which violates human rights in Malaysia on the basis that 
it has been and continue to be used to detain individuals (both Malaysians and non-
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Malaysians) without trial for their alleged involvement in subversive activities that 
endanger the country‟s security and sovereignty. To complicate matters, the concept of 
human rights espoused by the authoritarian Malaysian government, as Cecilia Ng, 
Maznah Mohamad, and Tan Beng Hui contend, does not include sexuality rights (and 
the protection of such rights) mainly because same-sex sexuality contravenes with the 
nation‟s religious values and principles (144-145). This, in turn, explains why many 
queer-identified Malays and queer-identified non-Malay Malaysians have a well-
founded fear of prosecution because of their sexuality. Many have sought asylum in 
countries such as the UK to flee prosecution and to live an openly queer life in a safe 
and secure environment. If only human rights of queer Malaysians of all races were 
acknowledged, recognized, and protected locally, then the difficulties in identifying and 
repositioning oneself openly as “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” or “transgendered” in 
Malaysia could perhaps be overcome. But will it be possible for queer Malaysians to do 
so when their basic rights to organize their identities and their lives around same-sex 
sexuality, desires, and practices is officially and judicially denied? 
10
 
 
Queer-identified Malay men and women cannot adequately protect themselves from 
being persecuted, harassed, and humiliated by the local police and religious authorities. 
Many Malay “mak nyahs,” as Khartini Slamah, Teh Yik Koon, and others have argued, 
are often asked to strip naked and expose their genital parts, and even cajoled into 
having sex with police officers during arrest or while in custody.
11
 One may recall the 
character Manisha in Osman Ali‟s film, Bukak Api, who expresses her dissatisfactions 
with the ways “mak nyahs” are often cruelly mistreated and abused by local police 
officers. As Manisha points out: 
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Aku tak kisah sangat pasal undang-undang tu 
Yang aku geram sangat cara dia layan kita tu  macam binatang tau tak! 
Suka-suka hati dia boleh sepak terajang kita ni 
Aaaa… Siapa tak geram? Aku pun biasa gak kena tangkap.  
(Manisha, Bukak Api) 
 
[I don‟t care much about the laws 
But what really infuriates me is the way they treat us like animals! 
They kick and trample us as they like 
Aaaa… How can you not be angry? I‟m used to being arrested too.]  
(translation mine) 
 
 
Gay Malay men, on the other hand, cannot protect themselves from being beaten up 
and flogged by police officers before they are put on trial for engaging in legally 
proscribed same-sex sexual practices. In his article, entitled “Islam and the Politics of 
Homophobia: The Persecution of Homosexuals in Islamic Malaysia Compared to 
Secular China,” Walter L. Williams asserts that gay Malay men (and their non-Malay 
counterparts) are subjected to harassment, detention, and abuse by the local police. It is 
increasingly difficult for gay Malay men to defend and protect themselves, given that it 
has become a common practice for the police to use their power to prosecute and, at 
times, abuse those who are guilty of engaging in the legally prohibited male same-sex 
sexual activities. As Williams rightly notes: 
The fact that homosexuals are so commonly arrested is itself a sentence of 
punishment. A person who is arrested for a crime in Malaysia often has to 
wait in jail for a long time, sometimes up to eight years, before being 
brought to trial. Guards regularly beat prisoners. The torture of prisoners is 
justified by the commonly meted out sentence of being flogged with a cane. 
The practice of caning is so severe that prisoners often faint from the pain 
and are left with permanent scars. In the case of prisoners who are 
homosexual, the extensive publicity regarding the government [sic] 
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condemnation of homosexuality has sent the message to the police and 
others that the persecution of homosexuals is acceptable (16; emphasis 
added).
12
  
 
While I concur with Khartini, Teh, and Williams‟ contentions on the legal ramifications 
of being “mak nyah” and “gay” in indigenous contexts, I would like to argue that the 
persecution of queer-identified Malays, in addition to governmental interventions into 
queer-identified Malays‟ private lives, do not fully contain the articulation of a sexually 
dissident notion of Malay ethnicity. This is because many queer-identified Malay men 
and women continue to articulate and sustain their own ethnic identities which are 
marked by queerness, despite ongoing governmental control and surveillance. Malay 
“mak nyahs,” for instance, continue to assert notions of difference by sustaining cross-
gendered identifications, regardless of the risk of prosecution. Many Malay “mak 
nyahs,” as Khartini Slamah rightly asserts, challenge the “fatwa” on sex-change 
operation among all Muslims in Malaysia by going out to neighbouring countries such 
as Thailand to undergo gender reassignment surgery (101). Teh Yik Koon also points 
out that many Malay “mak nyahs” in her ethnographic study claim that they insist on 
being “nyahs,” despite legal ramifications of doing so simply because “deep in their 
hearts, [many mak nyahs] feel that they are women” (“Male to Female”105). What is 
worth noting here is that Malay “mak nyahs” assert transsexuality and a strong desire to 
be women, alongside ethnic and religious heritages, as a way of resisting 
heteronormative notions of being “Malay” and the laws which continue to prohibit 
“mak nyah-ness.” Such a strong desire to “truly” self-identify as women is clearly 
exemplified by Jelita in Osman Ali‟s film, Bukak Api. Manja, the actor who plays the 
character Jelita in the film, is a self-identified Malay “mak nyah” and her involvement 
with the film is part of her contribution to the Transsexual Programme under Pink 
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Triangle Malaysia – a non-governmental organisation that reaches out to “mak nyahs” 
and other local sexual minority groups. It is necessary to point out that Pink Triangle 
Malaysia, which is now known as PT Foundation, is the first non-governmental 
organization in Malaysia that deals with issues concerning HIV/AIDS. As a non-profit 
making and community-based organization, PT Foundation provides education on 
HIV/AIDS, prevention, care and support programmes, sexuality awareness and 
empowerment programmes for vulnerable communities which include drug users, sex 
workers, transsexuals, men who have sex with men (MSM), and people living with 
HIV/AIDS. 
13
 Manja, along with other Malay “mak nyahs” who also contribute to the 
success of the film project and PT Foundation‟s Transsexual Programme, take on “mak 
nyah-ness” as a subject position without necessarily discarding cross-gendered 
appearances and behaviours for fear of prosecution. More importantly, Manja and her 
fellow “mak nyahs” not only inhabit Malay identities marked by sexual difference by 
renegotiating “mak nyah-ness” and “Malay-Muslimness,” but engender a hybrid form 
of resistance against governmental control and containment. That is, Malay “mak 
nyahs” do not replicate western model of queer resistance as evidenced in radical queer 
activism in the West, but enact a similar form of resistance by reinforcing cross-
gendered identifications and transgressive forms of gender as a way of defying legal 
and religious sanctions against “mak nyah-ness.” However, this hybrid form of 
resistance may not necessarily effect significant social changes in the lives of many 
Malay “mak nyahs” within the borders of Malaysia. This is because Malay “mak 
nyahs” continue to be socially and economically marginalized as a result of failing to 
comply with culturally normative notions of gender as prescribed and enforced by the 
dominant Malay Muslim community and the Malaysian nation-state in general. 
Khartini Slamah and Teh Yik Koon have pointed out that many Malay “mak nyahs” 
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living in Malaysia experience discrimination on various levels, which include access to 
education and employment, as well as health services and treatment for HIV (Khartini 
103; Teh, “Male to Female” 101). To compound matters further, many Malay “mak 
nyahs,” as Teh Yik Koon contends, are forced to live in poverty as a result of the 
difficulty in renting accommodation and in securing housing loans (“Male to Female” 
105). More than fifty percent of “mak nyahs” in Teh‟s ethnographic research work in 
the sex industry and are involved in drug abuse. This prevents many Malay “mak 
nyahs” from obtaining loans and other forms of financial assistance which they 
genuinely need to improve their living conditions. Such difficulties strengthen my 
argument that the articulation of queer Malay identity brings about diverse material 
impacts on Malay “mak nyahs‟” actual lived conditions and everyday struggles. As the 
character Kak Tipah in Osman Ali‟s film, Bukak Api, accurately summarizes:  
Mereka ni ada satu impian. Mereka nak negara ni bersih. Bebas dari seks 
haram. Oklah, itu kerja mereka. Kerja aku cari duit nak hidup. Apa yang 
aku tahu sekarang melacur. Aku tak banyak modal berniaga. Aku tak 
diterima mana-mana tempat berkerja. Sebab aku ni mak nyah! Pondan! 
(Kak Tipah, Bukak Api) 
 
[They (i.e. the state authorities) only have one dream. They want this 
country to be “clean.” Free from illegal sex. Okay, that‟s their job. 
My job is to earn money for a living. What I can do now is to be a sex 
worker. I don‟t have enough money to start my own business. I‟m not 
accepted in the workplace. Because I‟m “mak nyah”! “Sissy”!] (translation 
mine) 
 
Kak Tipah‟s strong resentment toward the state authorities, in my view, raises the 
pertinent question of whether taking on a queer Malay identity in present-day Malaysia 
will ever be enough to overcome various forms of discrimination and marginalization 
on the basis of sexual difference. Will articulating a queer Malay identity ever be 
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enough for Malay “mak nyahs” to challenge discrimination in employment, education, 
health care, and public benefits as a way of effectuating significant change in their 
lives? Can Malay “mak nyahs” and other queer-identified Malays assert a queer Malay 
identity as a mark of differentiation from the dominantly heteronormative Malay 
Muslim community and the Malaysian nation-state?  
 
Many gay Malay men, on the other hand, continue to assert and inhabit identities 
marked by male same-sex sexuality, despite governmental monitoring and policing of 
homosexuality. The growing number of gay establishments in Kuala Lumpur and other 
cosmopolitan centres across Malaysia provide a much needed avenue for gay Malay 
men in particular, and the local gay community in general, to develop erotic, 
affectional, social or political ties with other gay-identified men. Local gay 
establishments, which include gay bars, clubs, saunas, and massage parlours, provide 
an avenue through which Malay gay men are able to engage in, for instance, same-sex 
erotic practices which are specifically prohibited by both the civil and Shariah laws in 
Malaysia. Instead of resigning themselves submissively to the laws against the 
articulation of male same-sex sexuality, many Malay gay men strategically renegotiate 
and accommodate their ethnic, religious, and same-sex sexual identities as they move 
fluidly across various social spheres, which include heteronormative and queer 
designated spaces. This is readily observed in the ways in which many of Malay gay 
men adopt a public heterosexual identity as a way of being in the dominantly 
heteronormative Malay Muslim community while simultaneously identifying 
themselves as “gay” in relation to others within the local gay community. Some, if not 
many, gay Malay men continue to maintain their role as dutiful sons within the 
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domestic space of the family while simultaneously fulfilling various roles within the 
homosexual spheres such as gay bars and clubs. As Dennis Altman notes:  
[T]he dutiful Confucian or Islamic Malaysian son one weekend might 
appear in drag at BlueBoy, Kuala Lumpur‟s gay bar, the next– and who is 
to say which is the real person? Just as many Malaysians can move easily 
from one style to another, from camping it up with full awareness of the 
latest fashion trends from Castro streets, to playing the dutiful son at a 
family celebration (Global Sex 92). 
 
What is notable here is that it is still possible for many gay-identified Malay men to 
identify themselves as “gay” in a country where male same-sex sexuality remains 
subject to governmental control and surveillance. This is especially true when many 
gay-identified Malay men continue to self-identify as “gay” without necessarily ceasing 
to be “Malay” by renegotiating multiple roles and identities as they move fluidly 
between heteronormative and queer designated spaces. The internet, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, also provides a viable means through which Malay gay men are able 
to communicate and socialise with other gay-identified men with relative ease and 
safety. Many members of “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” (hereafter cited as KWGM) 
find it easier to exchange their contact details such as postal and email addresses, as 
well as telephone and mobile phone numbers online as way of initiating and 
maintaining contacts with other gay-identified members.
14
 Moreover, the internet 
provides a much-needed space for KWGM members to identify themselves online as 
“gay” with much comfort and ease, given that it remains difficult to be “gay” in 
heteronormative public spaces. This is can be observed in the ways in which many 
KWGM members identify themselves fully and, at times, unconditionally, as “gay” on 
the internet without having to worry about being derogatively depicted and publically 
shamed by the dominant Malay Muslim community. For example, phrases such as 
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“Aku gay/Aku gayboy,” (“I‟m gay/I‟m a gayboy”) “Aku PLU,” (“I‟m “People Like 
Us”), and “Aku top/bottom/bisek” (“I‟m top/bottom/bisexual”) are frequently used by 
many gay Malay men in KWGM to address themselves while/when communicating 
with other gay-identified members online.
15
 What I find fascinating is that the internet 
enables gay Malay men to redefine and transform heteronormative notions of being 
“Malay” by constructing a hybrid form of self-identification. This is especially true 
when many gay Malay men in KWGM redefine, rather than rigidly adhere to, their 
“fitrah” by continuing to engage in same sex eroticism whilst preserving ethnic and 
religious heritages in identifying and repositioning themselves as “gay” and “Malay.” 
Although gay Malay men cannot sufficiently protect themselves from being prosecuted 
by the police and religious authorities for their involvement with same-sex erotic 
practices, gay Malay men are able to engender a hybrid form of resistance against 
governmental monitoring and control. This is precisely true when gay Malay men‟s 
notions of resistance are not complete duplicates of western model of resistance, but 
are, at times, infused with western notions of agency and defiance. Rather than 
asserting agency and expressing defiance by staging gay pride marches as evidenced in 
the West (and in some other metropolitan parts of postcolonial Asian countries), gay 
Malay men reclaim gayness with pride in the virtual sphere, and use gayness as a 
means of defying the existing laws that continue to criminalize homosexuality. Many 
Malay gay men in KWGM and other local gay networking websites formulate and 
express visible, assertive, and hybridised gay male identity online and use the internet 
to form, organize, and negotiate legally proscribed and religiously prohibited same-sex 
sexual activities. In an open note for visitors and members of KWGM, the founder of 
KWGM, Edie Mohamad not only extends his gratitude to all members of website for 
their support in dignifying the gay coterie (“memartabatkan golongan gay”), but 
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welcomes mIRC (Internet Relay Chat) users to show their support through KWGM’s 
official channel #GAYMELAYU at DALnet server.
16
 Edie‟s very idea of ennobling a 
group of people who share similar sexual interests and experiences, in my view, is 
crucial because it sends out a positive message to many KWGM members that it is not 
wrong to articulate gay male identities online.  
 
While acknowledging that gay Malay men in KWGM can conveniently express notions 
of difference online, it is, however, important to note that gay Malay men and other 
queer-identified Malays experience difficulties in asserting their sense of agency as a 
way of undermining lived social and juridical surveillance. This is because queer-
identified Malays‟ notions of agency, while sporadically influenced by the West, are 
intimately entwined with Islamic concept of agency. Raihannah Mohd Mydin posits 
that Muslim‟s concept of agency; that is, “Islamic agency,” is intricately linked with 
one‟s responsibility to the Creator, to the family and community, and to oneself. 17 
Raihannah maintains further that Muslims are able to function more effectively at the 
personal and public levels by incorporating responsibility into their sense of agency (7). 
But if a Malay Muslim places more emphasis on the responsibility to himself or herself, 
rather than to God and to the family and community, then his or her sense of agency is 
considered “incomplete” in the context of Islam and in the eyes of many Malay 
Muslims. This explains why queer-identified Malays‟ notions of agency are often 
perceived by many Malays as placing too much emphasis on individual responsibility. 
Such notions of agency amplify what Raihannah describes as a western form of agency, 
which lacks a sense of moral responsibility and religious ethics in the context of Islam 
(8). I would like to argue very strongly that it is incorrect to say that queer-identified 
Malays‟ notions of agency are completely western and are, therefore, devoid of any 
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sense of responsibility to God and to the family and community. This is simply because 
many queer-identified Malays continue to show reverence to their family, to the Malay 
Muslim community, and, most importantly, to God by fulfilling filial and communal 
responsibilities including religious duties as outlined in the Quran. Many queer-
identified Malays, particularly gay Malay men in KWGM, are fully aware that their 
involvement with same-sex erotic practices defies and defiles the Quran and Sunnah. 
But this does not prevent Malay Muslim members of KWGM from fulfilling religious 
obligations by performing regularly the “solat” (“obligatory daily Muslim prayers”), 
which is one of the five pillars of Islam. Moreover, many gay Malay men in KGWM are 
also aware of the dire consequences of going against “hukum Allah” (“God‟s law”), 
which prohibits same-sex eroticism. For instance, in the forum discussion “thread” 
(“topic”) on “Kawin Sesama Lelaki, Sanggupkah Anda Lakukan…Jika Undang2 
Mengizinkan… (Undang2 Negara Le)” (“Same-Sex Marriages: Are You Willing To 
Do It If The Law Permits?”), many Malay Muslim members of KWGM claim online 
that they would not enter into same-sex marriages even if the Malaysian government 
allowed and legitimised it. As some of KWGM members maintain: 
 
Even mahkamah dunia pun benarkan kita kawin sejenis…kita xboleh 
ketepikan hukum agama. So think ur self… (boy, “Kawin Sesama Lelaki” 
October 7, 2009) 
 
[Even “the world‟s court” allows us to marry… but we cannot ignore 
religious laws. So think for yourself…] (translation mine) 
 
Undang-undang yang paling ku takut adalah undang-undang Allah S.W.T. 
(ShaRyzal, “Kawin Sesama Lelaki” October 8, 2009) 
 
[The law that I fear most is Allah‟s (S.W.T) law.] (translation mine) 
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Kalau cakap bab sanggup maybe ramai yang sanggup (for non muslim 
rasanya tak jadi masalah) bagi yang Islam nie dah memang sah kita ni x 
boleh lawan agama… 
(Zieclair Naphael, “Kawin Sesama Lelaki” October 13, 2009). 
 
[If we talk about willingness, maybe many of us would (there‟s no problem 
for non-Muslims though). For Muslims, it is clearly stated that we cannot 
defy or go against religion…] (translation mine) 
 
What is clearly evidenced here is that Malay gay men‟s own sense of agency, which 
they assert in engendering resistance against socio-juridical surveillance of male same-
sex sexuality, is not completely western or “un-Islamic.” This is because some Malay 
gay men, particularly “Boy,” “ShahRyzal,” and “Zieclair Naphael,” fear the 
consequences of violating the law (God‟s law in particular) against same-sex 
marriages. What I find particularly interesting is that “Boy,” “ShahRyzal,” and 
“Zieclair Naphael” strongly believe that despite defining their own identities and 
organizing their lives in terms of male same-sex sexuality, they must continue to fulfil 
their duties as Muslim men and meet their responsibilities toward Islam by obeying the 
law of God as expressed and inscribed in the Quran. This illuminates the idea that gay 
Malay men‟s notions of agency are not “incomplete” in the context of Islam simply 
because some gay Malay men (and, perhaps, other queer-identified Malays) integrate a 
deep feeling of religious responsibility into their own sense of agency which they assert 
in defining themselves as “gay,” “Malay,” and “Muslim” in the contemporary world. 
While acknowledging that legal and religious sanctions against queer sexuality have a 
direct and substantial impact on queer-identified Malays‟ lives and their identities, the 
question that still needs to be addressed is whether the material articulation of a 
sexually dissident notion of Malay identity affect queer-identified Malays‟ sense of 
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belonging and attachment to the Malay Muslim community and the Malaysian nation-
state. 
 
Queer Malay Identity, Notions of Belonging, and “Bangsa Melayu”  
I strongly believe that the articulation of queer Malay identity impacts materially on 
queer-identified Malays‟ sense of belonging to the Malay Muslim community, in 
particular, and to the Malaysian nation-state, in general. Many queer-identified Malays 
in the media and genres I examined face the risk of having their statuses smeared and 
their membership into the Malay Muslim community invalidated as a result of 
identifying themselves as “queer” and “Malay.” One may recall Rokiah in Ismail 
Baba‟s ethnographic study, who claims that she always finds it difficult to self-identify 
as a “lesbian” mainly because Islam and the dominant Malay Muslim community do 
not accept lesbianism, let alone allow Malay Muslim women to develop emotionally 
intimate bonds with other women. One may also recall viewers‟ reactions to Amy 
Ikram Ismail‟s film, Comolot, where gay Malay men have been accused of bringing 
shame and disgrace to “bangsa Melayu” (“Malay race”) and “umat Islam” (“Muslim 
community”) for committing the very sins of “Kaum Lut/Kaum Sodom” (“the People 
of the Prophet Lut/the People of Sodom”). What is notable here is that Rokiah, Malay 
gay men, and other queer-identified Malays experience a great deal of difficulty in 
asserting a sense of belonging to “bangsa Melayu” (“Malay race”) and “umat Islam” 
(“Muslim community”). This is because notions of belonging to the Malay race and to 
the Muslim community remain predicated on Malays‟ strong attachments to ethnicity 
and religion.
18
 The extent to which Malay‟s entry into the “bangsa Melayu” and “umat 
Islam” is determined by his or her strong adherence to culturally prescribed gender 
exepctations reinforces further the idea that a Malay sense of belonging and community 
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is also conceived in terms of heterosexuality and heteronormativity. Michael G. Peletz, 
for instance, has argued that many Malays in Malaysia place a great deal of emphasis 
on marriage and the family in constructing their sense of self and belonging. Peletz 
contends that in becoming a “full-fledged social adult” and a full-fledged member of 
the Malay Muslim community, “one must enter into a legitimate marriage (with 
socially approved member of the opposite sex) and bear or father (or adopt) children” 
(“Neither Reasonable” 109). While this amplifies Jacqui M. Alexander and Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty‟s contention that ideas about citizenship and belonging to the nation 
have always been configured on heterosexuality and heteronormativity, I would like to 
argue strongly that queer-identified Malays can overcome the difficulties of creating 
and maintaining a sense of attachment to “bangsa Melayu” and “umat Islam” by 
redefining and transforming heteronormative notions of membership of the Malay 
Muslim community. Benedict Anderson, Homi K. Bhabha, and others have 
demonstrated that nation is an imagined construct which is constantly being rewritten 
by the nation‟s people. Anderson, for example, contends that there is no single, 
satisfactory definition of nation, nationality, and nationalism. This is because the 
nation, as Anderson notes, is a limited and an imagined political community: the nation 
is limited in the sense that “even the largest of [nations] […] has finite, if elastic 
boundaries, beyond which lies other nations”; and the nation is envisioned as an 
imagined political community because “the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 7, 6). Bhabha, on the 
other hand, views the nation as a form of an ambivalent narration which is configured 
through the dialogical tension between the “pedagogical” and the “performative.” 
Bhabha asserts that in the process of writing the nation, “there is a split between the 
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continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, recursive 
strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting that the conceptual 
ambivalence of the modern society becomes the site of writing the nation” 
(“DissemiNation” 297). What Anderson and Bhabha both suggest here is that nation is 
neither a fixed nor a stable construct simply because it is constantly being created and 
recreated by the nation‟s citizenry; namely, the state elites and the people of the nation, 
who hold different visions of what a nation should be. The state elites‟ limited vision of 
the nation, which are constructed and maintained through pedagogical “instruments” 
such as culture and religion, is constantly redefined through the performative “forces” 
or “actions” of the nation‟s people. This can be seen, for instance, in the ways in which 
many ethnic Malays reconfigure the Malay nationalist elites‟ vision of the “bangsa 
Melayu” (“Malay race/nation”) through their everyday lived experiences of being and 
becoming members of the Malay community. Such experiences are not only shaped by 
varied notions of selfhood, nationhood, national sentiment and aspiration, but inflected 
by a multitude of subjectivizing factors such as age, race, class, gender, and sexuality, 
in addition to Malay culture and religion. This, in my view, demonstrates that “bangsa 
Melayu” is not fixed, but is an “imagined” and an “ambivalent” formation which is 
assembled through the integration of diverse, competing visions of the Malay 
race/nation as envisioned by both the sate elites and ethnic Malays.  
 
The same, I think, can be said of the dominant notions of membership of the Malay 
Muslim community. Such notions, which the Malay state elites formulate and sustain 
through Malays‟ strong ethnic and religious attachments, are constantly redefined by 
queer-identified Malays‟ lived experiences of being the member the Malay Muslim 
community. Many queer-identifying Malay men and women reconfigure dominant 
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ideas about a Malay sense of belonging and community by continuing to become a 
member of “bangsa Melayu” and “umat Islam” without necessarily ceasing to be 
“queer.” For instance, Rokiah and other queer-identifying Malay men and women, 
whom I mentioned in this thesis, maintain their sense of attachment to the Malay 
Muslim community without necessarily discarding their sense of queerness. It is, 
however, imperative to point out that although queer-identified Malays can redefine 
heteronormative notions of belonging, their membership into “bangsa Melayu” and 
“umat Islam” continue to be invalidated by the Malay state elites who officially 
conflate same-sex sexuality with western cultural influences. One possible explanation 
for this is that the Malay nationalist elites‟ concept of “bangsa Melayu” is constructed 
through the state‟s project of anticolonial nationalism which rejects western influences 
as a way of protecting the sanctity and purity of the national indigenous culture. This 
illuminates Partha Chatterjee‟s assertion on the importance of understanding the two 
cultural domains; namely, the “outer/material” and the “inner/spiritual,” as intrinsic 
features of anticolonial nationalisms in Asian and African nation-states.
 19
 According to 
Chatterjee, the “outer/material” domain embodies the western world and its great 
achievements in economy, science, and technology, while the “inner/spiritual” domain 
encapsulates indigenous people‟s cultures and identities. He posits that, in exposing a 
postcolonial difference from, and an anticolonial resistance against the West, it has 
become crucially important for Asian and African nation-states to replicate the 
achievements of their western counterparts, while simultaneously preserving and 
protecting their distinct indigenous identities and cultural heritages. As Chatterjee 
writes: “[t]he greater one‟s success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, 
therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one‟s spiritual culture. 
This formula is, I think, a fundamental feature of anticolonialisms in Asia and Africa” 
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(6). Although Chatterjee makes no specific reference to Malaysia, I believe that his 
discussion of the fundamental features of anticolonialism, alongside Anderson and 
Bhabha‟s definitions of the nation, provide a lens through which to rethink “bangsa 
Melayu” as an imagined community that is produced through the integration of various 
elements, including same-sex sexuality which the Malay state elites have come to 
regard as a degenerate western influence.  
 
Many Malays in modern-day Malaysia have come to think of “bangsa Melayu” as a 
group of people whose sense of identity and belonging are defined in terms of 
“bahasa,” “adat,” and “agama.” This is mainly due to the fact that the Malay state elites 
have placed an immense emphasis on Malay culture and language, and Islam as key 
markers “Malayness” and “bangsa Melayu.” The former Malaysian premier, Mahathir 
Mohamad, for instance has utilised the key markers of Malayness (Islam in particular), 
in creating state-sanctioned and state-endorsed notions of Malay identity and Malay 
race. Mahathir has urged Malays living in Malaysia to preserve spiritual and religious 
values (i.e. “inner/spiritual domain”) without refraining from the mastery of modern 
skills (i.e. “outer/material domain”) as a way of identifying themselves as “Malays” 
who are able to function more productively and participate more fully in the 
contemporary world.
20
  Moreover, Malays must also be able to maintain a complete 
abstinence from the so-called decadent and destructive western influences such as 
incest, cohabitation, and homosexuality, which Mahathir and other Malay political 
leaders regard as a threat to the disintegration of the Malay Muslim community and the 
Malaysian nation-state. “Western societies,” as Mahathir asserts, “are riddled with 
single-parent families, which foster incest, with homosexuality, with cohabitation, with 
restrained avarice, with disrespect for others, and of course with rejection of religious 
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teachings and values…Surely these are signs of an impending collapse” (81; qtd. in 
Obendorf 184). Mahathir‟s moral-political stance toward western values and societies 
is further amplified by members of “People‟s Anti-Homosexual Volunteer Movement” 
(Pasrah) who launch nationwide campaigns against homosexuality by publically 
condemning it as a “defiling western import” and a threat to the Malay race and the 
nation. Homosexuality, as members of Pasrah strongly assert, “is a defiling western 
import that is profoundly threatening with respect to race and nation because it 
jeopardizes the reproduction and strengthening of Islamic and Malaysian values 
specifically and Asian values in general” (qtd. in Peletz, Islamic Modern 268).21 What 
is especially prominent here is that Malay nationalist elites in modern-day Malaysia not 
only construct the notion of “bangsa Melayu” through culture and religion, but sustain 
its cultural legitimacy through nationalist discourses which perceive homosexuality as a 
degenerate western influence. These nationalist discourses form a significant part of the 
state‟s project of anticolonial nationalism which repudiates western influences in order 
to protect what Partha Chatterjee posits as the “sovereign domain” of Malaysia‟s 
indigenous culture. But I would like to argue strongly that homosexuality cannot be 
regarded as emanating solely from the West simply because male same-sex sexuality 
has been present within the local social and cultural milieu. Male same-sex sexuality, a 
point to which I shall return shortly, is already inscribed in the Malay culture. This, I 
believe, opens up the possibility of rethinking “bangsa Melayu” as an imagined 
community which is composed of same-sex sexuality and other culturally authoritative 
markers of Malayness. 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing number of literature on male same-sex 
sexuality (“pondan” in particular) within the Malay society and culture, and on the 
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ways in which “homosexuality” in the modern western sense has been brought into 
local social and cultural landscape through a history of colonialism and, most recently, 
globalisation.
22
 Michael G. Peletz, for example, has demonstrated that “pondan” and 
other transgressive forms of gender have always been treated with a great deal of 
kindness and tolerance within the Malay community. This is especially true when 
“pondan” or effeminate Malay men who act, behave, and dress like women are well 
accepted and tolerated by many “kampong” (“village”) dwellers.23 Peletz contends 
further that some “pondans,” particularly those who take on the role of “mak andam” 
(“bridal beautician”), are revered for their contributions to the “kampong” community 
and to Malays living in the urban centres. Cultural openness and tolerance toward 
effeminacy in Malay men have also been exhibited and enshrined in the Malay familial 
traditions. By referring to the former minister in the Prime Minister‟s Department, 
Datuk Abdul Hamid Othman‟s stance on the issue of transvestism in the Malay 
parenting culture, Peletz posits that some Malay parents have an accepting and tolerant 
attitude toward their children‟s transgressive gender behaviours. Some Malay parents 
have even allowed their sons to develop “female characteristics” (i.e. having enlarged 
breasts) and that this has inadvertently facilitated transvestism in the Malay 
community. As Abdul Hamid maintains: 
Boys brought up as girls has been the main reason they become 
transvestites…  
 
Some parents who have sons and yearn for a daughter end up dressing one 
of their sons as a girl, buying him bangles and allowing him to develop 
female characteristics. They fail to realize the danger because the child, 
confused about his gender, grows up thinking he is a woman trapped in a 
man‟s body… 
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Parents need to be told the importance of bringing up their children 
according to the child‟s natural gender. A daughter should realize she will 
eventually become a wife and a son should know he will be a husband 
someday, not the other way around…. (qtd. in Peletz, Islamic Modern 256). 
 
I find that Abdul Hamid‟s view on transvestism is useful for two reasons. First, 
his assertion that Malay parents must bring up their children heteronormatively 
reinforces my earlier argument that notions of being a “Malay man” and a 
“Malay woman” in the context of “dunia Melayu” (“Malay world”) are 
profoundly shaped by heteronormative cultural and religious practices. Second, 
Abdul Hamid‟s view on Malay parents‟ lenient attitudes toward fluid forms of 
gender takes further the notion that male same-sex sexuality cannot be officially 
conflated as a defiling western influence.
24
 This is mainly because male same-sex 
sexuality is already embodied in, and regulated through, the cultural traditions 
and practices of the people who make up “bangsa Melayu.” This, I believe, 
enables one to view “bangsa Melayu” as an imagined community which includes, 
rather than excludes, male same-sex sexuality. The ways in which some, Malay 
parents raise their kids to appreciate or tolerate more fluid forms of gender also 
enable one to understand that male effeminacy as inscribed in the Malay culture 
differs from how it is perceived and practiced in the West. Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick, William Spurlin, and other scholars have maintained that there is still 
a considerable lack of tolerance toward male effeminacy, particularly effeminate 
boys in western societies. Sedgwick, for instance, has pointed that effeminacy has 
been used in the western (i.e. American) psychiatrists‟ construction and 
pathologization of effeminate boys‟ identities and subjectivities.25 This is 
especially true when Spurlin points out that effeminate boys in western families 
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can be diagnosed with “gender identity disorder in childhood (GIDC) – a 
“condition” defined by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) through The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) as a strong 
preference for cross-dressing and cross-gendered identifications.
26
 Although 
effeminate boys in Malay families are not readily diagnosed as having GIDC or 
even clinically and psychologically treated for such a condition, it is important to 
mention that not all Malay parents express tolerant attitude towards transgressive 
forms of gender behaviour. Some Malay parents have forced their children to 
adhere strictly to conventional gender roles as a way of preventing them from 
becoming homosexuals. More importantly, “pondans” and “mak nyahs” in 
Malaysia continue to be policed and monitored, despite the ways in which 
effeminacy in Malay men have been treated with a great deal of tolerance, 
kindness, dignity, and respect. This is largely attributed to the Malay state elite‟s 
project of more intense Islamization which values and valorises 
heteronormativity by enforcing a strict adherence to culturally and religiously 
prescribed gender roles whilst simultaneously policing non-normative genders 
and sexualities within the Malay Muslim community. As Peletz rightly asserts: 
“For a while pondan are certainly tolerated and accepted in village society, the 
past few years have seen concerted efforts by Islamic reformers and various state 
governments to crackdown and ultimately eliminate transsexuals, transvestites 
and all other types of gender crossers” (Reason and Passion 130).  
 
“Homosexuality” in the modern western sense has been brought into indigenous 
contexts via colonialism and globalisation. Robert Aldrich, for example, contends 
that colonialism played an important role in encouraging the development of 
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male same-sex sexual and emotional relations in non-western settings. 
Colonialism, as Alrich posits, opened up advantageous opportunities for 
European men to develop and engage in a wide range of same-sex relationships 
with indigenous men, which included intimate friendships, male bonding, and 
hierarchical relations (i.e. entrepreneur/employee; master/slave; 
colonist/houseboy).
27
 Interestingly, some of these intimate male bonds often 
veered off into sexual intimacy which provided a site in which European and 
indigenous men fulfilled same-sex sexual desires. By using documented evidence 
of male same-sex relations between European officers and indigenous men 
during the period of colonial rule in Malaya, Aldrich maintains further that 
“homosexuality” in the modern western sense had already permeated and 
penetrated the local social and cultural milieu. The western model of egalitarian 
homosexuality, on the other hand, has been brought into indigenous contexts via 
transnational and transcultural exchanges under conditions of economic and 
cultural globalisation.
28
 Dennis Altman, Gerard Sullivan, Peter Jackson, and 
others have cogently demonstrated that these exchanges are fostered and 
facilitated by various globalizing instruments such as international travel and 
tourism, and advances in technologies such as the internet.
29
 Such exchanges, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, have eased and increased interactions between 
gay men and lesbians from different parts of the world, providing them with new 
opportunities to form social or political alliances, and to articulate diverse ideas 
about same-sex sexualities, identities, desires, and practices.  
 
Therefore, it is not completely inaccurate to say that male same-sex sexuality has 
already become a fundamental feature of “bangsa Melayu,” particularly when it 
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has been historically cultivated through the “pondan” tradition and fostered by 
colonialism and globalisation. This, I believe, enables one to comprehend that 
same-sex sexuality (particularly male same-sex sexuality) is not completely 
western simply because it has always existed in local indigenous culture. More 
importantly, the idea that male same-sex sexuality is already present in the Malay 
culture reinforces my argument that “bangsa Melayu” is indeed an imagined 
community which is created through the integration of various elements 
including male same-sex sexuality. If “bangsa Melayu” were acknowledged as an 
imagined community composed of diverse components, then the ramifications of 
identifying and realigning oneself as “queer” and “Malay” in present-day 
Malaysia could perhaps be adequately minimized. This is precisely true when 
queer-identified Malays can continue to formulate and articulate identities 
marked by queerness on the basis that same-sex sexuality cannot be officially 
conflated with western influences because it is one of the many components that 
make up the imagined “bangsa Melayu.” Moreover, if “bangsa Melayu” were 
recognized as an imagined community assembled through multiple elements, 
then the risks of having queer-identified Malays‟ sense of self and belonging 
invalidated could perhaps be sufficiently overcome. This is because queer-
identified Malays can continue to define their sense of identity and belonging in 
terms of queerness on the grounds that same-sex sexuality is one of the many 
elements that constitutes the imagined “bangsa Melayu.” But the question 
remains whether “bangsa Melayu” will ever be acknowledged or recognized as 
an imagined community, which is conceived in terms of same-sex sexuality and 
other culturally authoritative markers of Malayness. Will same-sex sexuality ever 
be regarded as a component of “bangsa Melayu,” given that heteronormativity 
194 
 
has been and continue to be regarded by Malay nationalist elites and many ethnic 
Malays in Malaysia as a definitive marker of Malay race? Will queer-identified 
Malays ever be able to create and maintain a queer narrative of belonging when 
heteronormativity and strong ethnic and religious attachments are indispensible to 
dominant notions of belonging to “bangsa Melayu” as envisioned by the Malay 
nationalist elites and a majority of Malays within Malaysia‟s national 
boundaries? 
 
I must admit that there are no easy answers to these questions, since it is difficult 
to disentangle and even reshape received narratives of “bangsa Melayu,” which 
have been so firmly ingrained in the minds of some (if not many) ethnic Malays 
living within Malaysia‟s territorial boundaries. This is probably true when the 
dominant ideas about “bangsa Melayu” are built upon the widely endorsed notion 
that as members of the Malay race/nation, Malays must be heterosexual and 
adhere strictly to normative expectations of gender and sexuality as inscribed in 
Malay culture and religion. However, the questions I‟ve raised here and 
throughout this chapter allow one to think more deeply about pertinent issues 
concerning the articulation of queer Malay identity and its material implications 
on queer-identified Malays‟ lives and their sense of belonging to “bangsa 
Melayu.” This corresponds with the aim of my study that not only attempts to 
examine the various strategies used by queer-identified Malays to create their 
own notions of self-identity, but also delves into the consequences of taking it on 
as a subject position within the borders of Malaysia. This is especially true when 
the articulations of a queer narrative of Malayness have direct material impacts 
on queer-identified Malays‟ everyday lives and their sense of belonging to the 
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Malay Muslim community and to the Malaysian nation-state. It would therefore 
be very interesting to examine in future research queer-identified Malays‟ own 
ideas (and, perhaps, their own reservations) about issues pertaining to 
governmental control and surveillance of their sexuality and private lives. It 
would also be interesting to find out specific strategies queer-identified Malays 
often use in dealing with stigmatization, discrimination, violence, and abuse as a 
result of being “different” from the norm. A comprehensive examination of the 
coping strategies employed by queer-identified Malays can provide a better 
understanding and further insights into the complexity of articulating a Malay 
identity marked by sexual difference in Muslim-majority Malaysia. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 See Ruzy Suliza Hashim‟s “Meniti Duri dan Ranjau: Pembikinan Gender dan Seksualiti dalam Konteks 
Dunia Melayu,” and Ruzy Suliza Hashim and Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf‟s “From the Courts of Melaka 
to the Twin Towers of Petronas: Charting Masculinities in Malaysian Works” for their in-depth 
discussions of the construction of gender and sexuality in the context of “dunia Melayu” or “Malay 
world.” For further reading on gender and sexuality in “dunia Melayu,” see Shamsul Amri Baharuddin 
and Mohamad Fauzi‟s “Making Sense of Malay Sexuality: An Exploration” and Ahmad Shehu 
Abdulssalam‟s “Gender and Sexuality: An Islamic Perspective.”     
2 See Asrul Zamani‟s The Malay Ideals and Zeenath Kausar‟s Social Ills: Causes and Remedies for their 
extensive research on the prevailing social and moral decay in Malaysian Malay Muslim community. 
3 See Asrul Zamani‟s The Malay Ideals, particularly for his assertion that iman,” (“religious faith”), 
“taqwa” (“God consciousness”), and “ahlaq” (“good moral behaviour”) are the constituent elements of a 
“true” Malay Muslim identity on pp. 348-353. 
4 See Farish A. Noor‟s articles, entitled “Who‟s Afraid of Sodomy?,” Malaysia‟s Shame,” and “Politics, 
Power and the Violence of History,” especially for his contention that “morality police” and “shariah 
enforcers” form a significant part of governmental regulatory measures to monitor and police Malay 
Muslims‟ public and private lives in present-day Malaysia.  
5 For further reading on Islam in the Malay-dominated Malaysian politics, see, for instance, Joseph 
Chinyong Liow‟s article, entitled “Political Islam in Malaysia: Legitimacy, Hegemony and Resistance.” 
6 See also Globalgayz.com at <http://www.globalgayz.com/>, especially the section on “Gay Malaysia 
News & Reports” for media reports on a series of police raids that have been conducted and carried out 
on gay establishments in metropolitan centres such as Kuala Lumpur and Penang. 
7 See Au Waipang‟s “Sodomy, Corruption and Malaysia‟s Penal Code,” for his discussion of the 
criminalization of sodomy under Section 377 of the Malaysian Penal Code. 
8 See Shariah Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997, especially on p. 17 for the types of punishments 
imposed on Malay Muslim men who pose as “women.”   
9  The English version of the fatwa on “Hukum Wanita Merupai Lelaki (Pengkid)” can be accessed via e-
fatwa, the official Malaysian fatwa portal. For further reading on the reception of the fatwa, see “Dear 
Fatwa Council and Malaysians” on The Nut Graph, an independent Malaysian news website, where a 
number of Malay and non-Malay Malaysians have openly expressed their concerns online over the 
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implications that the “fatwa” on lesbianism may have on Malay women in particular, and non-Malay 
women in general. They argue that the “fatwa” discriminates against Malay Muslim women, particularly 
“pengkids” and “tomboys,” on the basis of their so-called “manly” appearance and mannerisms, as well 
as their sexual orientations. As these “concerned” Malay and non-Malay Malaysians collectively assert: 
“The views expressed by the council reflect a deeper discrimination against anyone who does not 
conform with what is considered “mainstream” and also anyone who does not fit into a stereotypical 
heterosexual relationship. Everyone has the right to form loving relationships with the person of their 
choice, regardless of their sex and the sex of their partner” (“Dear Fatwa Council and Malaysians”).    
10 For further reading on queer Malaysian asylum seekers and refugees, see the articles, entitled “Two 
Malaysian Gay Men Granted Asylum in the UK” at <http://www.fridae.com/ newsfeatures/2010/10/01/ 
10349.two-malaysian-gays-granted-asylum-in-the-uk> and “Malaysian Transsexual Given Refugee 
Status in Australia” at <http://www.fridae. com/newsfeatures/2010/ 05/04/9889.malaysian-transsexual-
given-refugee-status-in-australia>.   
11 See Khartini Slamah‟s “The Struggle To Be Ourselves, Neither Men Nor Women: Mak Nyahs in 
Malaysia” and Teh Yik Khoon‟s “Male to Female Transsexuals (Mak Nyah) in Malaysia,” and “Politics 
and Islam: Factors Determining Identity and the Status of Male-to-Female Transsexuals in Malaysia” for 
their comprehensive research on the actual lived conditions and everyday struggles of Malay “mak 
nyahs.”  
12 See Walter L. Williams‟ “Islam and the Politics of Homophobia: The Persecution of Homosexuals in 
Islamic Malaysia compared to Secular China,” for his discussion of the legal implications and 
ramifications of being and becoming a homosexual in an Islamic nation-state such as Malaysia.  
13 See PT Foundation (Yayasan PT) at <http://www.ptfmalaysia.org/index.php>. 
14 See the contact details and profile pictures that many gay Malay men upload and publish on “Komuniti 
Web Gay Melayu” website at <http://gaymelayu.ning.com> and “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu‟s” 
Facebook webpage at <http://www.facebook. com/group.php?gid=161593141989&ref=search#!/ 
group.php?gid=161593141989&v=wall&ref=search>. Some gay Malay men have also uploaded 
“amateur” or “homemade” erotic videos that can be easily accessed on <www.gaytube.com> and 
<www.xtube. com>. 
15 See the forum discussion section on “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” at <http://gaymelayu.ning.com>, 
particularly in the ways in which many gay Malay men fully and unconditionally identify themselves as 
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“gay,” “top,” “bottom,” or “bisek” when communicating with other gay-identified indigenous men in the 
virtual sphere. 
16 See Edie Mohamad‟s open note for visitors and members of “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” at 
<http://gaymelayu.ning.com/profiles/profile/show?id=founder&>.   
17 See Raihanah Mohd Mydin‟s article, entitled “The Individual, the Community, the Creator: Malay 
Muslims‟ Sense of Identity in Noordin Hassan‟s Children of this Land, especially on pp. 7-8 for her 
discussion of Muslim‟s concept of agency or “Islamic agency” that is vital to the construction of Malay 
Muslim identity. 
18 See Osman Bakar‟s ““Political Islam in Post-Mahathir Era: Trends and Possibilities,” particularly for 
his contention that Malays‟ sense of belonging to the Malay Muslim community in Malaysia is deeply 
and profoundly shaped by their attachment to Islam. For further reading on notions of belonging and 
attachment in present-day Malaysia, see Judith Nagata‟s “What is a Malay? Situational Selection of 
Ethnic Identity in a Plural Society,” Vidhu Verma‟s Malaysia, State and Civil Society in Transition, 
especially on p. 40, and Anthony Milner‟s The Malays, especially Chapter 5: “Experiencing Colonialism 
and the Making of Bangsa Melayu.”  
19 See Chatterjee‟s The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories for his detailed 
discussion of the two cultural domains, namely the “inner/spiritual” and “outer/material,” which have 
become intrinsic features of anticolonialisms in Asia and Africa.  
20 See Virginia Matheson Hooker‟s article, “Reconfiguring Malay and Islam in Contemporary Malaysia,” 
especially on p. 15, for her analysis of the construction of state-endorsed notions of Malay identity and 
“bangsa Melayu” during Mahathir‟s premiership. 
21 In brief, the “Asian values” discourse emerged in the 1990s from the idea that common values shared 
between diverse ethnic and religious groups in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and 
China could be politically employed as a nationalist means to disindentify from the West. One of the 
discourses‟ central assertions is that social and communitarian harmony can (only) be sought through 
one‟s loyalty to the family, nation, and authority. Personal freedom, civil liberties, human (and sexual) 
rights are not only configured as western values, but are perceived as a threat to the disintegration of the 
kind of harmony and prosperity that these Asian countries seek to achieve. Yet, scholars have argued that 
“Asian values” discourses remain highly contested simply because of the vast cultural diversity of the 
people across Asia, which can never be encapsulated into a single universal “Asian value” paradigm. 
199 
 
                                                                                                                                              
This is not to mention the ways in which the values practiced and shared are not completely dissimilar to 
the West as evidenced in loyalty and respect to various forms of authorities that exist in both western and 
non-western societies. See, for instance, Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik‟s “Democracy in 
Malaysia: Discourses and Practices,” for their discussion of “Asian values” discourses and their 
implications on Malaysian political culture and practice.  
22 There is a growing body of research by scholars who have written extensively about same-sex 
sexuality (male same-sex sexuality in particular) in the Malay society and culture. Foremost among these 
scholars is Michael G. Peletz, who has written about the historical and cultural constructions of “pondan” 
and transgendered practices in the Malaysian Malay Muslim community. See, for instance, Peletz‟s 
book, entitled Gender and Pluralism: Southeast Asia Since Early Modern Times for his discussion of 
“pondan,” transgendered practices, and same-sex relations in Malaysia. 
23 See Michael Peletz‟s Reason and Passion: Representations of Gender in a Malay Society, especially 
on pp. 123-132 for his comprehensive study into the lives of “pondan” or effeminate indigenous men 
who are treated with tolerance and kindness in Negeri Sembilan. 
24 See Gerard Sullivan‟s “Variations on a Common Theme? Gay and Lesbian Identity and Community in 
Asia,”especially on p. 254 where he explains that “transgender(ed) homosexuality,” which involves 
cross-dressing and other transgendered forms of gender, is already inherent in Southeast Asian countries 
such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.  
25 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick‟s discussion of effeminacy in western medical discourse in “How to 
Bring Up Your Kids Gay.”  
26 See William Spurlin‟s “Sissies and Sisters: Gender, Sexuality and the Possibilities of Coalitions,” 
especially pp.82-83 for his analysis of “gender identity disorder in childhood” (GIDC) as defined by the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) and its diverse implications on gender non-conforming children 
in western societies. 
27 See Robert Aldrich‟s Colonialism and Homosexuality, especially on pp. 195-198 for his discussion of 
the development of homosexuality in indigenous contexts during the period of colonial rule in Malaya.  
28 See Gerard Sullivan‟s “Variations on a Common Theme? Gay and Lesbian Identity and Community in 
Asia,” especially p. 254 for his use of the term “egalitarian” type of homosexuality to describe “gay (and 
lesbian identity) and community that have become somewhat disconnected from heterosexual institutions 
and are establishing independent cultural patterns.”  
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29 See Dennis Altman‟s Global Sex. “Rupture or Continuity?: The Internationalisation of Gay Identities,” 
Gerard Sullivan‟s “Variation on a Common Theme? Gay and Lesbian Identity and Community in Asia,” 
and Gerard Sullivan and Peter Jackson‟s Gay and Lesbian Asia: Culture,Identity, Community for their 
substantive research on the ways in which western notions of homosexuality have been brought into non-
western contexts through recent economic and cultural trends in globalisation. 
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Chapter 6 Being “Queer” and “Malay”: Rethinking Queerness and the Politics of  
                  Queer Malay Identity in Malaysia and Beyond  
 
That queerness remains open to a continuing critique of its privileged 
assumptions “ought to be safeguarded not only for the purposes of 
continuing to democratize queer politics, but also expose, affirm, and 
rework the specific historicity of the term.” The operations of queer 
critique, in other words, can neither be decided on in advance nor be 
depended on in the future. The reinvention of the term is contingent on its 
potential obsolescence, one necessarily at odds with any fortification of its 
critical reach in advance or any static notion of its presumed audience and 
participants. 
                                               David L. Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José  
                                               Esteban Muñoz, What’s Queer About Queer  
                                               Studies Now? 
 
On December 15, 2010, Azwan Ismail, a 32 year old gay Malay man, posted an “It 
Gets Better in Malaysia” video on the popular video sharing website, YouTube. 
Inspired by Dan Savage‟s “It Gets Better” video project, where American LGBT adults 
convey encouraging messages via YouTube to LGBT teens in America who are 
struggling with bullying and intolerance, Azwan created his own version of the video to 
tell young queer Malaysians not to despair because life would get better.
1
 The video 
was part of Seksualiti Merdeka‟s video series, which featured queer-identified 
Malaysians who shared their actual lived experiences and everyday struggles of being 
“queer” in Malaysia. In brief, Seksualiti Merdeka (“Sexuality Independence”) is 
currently the organiser of an annual human rights festival on sexuality in Malaysia, 
which aims to empower Malaysians of all sexualities through series of talks, forums, 
workshops, art, theatre, music performances, interactive installations, and film 
screenings.
2
 This annual human rights festival is jointly organised by local artists and 
individuals, as well as a number of non-governmental organisations, including the 
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Malaysian Council Bar, Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), PT Foundation, United 
Nations, and Amnesty International. The video series are not merely a medium through 
which queer-identified Malaysians convey inspirational messages to young queer 
Malaysians who are facing discrimination, bullying, and harassment. These videos, in 
my view, also provide a much-needed platform for queer-identified Malaysians to take 
on queerness as a subject position by identifying themselves publicly as “gay,” 
“lesbian,” “bisexual,” or “transgender.” 
 
But there was a huge public outcry following the release of the video mainly because 
Azwan, a member of Malaysia‟s Malay Muslim majority, openly admitted that he was 
“gay.” Azwan is now facing prosecution by the police and religious authorities, and has 
received numerous threats of violence and murder as a result of declaring his sexuality. 
To make matters worse, several Malay political leaders, who lambasted Azwan for 
insulting Islam, failed to speak against these violent threats which already put Azwan‟s 
life in danger. The video has been removed from YouTube as Azwan fears for his 
safety. In a telephone interview with The Associated Press, Azwan explained that, 
“religious and cultural factors have defined our lives, telling us who we can be and who 
we can‟t […] My intention was not to insult Islam […] I just wanted to represent gay 
Malays in this project. I hope these videos will help create a more open society and 
more discussion.”3 A few months have now passed since Azwan posted the video and 
there has been no news of his whereabouts. What has happened to Azwan? What will 
happen to Azwan when the local authorities have not taken any legal action against 
those who issued threats of violence and intimidation to him? What will happen to gay-
identified Malay men in Malaysia when they are not adequately protected by the 
authorities from violent crimes which are motivated by hatred and prejudice based on 
203 
 
sexual difference? What will happen to gay-identified Malay men when the Islamic 
Development Department of Malaysia (JAKIM) has pledged to impose more stringent 
laws and regulations to curb and eliminate sexual practices within the local gay 
community following Azwan‟s public admission of his sexuality? In what ways does 
this help illuminate Michel Foucault‟s contention that sexuality has been subjected to 
repressive disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms of the state historically?  
 
The news of Azwan‟s ordeal has had such a profound effect on me, especially since I 
am now two months away from finishing my thesis. After spending almost four years 
writing about what it means to be “queer” and “Malay” in Malaysia, Azwan‟s 
predicament in 2010 has made me pause for a moment to take stock of where my thesis 
is going: I may have spent a great deal of time explaining how queer Malays 
constructed a sexually dissident notion of Malay identity, but there still remains the 
question whether queer Malays will ever be able to identify themselves openly as 
“queer” and “Malay” within the borders of Malaysia. And while I have written at great 
length about the challenges of asserting and inhabiting a queer narrative of Malayness, 
I‟m still uncertain whether queer Malays will ever be able to overcome these challenges 
and live a peaceful and fulfilling life without fear of violence and discrimination. It is 
already hard being queer in Malaysia, but being public about it is even harder. Is being 
“queer,” then, enough for queer Malays to resist the hegemonic impulses of culture and 
religion which continue to govern and constrain their lives? Is being “queer” enough 
for queer Malays to resist the ideological structures which continue to inhibit the 
proliferation of queerness in the modern, Muslim-majority Malaysian nation-state? 
What I have learned from Azwan (and also from other gay-identified indigenous men 
by listening to their own personal experiences) is that being “queer” is and, probably, 
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will never be enough for queer Malays to assert their identities and mark their 
difference in present-day Malaysia. This is mainly because Islam and Malay culture, as 
Azwan points out and as I have discussed throughout this study, have such a pervasive 
influence on what it means to be “Malay.” But this does not necessarily mean that 
queer Malays cease to fight for their rights and freedom in asserting notions of 
difference by identifying and repositioning themselves as “queer” and “Malay” within 
the local social landscape. This is because being “queer,” as Michael Warner asserts, is 
itself a constant struggle simply because one‟s life is always already implicated by 
various issues (e.g. the pervasiveness religion and culture, bullying, intolerance, 
violence, and intimidation) that arise as a result of being different from the norm. More 
importantly, being “queer” means that one must always deal with these issues and try to 
find ways to overcome them through/in the course of one‟s life as “queer.” As Warner 
notes:  
“[e]very person who comes to a queer self-understanding knows in one 
way or another that her stigmatization is intricated with gender, with the 
family, with notions of individual freedom, the state, public speech, 
consumption and desire, nature and culture, maturation, reproductive 
politics, racial and national fantasy, class identity, truth and trust, 
censorship, intimate life and social display, terror and violence, health and 
care, and deep cultural norms about the bearing of the body. Being queer 
means fighting about these issues all the time, locally and piecemeal but 
always with consequences” (“Queer Planet” 6; emphasis added).  
 
Rather than conceding that being “queer” is never enough for queer Malays to effect 
significant changes in their lives, I would like to bring together important strands of my 
thesis and take them a bit further in this chapter by reflecting on the possibilities and 
limitations of “queerness” (as sexuality, as a mode of critique, and as a political 
strategy) in the context of queer Malay identity-formation. Such a reflection, I believe, 
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is crucial in thinking about the future directions for research on queerness and the 
politics of queer Malay identity in modern-day Malaysia and beyond. 
 
But before I proceed further, let me summarize briefly what has been accomplished so 
far in my research on queer Malays and their self-identities. My analysis of queer-
identified Malays in contemporary Malaysian literature and culture has allowed me to 
accomplish one of the central aims of this study, which is to create an opening for 
rethinking pedagogical narratives of Malayness. Notions of being “Malay” in Malaysia 
cannot be officially defined in terms of Malay culture and religion simply because 
queer-identified Malays whom I discussed in my thesis also identified themselves as 
“Malay” by organizing their lives and identities around same-sex sexuality. Such 
nuanced and “queer” ways of being “Malay” redefine and radically reshape 
pedagogical conceptions of Malayness, which designate Malays as Muslims who must 
fulfil cultural and religious expectations related to gender and sexuality. My research 
on queer Malays and their own visions of Malayness has also enabled me to fill an 
important gap in the study of Malay identity construction. Malay studies scholars such 
as Anthony Milner, Joel S. Kahn, Leonard Andaya, and Shamsul Amri Baharuddin 
have placed far too much emphasis on Islam, “adat” (“indigenous customs and 
traditions”), social class, and geographical spatialization in examining the formation of 
Malayness. My research, however, shows that queer sexualities have become an 
essential component of ethnicity for some (if not many) Malays, particularly queer-
identifying Malay men and women. This illuminates the idea that Malay identity is 
complex because it is made up of a multitude of components that include ethnic 
Malays‟ diverse sexualities, in addition to culture, religion, class, and place. The 
findings of my research have enabled me to fill up the lacunae in the literature on local 
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forms of queerness. Existing research on queer identities and cultures in modern-day 
Malaysia has not devoted sufficient attention to analyzing how queer-identified Malays 
specifically construct their own sexual identities, nor has it investigated how these 
identities are used as a means for queer-identified Malays to subvert and undermine 
official conflations of queerness with western cultural influences. Queer-identified 
Malays whom I examined in my thesis formulated their own notions of being “queer” 
by selectively reappropriating both local and western forms of queer identities and 
queer cultures. More importantly, queer-identified Malays also open up the possibility 
of creating their own sexual identities which are marked by hybridity. This is especially 
true when notions of being “queer” for many queer-identified Malays are not only 
mediated by a multitude of factors pertaining to subjectivity, but are influenced by 
western forms of queerness which have been brought into the local social landscape via 
colonialism and, most recently, globalisation. Such findings are important for two 
reasons. First, they show that queerness in present-day Malaysia cannot be officially 
equated with western cultural influences, and second, they open up new lines of inquiry 
in the research on queer identities in non-western contexts such as in Malaysia by 
encouraging future scholars to delve more deeply into queer-identified Malays‟ diverse 
and unique ways of being “queer.”4 
 
It is, however, important to emphasize that “queerness” in Malaysia does not merely 
constitute local formations of queer identities, but can also function as a mode of 
critique and even a political strategy. In the Introduction to Social Text 84-85, “What‟s 
Queer About Queer Studies Now?” David L. Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Esteban 
Muñoz argue that there is an urgent need to reassess the political utility of “queer” 
which emerged into public consciousness in the 1990s. These scholars suggest that 
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queer critique now needs to be rethought in relation to current “historical emergencies” 
which include: 
[T]he triumph of neoliberalism and the collapse of the welfare state; the 
Bush administration‟s infinite “war on terrorism” and the acute 
militarization of state violence; the escalation of U.S. empire building and 
the clash of religious fundamentalisms, nationalisms, and patriotisms; the 
devolution of civil society and the erosion of civil rights; the pathologizing 
of immigrant communities as “terrorist” and racialized populations as 
“criminal”; the shifting forms of citizenship and migration in a putatively 
“postidentity” and “postracial” age; the politics of intimacy and the liberal 
recoding of freedom as secularization, domesticity, and marriage; and the 
return to “moral values” and “family values” as a prophylactic against 
political debate, economic redistribution, and cultural dissent (2). 
 
In order to maintain its intellectual and political relevance, queer studies in the present, 
as Eng, Halberstam, and Muñoz contend further, must take into consideration “the late-
twentieth-century global crises that have configured historical relations among political 
economies, the politics of war and terror, and national manifestations of sexual, racial, 
and gender hierarchies” (1). Although the U.S. is frequently cited in Eng, Halberstam, 
and Muñoz‟s discussion of recent historical emergencies and global crises, I would like 
to argue that current events which occur in non-western locales (i.e. Azwan‟s ordeal) 
must also be taken into account when reevaluating the political usability of “queer.” 
This is because Azwan‟s predicament demonstrates that “queerness,” which is 
understood by many western queer theorists as a challenge to all forms of normativity, 
may not be sufficient to resist strongly enforced ethnic and religious normativities 
which continually shape and constrict the lives of many queer-identified Malays within 
Malaysian territory. In what ways then do the events surrounding the release of 
Azwan‟s “It Gets Better” video demonstrate that the term “queer” fails to live up to its 
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political promise and premise to subvert regimes of sexual, racial, and religious 
normalization in non-western, Muslim-majority nation-states such as Malaysia? How 
can western queer scholars take stock of this failure to reexamine the very usability of 
“queer” as a political strategy for challenging normalizing mechanisms and ideologies 
in both western and non-western cultures and societies?  
 
The point here is that it is important to (re)consider the possibilities and limitations of 
“queerness” in non-western settings. This is especially noted by Judith Butler in 
Critically Queer where she rightly points out that the term “queer,” which is marked by 
a predominantly white movement, has not yet fully addressed the ways in which 
““queer” plays – or fails to play –within [the] non-white communities” (20; emphasis 
added). Michael Warner also shares a similar view when he notes that queer movement 
has long been dominated by middle-class white male activists of the U.S. Warner 
stresses the importance of forging a queer movement which brings together “differently 
sexualized and differently politicized people” (“Queer Planet” 11) who would address 
various issues concerning queerness and queer lives both locally and globally. Other 
scholars, such as William Spurlin, have demonstrated that queer studies, which is 
characterized by its Euro-American origins and traditions, has shown scant interest 
historically in the formation and articulation of same-sex desires, practices, and 
identities outside the Euro-American domains. Spurlin explains that “queer studies, 
perhaps most highly developed in the United States, historically has shown little 
sustained interest in cross-cultural variations of expression and representation of same-
sex desire; homosexualities in non-western cultures have been, until very recently, 
imagined through the imperialist gaze of Euro-American queer identity politics, 
appropriated through the economics of the West, or, at worst, ignored altogether” 
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(Imperialism 17). I agree with Spurlin mainly because queer studies can only operate as 
an “engaged” mode of critique if it engages more critically with queer representations 
across multiple locations. What are the possible new meanings of “queer” as it crosses 
various geographical locations and cultural sites? In what ways do these new meanings 
provide a better comprehension of “queerness,” which cannot be fully contained by 
queerness as felt and practiced in the West? How does paying specific attention to 
“queerness” outside western metropolitan axes help western queer scholars reexamine 
and transform “queer” as a viable mode of inquiry? What discussions by Butler, 
Spurlin, and Warner on “queerness” demonstrate is that emphasis must also be placed 
on the specificities and particularities of “queerness” in non-western contexts as a way 
of rethinking the usability of queer outside the western domains. In other words, if 
western queer theorists wish to sustain queer studies‟ intellectual and political currency, 
they need to be more attentive to the events including the historical emergencies and 
crises which affect queer lives in non-western locales, rather than being too anchored in 
issues and concerns facing queer communities in the West. One way of addressing 
these lacunae is by exploring the possibilities and limitations of “queerness” in the 
context of queer Malay identity-formation.  
 
On The Limits and Possibilities of Queerness in Local Contexts 
One of the major themes that emerge from my analysis of queer Malay identity 
construction is the various ways in which queer-identified Malays in Malaysia redefine 
and rearticulate official versions of Malayness. I began this study by demonstrating that 
the politics of Malaysian Malay identity is a dynamic process which is fraught with the 
tension between “authority-defined” and “everyday-defined” notions of Malayness. I 
argued that such a tension creates an opening for the formulation of Malay identities 
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marked by sexual difference. This is vividly illustrated by the very fact that notions of 
being “Malay” are not only configured by the state and those who are part of the elite 
governing bodies and local authorities, but also constructed by the general Malay 
populace, which includes, rather than excludes, queer-identifying Malay men and 
women. It is correct to say that Malay identity is dynamic and continually in transition 
on the basis that it is shaped both by official versions of Malayness and by the actual 
lived experiences of Malays in their everyday lives, including being “queer” and 
“Malay” amongst some Malays, which shapes what it means to be “Malay” in 
Malaysia. The dynamic and contingent nature of Malay identity creation also 
demonstrates that discursive conceptions of Malay identity are social inventions 
precisely because there will always be identities that do not fit. This is especially true 
when notions of being “Malay,” as subjectively felt and experienced by many Malays 
and queer Malays within national borders, do not always cohere with the legal 
definition of Malayness which designates “Malay” as a person who habitually speaks 
Malay, professes the Muslim religion, and conforms to Malay customs. Queer-
identified Malay men and women, whom I‟ve discussed in this study, constructed their 
own visions of Malay identity through same-sex sexuality while simultaneously 
sustaining their ethnic and religious heritages. Such “queer” visions of Malayness do 
not fit the culturally authoritative definition of Malay identity simply because same-sex 
sexuality has never been legally regarded as a defining marker of Malay ethnicity.  
 
The point here is not to suggest that there needs to be an exclusive Malay identity for 
queer-identified Malays, but rather to expose the unsuitability and instability inherent 
in official conceptualisations of Malayness. This, I believe, opens up a space for 
“queer” in indigenous contexts where queerness can be used as a critical tool to 
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interrogate discursive formations of Malay identity, which are sustained and stabilized 
by the state through normative markers of Malay ethnicity. Diana Fuss, Eve Kosofsky 
Segwick, Judith Butler, and other queer theorists have cogently demonstrated that 
identity is neither fixed nor given, and that the very stability of identity is continually 
destabilized and disrupted by queer sexuality and other axes of subjective 
identification. Diana Fuss, for instance, maintains that identities are intrinsically 
unstable. Fuss, following Sedgwick, contends further that identities are inflected by 
multiple forms of identification and that any attempts to fix or render identities as 
coherent, totalised, and self-evident will fail because identifications have the capacity 
to multiply and diversify. As Fuss points out:  
The astonishing capacity of identifications to reverse and disguise 
themselves, to multiply and contravene one another, to disappear and 
reappear years later renders identity profoundly unstable and perpetually 
open to radical change. Identification is a process that keeps identity at a 
distance, that prevents identity from ever approximating the status of an 
ontological given, even as it makes possible the formation of an illusion of 
identity as immediate, secure, and totalizable (Identification 2). 
 
The same holds true for queer-identified Malays who prevent official designations of 
Malayness from ever achieving a sense of stability and solidity. This can be seen in the 
process of queer Malay identity creation, where many queer-identified Malays continue 
to refigure and transform dominant narratives of Malay ethnicity by incorporating 
queerness, alongside legal markers of Malayness, into their own visions and versions of 
being “Malay” in Malaysia. Philip Brian Harper, on the other hand, asserts that fixed 
identities are constantly decentered by a multitude of subjectivizing factors which 
inflect upon and/or intersect one another. In “Gay Male Identities, Personal Privacy, 
and Relations of Public Exchange: Notes on Directions for Queer Critique,” Harper 
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calls for a challenge to “identic fixity” by arguing that sexual orientation should not be 
conceived as a primary identificatory marker of sexual identity simply because sexual 
identity is inflected by the pressure of various factors pertaining to subjectivity (26). 
What is notable here is that Harper calls fixed identities into question by suggesting 
that fixed identities are constantly being shaped and reshaped by multiple axes of social 
positioning. Although Harper does not address Malay identity directly, I find that his 
challenge to “identic fixity” can be used to substantiate my argument that official 
versions of Malayness are neither fixed nor given (the same holds true for any stable 
notion of queerness). This is precisely true when the state-sanctioned notions of Malay 
identity cannot attain and secure a sense of solidity and fixity through normative 
markers of Malay ethnicity, given that such notions are constantly molded by multiple 
variables including age, class, gender, and sexuality. The fact that state-endorsed 
notions of Malay identity are constantly inflected by diverse factors pertaining to 
subjectivity reinforces the central claim of my study that Malay identity is dynamic 
and, therefore, cannot be rigidly defined in distinctly ethnic and religious terms. 
  
It is, however, pertinent to point out that by problematizing the notion of “identic 
fixity,” Harper not only calls fixed identities into question, but envisions queerness as a 
form of resistance to all forms of fixity and normativity with regard to race, ethnicity, 
gender, socio-cultural norms and practices, and sexuality. Many queer-identified 
Malays, whom I‟ve discussed in this project, do not merely incorporate queerness into 
their identities as a way of being “queer” and “Malay.” This is because queerness is 
also taken up by queer-identified Malays as a way of being in the dominant Malay 
Muslim community, which valorises normative notions of Malay identity and 
heteronormative cultural and religious practices. It is accurate to say that queerness in 
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the context of queer Malay identity-formation should not be narrowly understood as 
constituting sexual identities or sexual practices alone, but can be employed as a tool 
for examining how ethnic, religious, gender, and sexual normativities are constantly 
“queered” (used here as a verb; that is, resisted and subverted) by queer-identified 
Malays. What makes it more interesting is that queerness can also be utilised as an 
instrument for analysing the ways in which non-queer identified Malays living in 
Malaysia construct their own ethnic identities using non-normative markers of 
Malayness.  For instance, I discussed in Chapter 1 how Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh 
Kok Wah pointed out that many highly-educated Malays in Malaysia invented an urban 
sense of Malayness through alternative identificatory markers such as “attachment to a 
leader or patriarch and/or a tradition of egalitarianism and democracy” (5-6; qtd. in 
Khoo 27). This urban notion of Malay identity, in my view, is always already “queer” 
(i.e. transgressive) in the sense that being “Malay” for many highly educated Malays 
challenge official and historical  designations of Malay ethnicity, which are produced 
and sustained through ethnic and religious normativities. The very creation of a 
characteristically “queer” urban Malay identity raises two important research questions: 
How can such creation provide further insights into the ways in which many Malays in 
Malaysia (both queer-identified and non-queer identified indigenous people) all 
contribute to the process and project of “queering” (used here as a verb; that is, 
challenging and transforming) normative formulations of Malayness by forging new 
Malay identities characterized by non-normative, non-typical identificatory markers? In 
what ways does the production of “queer” Malay identities (including those which are 
marked by urbanity and those characterized by queer sexuality) help demonstrate that 
“queerness” in non-western locales such as Malaysia stand as a challenge to the 
regimes of ethnic, religious, gender, and sexual normalization through which many 
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queer-identifying and non-queer identifying Malays are integrated into the modern 
Malaysian nation-state?  
 
Another major theme that has emerged from my analysis of queer Malay identity 
construction is that many queer-identified Malays constructed their own narratives of 
Malayness and queerness. I demonstrated that queer-identified Malays in contemporary 
Malaysian literature and culture created new ways of being “Malay” by, for instance, 
reconciling their sexuality with their religious, ethnic, and cultural heritages. I also 
demonstrated that notions of being “queer” in indigenous contexts are produced 
through a hybridising process where local and western forms of queerness are 
selectively reappropriated and recontextualised by many queer-identifying Malay men 
and women. These new forms of Malayness and queerness challenge the dominant 
normative understandings of Malay ethnicity and queer sexuality in present-day 
Malaysia. For example, Malay ethnic identity cannot always be understood in relation 
to Islam, Malay language, and Malay customs simply because queer-identified Malays‟ 
notions of being “Malay” are defined in terms of same-sex sexuality and desires, in 
addition to Malay religion and culture. Queer sexuality in non-western indigenous 
contexts such as in Malaysia, on the other hand, cannot be officially conflated with 
western cultural influences. This is mainly because queer-identified Malays selectively 
replicate both local and western forms of queerness in identifying and repositioning 
themselves as “queer” in relation to others within and even beyond Malaysia‟s national 
territorial boundaries. It is, however, imperative to note that there are various 
ramifications of asserting and inhabiting narratives of Malayness which are marked by 
queerness. Malay “mak nyahs,” for example, can be charged under Section 21 of the 
Minor Offences Act 1955 and Section 28 of the Shariah Criminal Offences (Federal 
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Territories) Act 1997 for cross-dressing. Lesbian Malay women, on the other hand, are 
liable to prosecution and imprisonment under Section 26 of the Shariah Criminal 
Offences Enactment for engaging in “musahaqah” (“female same-sex sexual relation”).  
 
My point here is that queer-identified Malays cannot adequately protect themselves 
from being prosecuted for constructing and asserting a sexually dissident notion of 
Malay identity in the Muslim-majority Malaysian nation-state, especially when queer 
sexualities and the lives of queer-identified Malay men and women remain subject to 
local juridical control and containment. This, in my view, amplifies Michel Foucault‟s 
assertion that sexuality has been regulated by various disciplinary mechanisms and 
apparatuses of the state historically. In The History of Sexuality: Volume One, Foucault 
maintains that these repressive disciplinary mechanisms and apparatuses function as a 
medium through which the state exercises its power to contain women‟s sexed bodies, 
to monitor children‟s sexuality, to regulate biological reproduction, and to normalize a 
variety of sexual behaviours, particularly those characterized by perversity and 
deviance (104-105).  Foucault contends further that the state exerts powerful and 
consistent control over people‟s sexuality in a top-down fashion, where people‟s bodies 
and desires are constituted by a multitude of ideological discourses (e.g. legal, religion, 
medical, psychological) and repressive discursive practices of the state (e.g. 
prohibition, censorship). This reinforces the idea that sexuality is embedded in, and 
circumscribed by, complex relations of power. As Foucault writes: 
The power over sex is exercised in the same way at all levels. From top to 
bottom, in its over-all decisions and its capillary interventions alike, 
whatever the devices or institutions on which it relies, it acts in a uniform 
and comprehensive manner; it operates according to the simple and 
endlessly reproduced mechanisms of law, taboo, and censorship: from state 
to family, from prince to father, from the tribunal to the small change of 
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everyday punishments, from agencies of social domination to the structures 
that constitute the subject himself, one finds a general form of power, 
varying in scale alone. This form is the law of transgression and 
punishment, with its interplay of licit and illicit (84-85; emphasis added). 
 
Although Foucault focuses primarily on the historical production of western discourses 
on sexuality, I find that his discussion of the complex relationship between power and 
sex can be used to examine the ways in which queer sexualities are constantly being 
regulated by the Malay state elites via repressive mechanisms of discipline, 
surveillance, and punishment. If the state, as Foucault asserts, exerts top-down control 
over people‟s sexuality in western societies, the same can be said of non-western states 
such as Malaysia that enforce a top-down hierarchical monitoring and regulation of 
indigenous people‟s sexualities. This is clearly evidenced in the imposition of strict 
Shariah law (Islamic law) on both queer-identified and non-queer identified Malay 
Muslims in Malaysia. The state religious authorities throughout Malaysia are invested 
with power and authority to enact Islamic laws and reinforce disciplinary mechanisms 
to regulate, control, and police queer-identifying and non-queer identifying Malays‟ 
sexed bodies and desires, and to punish those who transgress these laws.
 5
 Such laws 
and repressive mechanisms (as evidenced in the enforcement of religious rulings 
(“fatwas”) prohibiting transsexualism and lesbianism, and the ongoing religious police 
crackdown on premarital sex among unmarried heterosexual Muslim couples and 
same-sex sexual practices), are grounded in and, organized around, the “interplay of the 
licit and illicit” (Foucault 85); that is, the permissible (“halal”) and impermissible 
(“haram”) forms of sex as inscribed in Islam. Liwat” (“male same-sex sexual erotic 
relations”) and “musahaqah” (“female same-sex erotic relations”) as discussed in 
Chapter 5, as well as “zina” (“adultery and premarital sex”), “khalwat” (“close 
proximity between unmarried male and female”) and “sumbang mahram” (“incest”) are 
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all punishable under Shariah laws in Malaysia.
6
 This is because heterosexual marriage 
and conjugal relations have been officially sanctioned as a legal and religiously lawful 
means of sexual gratification among Malay Muslims. Lesbianism, cross-dressing, and 
sex change operations, on the other hand, are all prohibited by the “fatwas” issued by 
Malaysia‟s National Fatwa Council on the grounds that Malay Muslims must actualise 
their “fitrah” (“natural and innate human disposition”) by adhering strictly to cultural 
and religious norms pertaining to gender and sexuality.  
 
But I would like to argue very strongly that it is wrong to assume the Malay state elites 
have ultimate control over ethnic Malays‟ sex and sexuality. This is because ethnic 
Malays (both queer-identified and non-queer identified Malays) cannot be reduced to 
mere objects of Shariah law, who are incapable of resisting enforced regulation and 
containment of their sexualities by the Malay state elites. In other words, although the 
Malay state elites (via the state religious authorities) exert their power and control over 
Malays‟ sexed bodies and desires, some (if not many) Malays continue to challenge 
and undermine state power in a variety of ways, using their own individual strategies of 
resistance. Azwan Ali, for instance, creates his own “It Gets Better” video and uses it to 
subvert the Islamic law prohibiting same-sex sexuality. In the video, Azwan identifies 
himself openly and honestly as a gay man. Such a public expression of sexuality can be 
perceived as Azwan‟s own strategy for contravening the law that not only criminalizes 
male same-sex sexuality, but suppresses the potentials of forging and inhabiting male 
same-sex sexual identities locally. Gay-identified Malays in diaspora (whom I shall 
discuss shortly) also devise their own method for challenging the power of the state 
over their sexed bodies and desires. This is particularly notable in the case of gay-
identified Malay men in diaspora who adopt migration as a viable way of escaping the 
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law that restrains them from living (and even denies their basic human rights to live) an 
openly gay life in Malaysia. Interestingly, some gay-identified Malay men, especially 
those who have migrated to the U.S. and other advanced nations in the West that 
recognize and protect the rights of their gay-identified citizens, formulate their own 
notions of being “gay” and “Malay” in the diaspora. I will demonstrate later that gay-
identified Malay men in diaspora radically reshape dominant narratives of Malayness 
that remain predicated on Malays‟ strong religious, ethnic, and communal affiliation by 
specifically creating their own sense of “gay” and “Malay” through their strong 
attachment to the gay community and gay activism in the U.S. and in other countries of 
residence. The various strategies gay-identified Malay men use to challenge, resist, and 
even evade the imposition of Shariah law on their lives and sexuality corroborates 
Foucault‟s contention that power (particularly in the form of the law that dictates sex) 
has been and continues to be resisted in different ways at different times across multiple 
locations. As Foucault notes:  
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, 
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power... 
[The existence of power relations] depends on a multiplicity of points of 
resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in 
power relations. These points of resistance are present everywhere in the 
power network. Hence there is no single locus of Refusal, no soul of revolt, 
source of all rebellions, or pure law of revolutionary. Instead there is a 
plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are 
possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, 
solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to 
compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in 
the strategic field of power relations (95-96; emphases added) 
 
Foucault‟s concept of the plurality of resistances is most evidenced in the ways in 
which many queer identified Malays whom I‟ve mentioned in this study developed 
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their own individual strategies to resist the laws and regulations pertaining to queer 
sexuality. Many gay Malay men in the local gay social networking website, “Komuniti 
Web Gay Melayu,” for instance, continue to assert and inhabit gay male identities 
online and utilize the internet to form and organize same-sex erotic practices as a way 
of defying the laws forbidding male same-sex sexuality. Many Malay “mak nyahs,” on 
the other hand, continue to cross-dress on a daily basis while others undergo sex 
reassignment surgery regardless of the “fatwas” proscribing cross-dressing and sex 
change operations. This buttresses the point made earlier that the Malay state elites (via 
the state religious authorities) do not have complete control over queer Malays‟ 
sexuality mainly because many queer-identified Malay men and women do not adhere 
strictly to Islamic laws pertaining to sexuality, particularly same-sex sexuality and 
same-sex erotic practices. Many queer-identified Malay men and women continue to 
resist, undermine, and transgress these laws in multiple and varied ways (i.e. cross-
dressing, queer identification and articulation online), thereby suggesting that queer 
Malays are able to exercise their agency and erotic autonomy to create radical notions 
of self and identity which challenge ethnic, religious, gender, and sexual normativities. 
However, the decision made by the Islamic Development Department of Malaysia 
(JAKIM) to impose tougher sanctions against same-sex sexual practices following 
Azwan Ismail‟s public admission of his sexuality can be seen as a major obstacle to 
queerness and the politics of queer Malay identity in Malaysia. This is because 
JAKIM‟s decision will certainly have significant and, perhaps, serious effects on the 
lives of many queer-identified Malays. For instance, queer-identified Malays‟ public 
and private lives will be placed under stringent police surveillance and any attempt at 
resisting the law against same-sex sexuality will most certainly be dealt with harshly. 
To complicate matters, queer-identified Malays may not be able to undermine fully 
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repressive governmental sanctions against same-sex sexuality, especially when “no 
one,” as the former Malaysian Inspector-General of Polic, Tan Sri Musa Hassan 
maintains, “is above the law” in Malaysia.7 How does this draconian measure to 
maintain law and order within Malaysia‟s national boundaries call into question 
Foucault‟s concept of power and resistance, particularly people‟s resistance to the 
imposition of the state‟s power over sex? More importantly, how does this call into 
question the very usability of “queer” as a political strategy for subverting the state 
repressive regimes of same-sex sexual regulation and control in non-western states such 
as Malaysia? 
 
While my study has argued that new narratives of Malayness are produced through 
queer-identified Malays‟ strategic renegotiations of ethnicity, religion, and culture,   
I would like to take this argument a little further by pointing out that queer-identified 
Malays‟ own notions of ethnicity are also configured through a complex realignment of 
identities and desires. Benigno Sánchez-Eppler, Charles Klein, Cindy Patton, Don 
Kulick, Jillana Enteen, and others have argued that queer-identified men and women 
often engage in multiple realignments of sex, gender, sexuality, identity, and desire in 
formulating their notions of self-identity. Benigno Sánchez-Eppler and Cindy Patton, 
for example, contend that these multiple realignments occur when queer-identified men 
and women move between various physical and ideological sites. As Sánchez-Eppler 
and Patton assert: 
“[B]eing” gay, homosexual, lesbian, joto, internacional, totillera, like that, 
battyman, bakla, katoi, butch, et cetera, entails answering or not answering 
to those terms and the desires they purport to index, in a given place, for a 
given duration. When a practitioner of “homosexual acts,” or a body that 
carries any of queering marks moves between officially designated spaces – 
nation, region, metropole, neighbourhood, or even culture, gender, religion, 
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disease – intricate realignments of identity, politics, and desire take place 
(3; emphasis added). 
 
Such intricate realignments of identity are evidenced in the contexts of queer Malay 
identity construction, especially when queer-identified Malays move between various 
designated spaces such as culture, religion, gender, and sexuality as they identify and 
resituate themselves as “queer Malay” in Malaysia. For example, some queer-identified 
Malays may realign themselves more closely with received notions of Malayness while 
other queer-identified Malays may identify themselves more strongly in terms of their 
sexuality, gender, and/or class. It is pertinent to emphasize that queer-identified 
Malays‟ realignments of identities and desires are constantly implicated and inflected 
by hegemonic impulses of culture and religion. Queer-identifying Malay men and 
women who adhere to dominant narratives of Malay ethnicity probably do so to 
conform to religious and cultural expectations of being Malay men and women within 
the dominantly heteronormative Malay Muslim community. Roslan, Ramli, and 
Rokiah, whom I mentioned in regard to Ismail Baba‟s ethnographic study, complied 
with social and familial expectations of marriage not just because heterosexual 
marriage is expected of Malay men and women, but because marriage is key to being 
“Malay” in the Malay Muslim community. More importantly, queer-identified Malays 
who conform to discursive conceptions of Malay identity probably do so because of 
their strong ethnic, religious, and communal affiliations. This corroborates Michael G. 
Peletz‟s assertion that a Malay sense of identity is defined by, and grounded in, social 
relationships and institutions (e.g. family, community, culture, religion) to which one 
belongs (Reason and Passion 204). Peletz‟s view of Malay identity helps explain why 
kinship and communal affiliations, in addition to ethnic and religious attachments, 
continue to exert a profound influence over many ethnic Malays and queer Malays‟ 
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notions of self-identification and sense of belonging. Such strong ethnic and religious 
attachments are clearly exhibited by many members of the local gay social networking 
website, “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu” (hereafter cited as KWGM). Based on my 
analysis of selected online forum discussion “threads,” I found that many Malay gay 
men in KWGM allied themselves firmly with received notions of Malay identity. In the 
online forum discussion thread on “Kawin Sesama Lelaki, Sanggupkah Anda 
Lakukan…Jika Undang2 Mengizinkan…” (“Same-sex Marriages: Are You Willing To 
Do It If The Law Permits?”), many KWGM members disapproved of same-sex 
marriage by claiming that they were Muslims who must abide by “hukum Allah” 
(God‟s law). For example, a KWGM member who identified himself online as “Alan” 
put God and his religion above anything else including his sexuality. Another KWGM 
member who referred to himself online as “Jackie,” claimed that gay Malay men must 
accept the fact that they were born Muslims and, therefore, must observe and comply 
with “rukun Islam” (“Pillars of Islam”). Malay Muslims in Malaysia, like Muslims the 
world over, show their obeisance and reverence to Allah (SWT) by carrying out their 
obligatory religious duties as inscribed in the five pillars of Islam. What is especially 
prominent here is that some gay-identified Malay men, particularly those in the gay 
Malay online community such as KWGM, identify strongly with their Islamic identity. 
But what if queer-identified Malays realign themselves more closely with queerness 
and use it as a strategy for being in and going against the Malay Muslim community 
and the Muslim-majority Malaysian nation-state? Azwan Ismail, whom I have 
mentioned earlier, is a case in point.  
 
Azwan identifies himself publicly as a gay Malay man by defining his identity in terms 
of male same-sex sexuality. By claiming that “Saya Gay, Saya Okay,” Azwan not only 
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advances the notion that it is okay to be gay in Malaysia, but spreads awareness and 
empowers other gay-identified Malays to liberate themselves by asserting their gayness 
with pride and making their presence felt in the public sphere. This sense of awareness 
and empowerment is indeed crucial for gay-identified Malay men as well as other 
queer-identified Malays to challenge the imposition of the state‟s power over their 
lives, their sexed bodies, and desires.
8
 Unfortunately, Azwan‟s public self-identification 
as a gay man has been fiercely criticized by many Malaysians, most of whom are 
individuals from the Malay Muslim community and the local Muslim organisations. 
The Minister from the Prime Minister‟s Department, Datuk Seri Jamil Khir Baharom, 
for example, mentioned that local officials might take “appropriate action to prevent 
[homosexuality] from spreading because it would hurt Islam‟s image” following the 
release of Azwan‟s video. The Perak Mufti, Datuk Hairussani Zakaria, on the other 
hand, asserted that Azwan should have not declared publicly his sexuality because “it 
derided his own dignity (as Malay and Muslim) and Islam in general” (notes added).9  
The centrality of religion in Jamil Khir Baharom and Hairussani Zakaria‟s response to 
Azwan‟s sexuality and homosexuality in particular, amplifies one of my central 
assertions throughout this thesis that gayness, in particular, and queerness, in general, 
continue to be juridically conflated with being “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” in 
Malaysia. This enables us to reconsider the notion of “intricate realignments of 
identity” which Sánchez-Eppler and Patton contend with regard to queer-identified 
people‟s movements between various official designated spaces (i.e. culture, religion, 
gender). That is, although queer-identified Malays can ally themselves more intimately 
with queerness, this always comes with a cost, given that queerness remains subject to 
social and legal sanctions in Muslim-majority Malaysia. Azwan‟s predicament also 
compels a rethinking of the political usability of “queer,” particularly the ways in 
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which queerness has been conceived by many western queer scholars as a mode of 
“resistance to regimes of the normal” (Warner, “Queer Planet” 16). This is especially 
true when queer-identified Malays cannot dismantle fully long held ethnic and religious 
normativities by simply taking on identities marked by sexual difference. Although 
queer Malays can identify themselves as “queer” and “Malay,” queer Malays will 
always remain at risk for legal consequences because being “queer” and “Malay” do 
not cohere with normative notions of Malayness. This raises some pertinent questions 
that need to be addressed with regard to queerness and the politics of queer Malay 
identity in Malaysia: how can intricate realignments of identities and desires protect 
queer-identified Malays from prosecution by the police and state religious authorities? 
More importantly, how can queer-identified Malays protect themselves from the threats 
of violence issued by individuals who condemn same-sex sexuality in the name of 
religion by clinging more tightly to their sexual identities and by forging a strong 
attachment to the local queer community? In what ways can queerness be conveived as 
a strategy of resistance against and, a mode of liberation from, normalizing regimes of 
the Malaysian nation-state which continue to constrict queer-identified Malays‟ lives 
and the very articulation of queer Malay identity? 
 
My analysis of queer Malay identity construction has also demonstrated that queer 
Malay identities are configured through the process of hybridization under conditions 
of globalisation. By using theories of globalisation, I argued that notions of being 
“queer” and “Malay” are hybrid and heterogeneous formations which are queerly born 
out of transnational and transcultural interactions between local and western queer 
identities and queer cultures. These interactions are fostered and facilitated by various 
instruments of globalisation such as international travel and the internet. The internet, 
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for instance, has enabled many queer-identified Malays (gay-identified members of 
KWGM  in particular) to formulate and inhabit visible and assertive gay male identities 
in the virtual sphere. These male same-sex sexual identities (e.g.“Geiboi/Gayboy,” 
“Str8,” “Anak Ikan,” and “Gay Tahfiz”) are assembled through a complex interaction 
of various components such as age, class, ethnicity, religion, as well as the local and 
western expressions of gayness. I also demonstrated how the internet has enabled 
Malay gay men in KWGM to construct an “exclusive” and “inclusive” vision of “gay 
Melayu” identity – a gay male identity which is not only used to address gay Malaysian 
Malay men, but also gay Malay men from different parts of the world, as well as non-
Malay Malaysian and non-Malay non-Malaysian gay men who seek to affiliate with 
Malay members in KWGM. Such an exclusive/inclusive vision of “gay Malay” identity 
amplifies Anthony Milner‟s contention on the “civilizational” characteristic of 
Malayness. Milner argues that this characteristic provides a useful means of 
comprehending the high degree of flexibility and adaptability encountered in the use of 
categories such as “Malay” and “Malayness” (230). This is because the concept of 
“civilization,” as Milner points out, “has the advantage of communicating a dynamism 
that the terms “(Malay) ethnicity” and “(Malay) race” do not readily convey” (242; 
notes added). Such dynamism is clearly evidenced in the ways in which “gay Melayu” 
identity cannot be adequately expressed through Malay ethnicity/race simply because 
“gay Melayu” identity accommodates Malay and non-Malay gay men from diverse 
cultural, linguistic, racial, ethnic, religious, political, and geographical backgrounds. It 
is possible to say that gay Malay men in the diaspora (in addition to non-Malay 
Malaysian and non-Malay non-Malaysian gay men), may be able to assert “gay 
Melayu” identity and take it on as a subject position without necessarily identifying 
themselves as “Melayu” as conflated with ethnic Malays living in Malaysia. This, I 
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believe, opens up a space for “queer” in non-western settings such as Malaysia where 
queerness can be used as a way of understanding multiple constructions of Malayness 
across national borders and territorial boundaries. In his article, entitled “Out Here and 
Over There: Queerness and Diaspora in Asian American Studies,” David L. Eng 
cogently points out that queerness and diaspora, when taken together, can be utilised as 
an instrument for analysing the constructions of Asian American identity within and 
beyond the borders of United States. Eng maintains that queerness and diaspora can be 
usefully employed in Asian American studies to further examine Asian American racial 
formations across multiple axes of difference and its numerous local and global 
manifestations (39). Queerness and diaspora, as Eng posits further, can also function as 
a mode of inquiry for assessing the configurations of new Asian American identities 
under current conditions of transnational flows of global capital, immigration, and 
labor.
 10
 I find that Eng‟s discussion of queerness and diaspora provides a means for 
evaluating how new forms of Malay identity are produced beyond Malaysian borders. 
Many gay-identified Malay members of KWGM, particularly those living in the 
diaspora, redefine culturally authoritative conceptions of Malaysian Malay identity by 
formulating a narrative of Malayness that is both queer and diasporic. KoolMalay, a 
gay-identified member of KWGM who currently lives in San Francisco, California is a 
good case in point.  
 
In responding to the online forum discussion “thread” on “Kawin Sesama Lelaki, 
Sanggupkah Anda Lakukan…Jika Undang2 Mengizinkan…” (“Same-sex Marriages: 
Are You Willing to Do It If the Law Permits?”), KoolMalay wrote: 
I live in the United States & would like to correct the statement on gay 
marriage here because not all 50 states in the US recognize gay marriage! 
In fact, only a few states (including in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, 
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and Vermont, marriages for same sex couples are legal and currently 
performed. In New Hampshire, same-sex marriages will begin on January 
1, 2010.) While I fully support the gay marriage, an [sic] American & live 
in California, sad enough the gay marriage is still illegal here! On the good 
news, unlike in Malaysia, we have the separation of church & state where 
the laws are build upon human rights, not religion. As a result, many gay 
men & women (like my life partner & I) will continue to fight for our basic 
human rights, equality & justice for all! (KoolMalay, “Kawin Sesama 
Lelaki,” December 14, 2009) 
 
What is worth noting here is that KoolMalay‟s own notion of Malay identity reinforces 
Eng‟s contention that “there are (indeed) possible new meanings of race as it crosses 
through various national borders and locales” (“Over Here” 38). I say this because 
dominant ideas about race/ethnicity and racial/ethnic identity are constantly being 
reconfigured as a result of transnational labor migration processes. KoolMalay, who 
probably migrated to the United States from Malaysia in search of better employment 
opportunities, has not only created a new form of ethnic identification, but also 
developed a new sense of home and belonging. What it means to be “Malay” in 
America for KoolMalay is strongly defined in terms of his sexuality and his close 
attachment to the American gay community and gay rights movement (hence the use of 
the word “kool” (“cool”) that reinforces KoolMalay‟s self-evident sense of 
“Americanness” and accentuates further his radical difference from Malays living in 
Malaysia). It is not wrong to say that KoolMalay‟s own sense of ethnic identity 
radically redefines normative notions of Malayness, which are predicated on strong 
ethnic, religious, and communal affiliation, as well as heterosexuality and 
heteronormativity. However, I would like to point out that gayness and everyday lived 
experiences of being “gay” in the diaspora do not always figure prominently in process 
of self-identification among diasporic gay Malay men. This is because some gay Malay 
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men living outside the borders of Malaysia establish their self-identities by realigning 
themselves firmly with discursive conceptions of Malayness. This holds true for Pjoe, 
another gay-identified member of KWGM who lives abroad. In responding to the online 
discussion “thread” on “aku keliru” (“I‟m confused”), Pjoe urged Salman, a fellow 
member who posted the “thread,” to consider seriously the implications of coming out 
as “gay.” As Pjoe wrote:  
Tetapi ingat, hidup ini penuh dengan pilihan, dan setiap pilihan kita ada 
korban dan ganjarannya. Bagi saya, kerana tidak mahu hidup dengan 
kepuraaan korbannya ialah berjauhan dengan keluarga, sahabat dan 
tanahair (Pjoe, “Kawin Sesama Lelaki” June 30, 2008). 
 
[But remember, life is full of choices, and every single choice we make has 
its sacrifices and rewards. Because I don‟t want to live in denial, I have to 
make the sacrifice to be away from my family, my friends, and my 
homeland.] (translation mine). 
 
Pjoe‟s concluding line resonates with Gayatri Gopinath, Lawrence M. La Fountain-
Stokes, and Timothy J. Randazzo‟s assertions that many queer men and women in 
diaspora were compelled to live outside their home country in order to escape from 
oppression based on sexual difference, and to seek freedom and better opportunities 
elsewhere. Gayatri Gopinanth, for example, maintains that many queer men and 
women are compelled to leave the “third-world” site of gender and sexual oppression in 
order to come out into the more liberated West (“Nostalgia” 304). This is particularly 
prominent in the case of many diasporic South Asian queer subjects who view their 
“home” as “a place to be left behind, to be escaped in order to be engaged into another, 
more liberatory space” (Gopinath, Impossible Desires 14). While I concur with 
Gopinath‟s view on why many “Third World” queer men and women have been driven 
away from their home countries, I would like to argue that Pjoe still retains a deep 
229 
 
emotional connection to his family and to his homeland, despite having to move to 
another country where he can live openly and honestly as a gay man.  One tentative 
explanation for this is that Pjoe probably considers himself as “anak perantau di negeri 
orang” (“a migrant in a foreign country”) who asserts his cultural identity more 
strongly for various reasons, including as a mark of differentiation from the host 
society or as a way of resisting pressures to assimilate into the host culture.
11
 This is 
precisely true when the word “Malay” helps distinguish Pjoe from the people of the 
host country simply because the word carries along with it local particularities and 
specificities such as language, cultural and religious traditions of those who have come 
to regard and think of themselves as members belonging to the Malaysian Malay 
community. By doing so, one is constantly reminded to cling more tenaciously to one‟s 
Malayness and to preserve “the ways of Malay” (“cara Melayu”) as one settles into a 
new country and culture.  
 
Pjoe‟s notion of diasporic gay male subjectivity also calls into question Eng, 
Halberstam, and Munőz‟s notion of queer diaspora which “emerges as a critical site 
providing new ways of contesting traditional family and kinship structures – of 
reorganizing national and transnational communities based not on origin, filiation, and 
genetics but on destination, affiliation, and the assumption of a common set of social 
practices or political commitments” (7; emphasis added). Obviously, Pjoe contradicts 
this notion of “queer diaspora” by defining what it means to be a diasporic queer 
subject in terms of “keluarga” (“filiation”) and “tanahair” (“origin”). This is probably 
due to the fact that Pjoe (and, perhaps, other Malaysian Malays who have settled in a 
country of residence) feels a strong sense of emotional attachment to his family and to 
his country in particular. Many Malaysian Malays living in diaspora whom I know 
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often express an ardent love for their country (and even harbour a strong desire to 
return home) through the Malay proverb (“peribahasa”) that goes: 
Hujan emas di negeri orang, hujan batu di negeri sendiri, lebih baik di 
negeri sendiri. 
 
[It rains gold in other countries, it rains stone in our country; our own 
country is still the best.] (translation mine) 
 
This proverb, which figures prominently in the Malay culture and in the lives of many 
Malays, instils loyalty and affection for the homeland (i.e. Malaysia) by simply 
reminding Malays living in Malaysia and elsewhere that their country (despite all its 
flaws) is a better place to live than any other country. Another possible explanation is 
that Pjoe must have spent his formative years living within the borders of Malaysia and, 
therefore, has developed feelings of love and affection towards his own country over 
time. More importantly, Pjoe must have been “taught” to show his devotion to, and to 
take pride in, his homeland. I use the word “taught” because both Malay and non-
Malay Malaysians were taught at a very young age to be proud of our country. I recall 
attending history classes, where my classmates and I not only learned that our country 
was blessed with natural wealth and resources, but were taught to show our gratitude to 
our forefathers who had fought for our independence from “penjajah” (“colonial 
rulers”) particularly the British colonizers. Furthermore, we were also taught to show 
great respect for our national leaders and national symbols, including „Bendera 
Malaysia” (“Malaysia‟ national flag) and “Lagu Negaraku” (“Malaysia‟s national 
anthem”). I can still remember how my friends (all of whom are Malay and non-Malay 
Malaysians) and I routinely showed our respect to “Bendera Malaysia” and pledged our 
allegiance to the country and to our King by singing “Lagu Negaraku.” As the song 
goes: 
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Negaraku, tanah darahku 
Rakyat hidup, bersatu dan maju 
Rahmat bahagia, tuhan kurniakan 
Raja kita, selamat bertakhta 
Rahmat bahagia, tuhan kurniakan 
Raja kita, selamat bertakhta. (“Lagu Kebangsaan”) 
 
[My country, my native land 
The people living united and progressive 
May God bestow blessings and happiness 
May our King have a successful reign 
May God bestow blessings and happiness 
May our King have a successful reign.] (trans. DiPiazza 69) 
 
The lyrics of the song have not only “fixed” in our minds the idea that Malaysia is our 
“birthplace” (“tanah tumpahnya darahku”), but have constantly reminded us that we 
must always be proud of “our country” (“negaraku”) because it is a stable, progressive, 
harmonious, and peaceful nation. The song lyrics may have also created a deep sense of 
national pride, as well as a sense of cultural longing and belonging in Pjoe and in the 
hearts of many Malaysians who left Malaysia and live in diaspora. This is probably true 
when Pjoe expresses a deep sense of cultural longing to identify with his homeland, to 
the extent that he clings more to his ethnic and national identities, rather than liberates 
his sexual identity in his country of settlement. But it is important to emphasize that 
national anthem, such as this one, is very much an invention because it is tied to the 
idea of an imagined community. Benedict Anderson, for instance, posits that the nation 
is an imagined community because “the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind 
of each lives the image of their communion.”(6) Furthermore, the nation, as Anderson 
asserts further, is “imagined as a community, because regardless of the actual inequality 
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and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradeship.” (7) Anderson‟s concept of the nation as an imagined 
community can be applied to understanding Malaysia‟s national anthem as an 
invention. This is because the national anthem is created based on the idea that 
Malaysians of all backgrounds (regardless whether some have never met each other 
before) are imagined as a “united” and “progressive” community, living together in a 
“peaceful” and “harmonious” nation.” I would like to argue very strongly that the 
national anthem is an imagined creation of the state simply because it cannot foster 
unity among, and instill a sense of pride in, all Malaysians. This is due to the fact that 
there is always a mismatch between what is idealised in the narrative of the national 
anthem (and the unity and pride it is supposed to instill) and the actual material 
conditions in the country (e.g. Malaysians‟ own experiences of being the nation‟s 
citizenry, the structure of governance and power). The rise in emigration out of 
Malaysia is indicative of this mismatch, where thousands of Malaysians migrated to 
different parts of the world for various reasons, including the attempt to escape from 
authoritarian and repressive structure of power and governance within the country. 
KoolMalay and, perhaps, other gay-identified men in diaspora have adopted migration 
as a feasible means of evading the law that prohibits them from living an openly gay 
life in the Muslim-majority Malaysia. Some (if not many) Malaysian who left Malaysia 
and settled in their country of residence claimed that they did not feel a strong sense of 
pride in their homeland. In an article, entitled “Stem the Tide of Migration Overseas,” a 
Malaysian writer who identifies himself online as “bapakmiki” contends that more than 
300,000 Malaysians migrated to countries such as Australia, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, U.S., and Canada in 2008 alone. Many Malaysians left their homeland 
because they have lost faith in Malaysia‟s political leaders who have failed to resolve 
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issues pertaining to race and religion, which have become deeply embedded in the 
multiethnic and multireligious Malaysian society. Some Malaysians who have 
emigrated to live and work abroad, as “bapakmiki” notes, claim that they feel 
“unwanted, unneeded, and unloved” by their own country, because they “have felt 
excluded from the mainstream way of life.”12 This is largely attributed to the fact that 
the Malay-dominated government continues to favour the Malays over the Chinese, 
Indians, and other ethnic minority groups in Malaysia. KoolMalay, however, reinforces 
Eng, Halberstam, and Munőz‟s concept of queer diaspora. This is especially true when 
KoolMalay specifically constructs a diasporic gay Malay identity based on a deep sense 
of belonging to the western gay community and to the U.S., which he has already 
regarded as his “home.” My whole point here is that, while queer diaspora does open 
up a space for challenging traditional kinship and familial structures, it would be more 
useful to view queer diaspora, particularly in the context of diasporic gay Malay 
identity-formation, as a site of contradiction and contradistinction. This is because 
there are various ways in which gay-identified Malay men living abroad identify 
themselves as “gay” and “Malay”: some diasporic gay Malay men may retain 
Malaysia‟s dominant notions of Malayness while others refigure these notions by 
creating new ways of being “Malay” in diaspora which cannot be conflated with being 
“Malay” in Malaysia. This illuminates what Gopinath, following Stuart Hall, describes 
as “the contradictions of sameness and difference [which] characterize competing 
definitions of diasporic (queer) subjectivity” (Impossible Desires 5; emphasis added). 
With this in mind, I would like to suggest that queer diaspora can be identified as a 
possible direction for futher research on queer Malay identities on the basis that 
queerness and diaspora provide new ways of thinking about “queer Malayness” and its 
diverse manifestations in multiple locations and settings. What does it mean to be 
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“queer” and “Malay” in Brunei, Singapore, and other countries of the Malay 
Archipelago? What does it mean to be “queer” and “Malay” in diasporic Malay 
communities in Sri Lanka and South Africa? In what ways do queer-identified Malays 
living beyond national territorial boundaries add further tension to the politics of 
Malaysian Malay identity creation? Alternatively, how can queer-identified Malays in 
the diaspora reinforce or challenge the fixity of the official designations of Malayness 
by formulating a diasporic queer Malay identity? More importantly, how do queer-
identified Malays who live outside the borders of Malaysia adhere to or radically 
reconfigure notions of “home,” “belonging,” and “citizenship”? In what ways does this 
call into question dominant narratives of nationalism, nationhood, and the nation as 
inscribed in Malaysia? 
 
Writing about the process of identity construction among queer-identified Malays has, I 
hope, broadened and deepen one‟s understanding of the complexities of being “queer” 
and “Malay” since “Malayness” continues to be configured through ethnic and 
religious terms, rather than through queer sexualities and desires. Writing about queer-
identified Malays‟ lived experiences and actual struggles in identifying and 
repositioning themselves as “queer” and “Malay,” on the other hand, has, I hope, 
engendered a better comprehension of the ramifications and complexities surrounding 
the formulation and articulation of a sexually dissident narrative of Malayness, 
particularly when “queerness” remains legally and religiously prohibited in modern-day 
Malaysia. The ways in which being “queer” is officially equated with being “un-
Malay” and “un-Islamic” have a deep resonance with my own struggles in identifying 
and realigning myself in relation to others and to the world. This is particularly true of 
the difficulties I personally experience in identifying myself as a sexually liberal, 
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university-educated, and secular middle class man in my Bidayuh ethnic community, 
which, like the Malay Muslim community, places immense emphasis on cultural, 
religious, and communal values, in addition to heteronormativity in formulating a 
culturally authoritative notion of “Bidayuh” identity. I have been called “nama jak 
Bidayuh” (“Bidayuh only in/by name”) and “Bidayuh murtad” (“no longer a Bidayuh”) 
for failing to adhere to and exemplify dominant conceptions of Bidayuh-ness simply 
because social class, sexuality, and educational background are important components 
in the process of my own ethnic self-identification. The same can be said of how same-
sex sexuality, along with other factors pertaining to subjectivity, play a significant role 
in the process of self-assertion and self-inscription among many “gay,” “lesbian,” 
“bisexual,” and “transgendered” Malays. What is interesting is that these queer-
identified Malay men and women continue to assert and establish identities marked by 
sexual difference, regardless of the ways in which they are constantly perceived to be 
“un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” by the dominant Malay Muslim community. Rather than 
conflating queer-identified Malays with being “un-Malay” and “un-Islamic” on the 
basis that same-sex sexuality and desire are intimately linked to “a world not Malay 
and not Islamic” (Ruzy and Nor Faridah 225), I have attempted to demonstrate in this 
thesis how queer-identified Malays rupture such a conflation by creating new and more 
nuanced ways of being “Malay,” “Muslim,” and “queer.” Many self-identified “gay,” 
“lesbian,” “bisexual,” and “transgendered” Malays as represented in the media and 
genres I examined constructed their identities based on same-sex desires and practices 
while simultaneously reasserting their cultural and religious heritages. Such nuanced 
ways of being “Malay,” “Muslim,” and “queer” disrupt the so-called “unique” and, at 
times, irreversible, equation between Malay and Muslim simply because to be “Malay,” 
as understood and experienced by many queer-identified Malays, cannot always be 
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defined as Muslims who must adhere to normative expectations of gender and 
sexuality. But I must admit that there remain many pertinent questions in relation to 
queerness and the process of queer Malay identity construction, which have not been 
fully explored in this study. This is not because these questions are unimportant or 
irrelevant, but because my project focused primarily on the various ways in which 
queer-identified Malays constructed their identities and the implications of asserting 
these identities in present-day Malaysia. I believe that these questions can be addressed 
more comprehensively in future studies on the queer Malays using qualitative research 
methods such as interviews (i.e. in-depth or focus-group types), questionnaires (i.e. 
open-ended or unrestricted types), surveys (i.e. telephone or online), and even seminars 
and workshops. Some of these questions include: In what ways does the formulation 
and expression of new and more nuanced ways of being “Malay,” “Muslim,” and 
“queer” help to resolve queer-identified Malays‟ struggles to reclaim social and 
political legitimacy in a world which remains heteronormative and, at times, 
homophobic? In what ways can the reassertions of ethnic, religious, and same-sex 
sexual identities help dissolve queer-identified Malays‟ struggles to identify and 
resituate themselves as “queer” and “Malay” in the dominantly heteronormative Malay 
Muslim community, in particular, and in Muslim-majority Malaysia, in general? In 
what ways can queer-identified Malays deconstruct and eliminate the stigma and social 
shame attached to same-sex sexualities, desires, and practices by self-identifying as 
“Malay,” “Muslim,” and “queer,” considering that many queer-identified Malays are 
often blamed for bringing shame and disgrace to “bangsa Melayu” and “umat Islam” as 
a result of engaging in the very sins of “kaum Lut/kaum Sodom”? It would be 
interesting to hear what queer-identified Malays have to say about their own 
experiences of being “queer” and “Malay,” particularly the various strategies that 
237 
 
queer-identified Malays employ in dealing with feelings of guilt and shame as a result 
of being “different,” and in resolving the tensions and conflicts which emanate from 
inhabiting and asserting a sexually dissident notion of Malay identity. 
  
One of the possible directions for future research on queer Malay identities which I 
have identified in this chapter is the formation of queer Malayness in multiple sites and 
locations. I have demonstrated how queerness and diaspora, when taken together, can 
be used as a viable lens for exploring and examining the creation of queer Malay 
identities in various social, cultural, political, and geographical settings. This, in my 
view, may provide new and interesting insights into the ways in which Malay identity 
is continually shaped by the actual lived experiences of queer-identified Malays living 
beyond the national borders of Malaysia. I would also like to suggest that more 
research needs to address how the internet can serve as a pivotal site for queer Malay 
identity creation. This is especially salient in the case of many queer-identified Malays 
(queer-identified Malay youths in particular) who configure multiple and fluid notions 
of being “queer” and “Malay” through various online communication tools and social 
software such as instant messaging, chatrooms, internet forums, blogs, social 
networking services, and video sharing websites. For instance, many young gay Malay 
men openly declare their sexuality online by posting their relationship statuses and 
photos of their lovers/partners on Facebook, Twitter, and other social networking 
websites. Moreover, some gay Malay men have also published their homemade erotic 
videos on gay video sharing websites such as Gaytube and XTube, while others write 
their personal reflections of being “gay” on Blogger, WordPress, and other online blog 
publishing services, regardless of the possibility of arrest if discovered or found out. 
What I find most interesting is that many young gay Malay men in “Komuniti Web 
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Gay Melayu” and “Komuniti Web Gay Melayu‟s” Facebook webpage have a strong 
tendency to use western nicknames and attach these nicknames to their birth names as a 
way of addressing themselves when communicating with others online. This, in my 
view, could be an interesting area for further research into the construction of young 
gay Malay men‟s notions of being “Malay” in an increasingly globalized world, where 
everyday lives continue to be affected by the global flow of information, knowledge, 
and culture. The internet, then, is indeed a powerful tool, which not only provides a 
wealth of valuable information about the formation of queer Malay identities in the 
virtual sphere, but offers advantageous opportunities for queer-identified Malays to 
gain more visibility and presence online. 
  
With this in mind, it is possible to say that the events surrounding Azwan Ismail‟s 
public admission of his sexuality does not necessarily signal an end to queerness and 
queer lives in non-western indigenous contexts. These events, I believe, mark an 
important juncture in the politics of queer Malay identity construction, where queer-
identified Malays in Malaysia and beyond must now find new ways and alternative 
mediums through which to assert “queerness” (as a sexual identity, a strategy of 
resistance, and a mode of liberation) in challenging the state‟s mechanisms of control 
and surveillance over queer sexualities and in disrupting all forms of fixity and 
normativity pertaining to race, ethnicity, religion, culture, identity, subjectivity, gender, 
and sexuality. I hope that my thesis has laid the groundwork for future research into 
this exciting and challenging task. 
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Notes
                                                 
1 See Dan Savage‟s “It Gets Better Project” website at <http://www. itgetsbetter. org/pages/about-it-gets-
better-project/>. Daniel Keenan Savage is an American author, editor, and journalist who started the “It 
Gets Better” video project as a response to Billy Lucas‟ suicide – a 15 year old high school freshman 
who took his own life as a result of homophobic bullying. The project encourages LBGT adults and the 
general public to create and post positive and inspiring video messages on YouTube as a way of telling 
LGBT teens that life will get better after bullying in high school.  
2 See Seksualiti Merdeka‟s website at <http://www.seksualitimerdeka.org/>. 
3 See the article, entitled “An Interview: Malaysian Gay Man Get Threats,” which was taken from The 
Associated Press at <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/2010122/ap_on_re_as/as_malaysia_gay_  
confession> .  
4 I say this because there is already a growing body of work by scholars who have investigated specific 
and complex productions of gay male identity outside the western (i.e. Euro-American) domain. 
Foremost among these scholars are Dennis Altman, Gerard Sullivan, Peter Jackson, Tom Boellstroff, and 
William Leap. 
5 Each of the thirteen states in Malaysia has its own religious council (“Majlis Agama Islam”), which is 
headed by a “mufti” (“the chief religious official”). Under the provision of Malaysia‟s Shariah law, all 
“muftis” are vested with the authority and responsibility to issue “fatwas” (“religious rulings”) on 
matters concerning the lives of Muslims in their respective states. As Helen Ting writes, “the state 
religious authorities have been endowed with wider-ranging power over their respective Muslim 
communities. Section 36(1) of the 1993 Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories Acts) 
provides the mufti, the top state religious official, the sole authority to amend, modify or revoke fatwa 
issued either by him or any previous fatwa.  More significantly, in some of the states, the fatwa of the 
mufti was rendered automatically binding and legally enforceable on the people, contrary to the 
traditionally advisory nature of a fatwa in Muslim societies. This power, given under the provisions of 
Syariah Criminal Offences Act/Enactment, effectively rendered the mufti a legislator parallel to the state 
assembly...” (84-85). For instance, the Mufti of Perak has recently issued a fatwa banning the Indonesian 
“poco poco” dance on the basis that it carries with it elements of Christianity and soul worshipping 
which are considered “haram” in Islam See the article on “Perak to adhere to fatwa banning “Poco-Poco” 
dance at <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/3/30/nation/20110330213627&sec=nation> 
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Because of the decentralised nature of Islamic administration in Malaysia, state religious authorities have 
the power to enact and administer different Islamic laws which govern both the public and private lives 
of Muslims living in these states. The Shariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997, which 
I‟ve referred to in this study, applies only to the offences committed by Muslims who reside in the 
Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan. The hudud-based Syariah Criminal Code (II) 
Enactment 1993, on the other hand, applies only to Muslims in the Malaysian state of Kelantan. Muslims 
in a state that has long been governed by the Malay opposition party PAS (Partai Islam Se-Malaysia), are 
liable to death penalty, stoning to death, amputation of the limbs, and/or whipping if found guilty for 
theft, adultery, fornication, drinking, and apostasy under this Shariah law (Hassan 133). 
6 For more discussion of the terms “liwat,” “mushaqah,” “zina,” “khalwat,” and “sumbang mahram,” see 
the Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 document at 
<http://www.mylawyer.com.my/pdf/Syariah_Criminal_Offences_Federal _Territories_Act.pdf>, 
especially pp. 15-17. 
7 See the article, entitled “IGP: No Compromise on Graft,” on Malaysia Today‟s website at 
<http://mt.m2day.org /2008/content/view/5210/>. for the discussion of Tan Sri Musa Hassan‟s 
contention that that no one in Malaysia is above the law and this includes some of his officers who must 
be punished according to law for their involvement in corruption and abuse of power.  
8 I genuinely believe that this sense of self-awareness and self-empowerment is necessary for queer-
identified Malays to make radical changes in their lives. This begins by embracing one‟s sexual identity 
and taking it a bit further by having the courage to identify publicly as “queer.” Azwan has certainly 
paved the way for queer-identified Malay and non-Malay Malaysians to do so through his video project 
which is the first step in defying juridical, cultural, and religious sanctions against queer sexuality 
locally. But the major obstacle to challenging these sanctions and enacting significant changes in the 
lives of queer indigenous people lies in the fact that not all queer-identified Malays responded positively 
to Azwan‟s “heroic” attempt at advancing the notion that it is okay to be gay in Malaysia. Some of my 
self-identified gay Malay friends have expressed strong concerns about how Azwan‟s public admission 
of his sexuality may affect their own lives.  My gay Malay friends claimed that Azwan should have not 
disclosed his sexual identity and encouraged others to follow suit simply because “ini Malaysia bukan 
America” (“this is Malaysia not America”). Many gay Malay men believed that as Malays and 
Malaysians, they must uphold cultural and religious values and beliefs that permeate and shape the 
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Malay community, in particular, and the Malaysian society, in general. This explains why many Malay 
gay men (including my gay Malay friends) agreed that it would be best to stay low key and keep their 
sexuality hidden, rather than getting into trouble with the law.  
9 See the article, entitled “Gay man fears for his life after exposing his sexuality on the Net,” on The Star 
newspaper website at <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file= /2010/ 12/23/nation /7670758 
&sec=nation>. 
10 See David L. Eng‟s article, entitled “Out Here and Over There: Queerness and Diaspora in Asian 
American Studies,” especially on p.33 for his discussion of the ways in which the process of Asian 
American identity-formation is constantly inflected and affected by the recent global capital flows and 
the movements of migrant workers. 
11 The term “anak perantau” reminds me of the song “Anak Dagang” (“trader” or “migrant”) sung by the 
late Malaysian Malay singer and songwriter, Dato‟ Sudirman Haji Arshad, which not only captures the 
emotion of what it feels like being away from home, but explains the importance of guarding one‟s 
tradition and cultural identity abroad. As the song goes: “Anak dagang di rantau orang, biar pandai 
membawa diri/ Jaga tutur kata, jaga cermat peribahasa/ Selalu berbudi tinggi, biar merendah/ Kata orang 
jangan di bantah, fikir dahulu sebelum berkata” [Migrants in foreign countries, carry yourself well/ 
Watch what you say, watch your manners/ Always be kind, be humble/ Don‟t disagree with others, think 
carefully before you speak] (translation mine). It would be interesting to find out what Pjoe and other gay 
Malay men in diaspora have to say about their notions of self and identity. This is simply because I 
believe that only Pjoe and gay Malay men who have moved across national borders and settled in foreign 
countries can explain how they specifically construct their identities through/based on the actual lived 
experiences of being “queer” and “Malay” abroad.  It would be fascinating to see the similarities and 
differences between the experiences of being “queer” and “Malay” within and outside of Malaysia‟s 
territorial boundaries. Such commonalities and dissonances may provide useful insights into the 
complexity of queer Malay identity-formation. 
12 See bapakmiki‟s article on The Borneo Post‟s website at <http://www.theborneopost.com/?p=3158>. 
for his discussion of the sense of affection for one‟s country, particularly among Malaysians who have 
emigrated to foreign countries. 
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